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STUDY
Domestic Advisory Groups 
(DAGs) have been established 
and meet regularly at EU level 
and in most of the EU’s trad-
ing partner countries.
However, insufficient infor-
mation-sharing and a lack of 
interest and interaction on 
the part of governments and 
the European Commission 
hamper the DAGs’ work.
Governments’ and the Euro-
pean Commission’s limited 
accountability also constrains 
the potential leverage of the 
DAGs’ work.
Due to a lack of enforcement 
tools, the DAGs’ impact on 
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The Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES) takes a stand for rule-
based trade policies on a global level that shape globalisa-
tion, respect sustainability and allow for a fair development. 
The FES division for international development cooperation 
has been working on the question how sustainability as-
pects can be effectively embedded within the framework 
of EU trade policy.  
Sustainability chapters of recent EU trade agreements 
have been analysed and reviewed in terms of feasibility. 
They contain provisions on aspects of social and ecological 
sustainability and refer to the observation of international 
environmental standards such as the Paris Agreement or 
guarantees for the protection of labour rights by reference 
to existing ILO conventions. Sustainability chapters of all 
agreements signed since 2011 require trade partners to 
set up civil society advisory bodies, so-called Domestic Ad-
visory Groups (DAG), so that adherence to these standards 
are not supervised in inter-governmental consultations on-
ly. The DAGs are supposed to keep in mind aspects of 
sustainability and monitor the implementation of agreed 
standards. 
The approach of the Trade Directorate of the European 
Commission to involve civil society players on an institutional 
level is an important step in the right direction. It takes ac-
count of a pluralistic political understanding and invites to a 
permanent exchange of decision-makers and civil society 
players to monitor the efficiency of political measures. This 
could be a possible model to overcome the often-criticised 
lack of democracy in the EU’s decision-making processes. 
On the other hand, there is a risk of increasing distrust if this 
turns out to be merely a tool for pseudo-participation.
There are nine EU agreements containing sustainability 
chapters (the most recent agreement with Vietnam being 
the tenth one) and there are more than 20 DAGs world-
wide. The FES is a member of the EU-DAGs linked to the 
Andean countries (Columbia, Peru, Ecuador), South Korea 
and Ukraine. Through our international network of offices, 
we maintain close contacts to DAGs of partner countries, 
too. In this way, we have gained many insights and experi-
ences on the operating principle and the efficiency of 
DAGs inside and outside the EU. 
The present study is a comprehensive evaluation of the 
DAGs’ work so far around the globe. We are very pleased 
to have been able to win over a team of researchers head-
ed by Prof. Dr. Jan Orbie, Dr. Deborah Martens and Diana 
Potjomkina from the Ghent University to cooperate in this 
evaluation. 
Below you find the independent analysis of the researchers 
on behalf of the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. 
We heartily thank the team from the Ghent University for 
this comprehensive and valuable study. It will be an impor-
tant contribution to the debate on the feasibility and sus-
tainability of European trade policies as well as the role of 
DAGs as civil society counselling bodies. 
November 2020
Alexander Geiger
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Executive Summary
Level Purpose Role Question Criteria




Forum Can they talk? -  Horizontal and vertical exchange
-  Independent, representative and balanced
-  Genuine dialogue
Medium Monitoring Watchdog Can they oversee? - Evaluation capacity
-  Accountability contracting parties
High Policy impact Policy-maker Can they influence? - Involved in decisions
-  Triggering dispute mechanism
Since the EU–Korea trade agreement in 2011, all chapters 
on trade and sustainable development (TSD) establish civil 
society mechanisms to monitor the commitments made in 
this chapter: a domestic advisory group (DAG) for each 
party and an annual transnational civil society meeting. 
The former is a membership-based closed mechanism, 
while the latter is not member-based and therefore more 
open and less structured than the DAGs.
In this report, we focus on DAGs, the most institutionalised 
and permanent civil society bodies under the TSD chapters. 
The objective of this study is to conduct a comprehensive 
evaluation of DAGs, identify their main challenges, distin-
guish teething problems from structural issues and put for-
ward solutions to address them. Original data collection 
was carried out through a survey, to which 50 EU and 74 
Non-EU DAG members responded, and 18 interviews with 
EU and Non-EU DAG members.
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
Evaluating DAGs is not as straightforward as it might seem 
at first glance. A key problem is that we lack clear criteria. 
We therefore developed an analytical framework that can 
be used pragmatically to evaluate DAGs. This ›ladder of in-
clusiveness‹ combines two dimensions. First, it indicates 
that inclusiveness is a matter of gradation. Second, it cap-
tures several kinds of participation. Depending on what is 
considered the main purpose of the civil society meetings, 
different types of inclusiveness might be pursued. This re-
sults in four steps or rungs of the ladder: instrumental pur-
pose, information sharing, monitoring and policy impact.
CAN THEY MEET? 
 – Yes, in principle most of DAGs can hold meetings. 
 – Nevertheless, there is still room for improvement, 
especially in Non-EU DAGs. The main organisational 
issues include the frequency and timely notification  
of meetings, support of a secretariat, and funding.
 – Moreover, logistical issues still take up large parts of 
the meetings, at the expense of substantive 
discussions.
 – DAGs are not considered to be merely a tool for 
legitimising trade agreements. Given their multiple 
weaknesses, however, there remains a risk that they 















There is sufficient interaction between the European Commission / own government and the DAG







Satisfaction with the impact of the DAGs







CAN THEY TALK? 
 – Overall, the essential ingredients for dialogue are 
present. 
 – Horizontal information exchange between civil 
society has been established. There is, however, a 
need for more genuine dialogue and a better defined 
work programme. Mainly in Non-EU DAGs, important 
tensions exist between business and non-business 
representatives.
 – Vertical information exchange between civil society 
and governments is evaluated less positively. The 
latter do not share sufficient information on the 
implementation of trade agreements and there is 
insufficient interaction between the governments  
and DAGs. Non-EU DAG respondents are more vocal 
about these issues than their EU DAG colleagues.
 – The impact of a given trade agreement on sustainable 
development is discussed during DAG meetings. 
Labour issues are generally high on the agenda. 
EU DAGs in particular often address compliance  
with labour rights in partner countries.
CAN THEY OVERSEE? 
 – Monitoring is the most aspired-to purpose of the 
respondents, mirroring the European Commission’s 
discourse. It has not fully materialised, however.
 – This mismatch is due to, first, insufficient resources for 
DAG members to conduct research.
 – Second, governments’ limited accountability 
constrains DAGs in playing their monitoring role. 
There is no feedback loop between DAGs and their 
governments, and governments do not sufficiently 
follow up on DAGs’ input. 
 – This accountability deficit also occurs at transnational 
level. Nevertheless, Non-EU DAGs appreciate the 
potential leverage enabled by the European 
Commission and EU DAGs.
CAN THEY INFLUENCE? 
 – The DAGs’ influence is very limited. This is a major 
source of dissatisfaction for their members.
 – Little impact is ascribed to DAG members because 
they are not actively involved in decision-making  
and governments do not act upon DAGs’ 
recommendations.
 – In addition, impact is limited because of the 
non-enforceability of TSD chapters and impossibility 
for DAGs to directly trigger disputes. 
 – Views on the enforceability of sustainable 
development commitments tend to be polarised.
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CONCLUSIONS
Even though some DAGs still face organisational issues, 
the main challenges start at the second step, because of 
the lack of genuine dialogue between DAG members and 
between DAGs and governments. This culminates in the 
accountability deficit which undermines civil society efforts 
to monitor adequately, which, in its turn, leads to a very 
limited policy impact. 
As a result of this dynamic DAGs have to date achieved 
little political relevance, which is a source of frustration for 
their members. It is therefore crucial for all actors involved 
that actions be taken to address these bottlenecks. While 
practical or organisation tweaks are necessary, they are in 
themselves insufficient. In particular a mentality shift on 
the part of policy-makers to take DAGs and their work 
more seriously and to increase DAGs’ political relevance is 
much needed. Otherwise there is a risk that DAGs will get 
stuck (if this is not already the case) in a negative feedback 
loop, entailing that no progress is made, and the interest 
and commitment of civil society may be eroded. In other 
words, much effort is being made to move up the ladder, 
but if participants feel it is impossible to climb further, 
DAGs risk losing meaning and the ladder might tip over. 
This would, in turn, contribute to the already vocal criticism 
of the EU’s trade policy.
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INTRODUCTION
All new-generation EU trade agreements since the EU–Korea 
trade agreement in 2011 contain a chapter on trade and 
sustainable development (TSD), which refers to labour and 
environmental standards that should be respected by the 
parties. The TSD chapters may be said to perform several 
functions: they serve to signal the EU’s commitment to sus-
tainable development, respond to societal criticism that 
trade policy is conducted undemocratically and unsustain-
ably, and are supposed to prevent a ›race to the bottom‹ in 
labour and environmental standards, which could lead to 
unfair competition for EU-based producers. The TSD chap-
ter establishes civil society mechanisms to follow up on, 
give advice about and monitor the commitments made in 
this chapter: a domestic advisory group (DAG) for each 
party and an annual transnational civil society meeting. 
The former is a membership-based closed mechanism, 
while the latter is not member-based and therefore more 
open and less structured than the DAGs.
In this report, we focus on DAGs, the most institutionalised 
and permanent civil society bodies under the TSD chapters. 
Since the first DAG meeting in 2012, numerous others have 
taken place in the context of a growing number of trade 
agreements and both the governments and civil society or-
ganisations involved have learned by doing, shaping this 
novelty along the way. The DAGs have been criticised for 
not being effective and often the counter-argument that ›it 
was still too soon to tell‹ was advanced. 
Now that the DAGs have been around for more than eight 
years it is time to take stock of how they have developed in 
and outside the EU, and what they have achieved, and to 
distinguish teething problems from structural issues. The 
objective of this study is therefore to conduct a thorough 
evaluation of the DAGs, to identify their main challenges 
and to put forward solutions to address them. For this pur-
pose, original data was collected through a survey, to 
which 50 EU and 74 Non-EU DAG members responded, 
and 18 interviews with EU and Non-EU DAG members.
In what follows, we will first elaborate the research ap-
proach, then introduce the DAGs and the analytical frame-
work. The subsequent section contains the body of this 
study, namely the evaluation of DAGs in accordance with 
the analytical framework, the ›ladder of inclusiveness‹. 
Based on this comprehensive evaluation, conclusions and 
policy recommendations are then formulated. The annex 
presents more in-depth case studies, as well as the survey 
questionnaire. 
1.1 RESEARCH APPROACH 
This report relies primarily on new data collected for this 
study based on a mixed-methods research design; more 
concretely, this involves combining surveys and case stud-
ies. The survey, sent to all current EU and Non-EU DAG 
members, enabled a broad evaluation of the DAGs by their 
members. In addition, three case studies were conducted 
to create a deeper understanding of the DAGs. Each pillar 
of the research design is described in more detail below.
The survey builds on a previous survey conducted by the 
authors with EU DAG members in 2016 and 2018. The 
original questionnaire has been elaborated in collaboration 
with FES and the new version contains questions on the 
functioning, perceived purpose, content, monitoring and 
impact of DAGs (see Annex for the full questionnaire). Al-
though the questions are essentially identical, a separate 
survey was sent to EU and to Non-EU DAGs in order to 
keep the wording of the questions simple and to facilitate 
analysis. The survey was anonymous, which meant that no 
personal data or other identifying information was collect-
ed and that the answers cannot be associated with the 
respondent.
For both surveys, the entire population, so all current EU 
and Non-EU members, was invited to participate. In the 
analysis of the results, we also included the surveys that 
were only partly completed, as they contain valuable data. 
The survey data was collected in June and July 2020.
For the EU DAGs this includes the DAGs with the EU trade 
agreements with Canada, Central America, Colombia / 
Peru / Ecuador, Georgia, Japan, Moldova, South Korea and 
Ukraine. A total of 94 personal invitations were sent, 
43 surveys were entirely completed and seven partly filled 
in, resulting in 50 answers or a response rate of 53 per 
cent. Table 1, gives a more detailed account of the EU DAGs 
respondents. There are also DAG members that belong to 
more than one EU DAG. In that case, the respondent was 
invited to select one trade agreement and to answer the 
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For the Non-EU DAGs the analysis includes the DAGs of 
Canada (environmental and labour DAG), Colombia, Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Ecuador, Georgia, Guatemala, Moldova, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Peru (official and shadow DAG), South 
Korea and Ukraine.1 For some Non-EU DAGs (notably the 
official Peruvian DAG, Honduras and Nicaragua) only very 
limited or even no information was available on DAG mem-
1 At the time of the survey the Japanese DAG was still in the process 
of being established.
bership and members’ contact details, affecting the re-
sponse from these countries. In total, 190 personal invitations 
were sent. Some 63 surveys were completed fully and 11 
were only partly filled in, resulting in 74 answers or a re-
sponse rate of 39 per cent. Table 2 gives a more detailed 
account of the Non-EU DAGs respondents.
Table 1
EU DAG respondents by group and trade agreement
Business  
associations





etc.) Other Total per DAG
Andean Community (excl. Bolivia) 1 2 3 6
Canada 3 3 4 10
Central America 1 5 3 9
Georgia 1 1 1 1 4
Japan 2 3 1 6
Moldova 2 2
South Korea 3 4 2 1 10
Ukraine 1 1 2
Unknown 1 1
Total per group (%) 12 (24 %) 21 (42 %) 15 (30 %) 2 (4 %) 50 (100%)
Table 2




trade unions NGOs Government Other
Total per  
country
Canada 1 2 3 2 8
Colombia 1 3 2 6
Costa Rica 2 1 3 1 7
Ecuador 4 3 1 8
El Salvador 1 1 2
Georgia 1 2 6 9
Guatemala 2 2 1 5
Honduras 1 1 2
South Korea 1 1 2 4 8
Moldova 1 3 3 7
Nicaragua /
Panama /
Peru official 1 1
Peru shadow 2 5 1 8
Ukraine 1 1 1 3
Total per group (%) 9 (12%) 21 (28%) 32 (43%) 1 (1%) 11 (15%) 74 (100%)
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When analysing the data we did not differentiate between 
agreements, as the number of responses per agreement 
are too small to allow for generalisations or comparisons. 
We did compare different constituencies, especially be-
tween business and non-business respondents (labour /
trade unions and NGOs, excluding the ›other‹ and govern-
ment category). Nevertheless, these comparisons need to 
be approached with caution, as the number of observa-
tions for business respondents is small. For all percentages 
mentioned in the report, we include the ratio in absolute 
numbers to be fully transparent. Blanks and ›don’t know‹ 
answers were excluded from the analysis.
The three case studies are the EU trade agreements with 
Georgia, Peru and South Korea. These vary in terms of 
years of existence, geography and economic relevance of 
the trade agreement, as well as level of civil society involve-
ment in the provisions of the trade agreements. For each 
case study, virtual interviews were conducted with EU and 
Non-EU DAG members. In all cases, interviews were car-
ried out with a representative of each group in each DAG. 
If this was not possible, other DAG members were contact-
ed. In total, 18 interviews were conducted, six per EU 
trade agreement, in June and July 2020. For reasons of 
anonymity, the list of interviewees is not shared. They are 
identified as EU or Non-EU respondents and numbered 
chronologically (for example, EU1 and NEU1). The inter-
views were complemented with previous field research 
and existing literature. 
1.2 THE ABC OF DAGS
Domestic advisory groups were introduced in the Europe-
an Union’s ›new-generation‹ free trade agreements, start-
ing with the EU–Korea agreement that was provisionally 
applied in 2011. So far, DAGs have been established under 
agreements with the Andean Community (Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru), Canada, Central America (Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama), 
Georgia, Japan, Korea, Moldova and Ukraine. 
The DAGs are civil society mechanisms intended to monitor 
the implementation of the chapters on trade and sustaina-
ble development. TSD chapters came into existence as part 
of the European Commission’s ›value-based trade agenda‹2 
in response to the broader societal debate, both in the EU 
and abroad, about the negative ramifications of free trade. 
Unlike other parts of the agreements, they rely on dialogue 
between civil societies and governments and on a soft dis-
pute settlement mechanism that does not provide for 
sanctions. The purpose of the TSD chapters is to safeguard 
labour rights and environmental standards, alleviating 
fears about a ›race to the bottom‹ – in which parties may 
attempt to lower sustainable development protection to 
maximise their competitiveness – as well as reasserting the 
EU’s commitment to values and sustainability. 
Along with the member-based DAGs, TSD chapters also 
foresee annual transnational civil society forums, which are 
more open and in most cases involve both DAGs and other 
2 Commission Services. 2017. ›Non-Paper of the Commission Ser-
vices: Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) Chapters in EU 
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs).‹ Available at: https://trade.ec.eu-
ropa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/july/tradoc_155686.pdf.
Figure 1
Institutional set-up of TSD chapters
Party A
Intergovernmental body 
on Trade and Sustainable 
Development 
governmental
5. Bi-regional civil society 
meeting + Intergov. body
all stakeholders + governmental
1. Domestic Advisory Group
Environmental, economic & 
social civil society stakeholders
1. Domestic Advisory Group
Environmental, economic & 
social civil society stakeholders
4. Bi-regional civil society 
meeting
all stakeholders

























Source: Orbie, J., et al. (2016). Civil Society Meetings in European Union trade agreements: Features, purposes, and evaluation. The Hague, Centre for the Law of EU External Relations.
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civil society representatives. Nonetheless, DAGs remain the 
most permanent and institutionalised bodies under the TSD 
chapters. While joint meetings exclusively between parties’ 
DAGs (DAG-to-DAG meetings) are not foreseen in the agree-
ments (except in the case of Korea), they have become a 
stable practice and usually take place once a year in advance 
of the open transnational meeting (see Figure 1 for an over-
view of the institutional structure of the TSD chapters). 
The membership of a DAG is supposed to be balanced 
between independent and representative business asso-
ciations, trade unions and (environmental)3 non-govern-
mental organisations (NGOs), reflecting the three pillars 
of sustainable development – social, economic and envi-
ronmental4 – and also mirroring the structure of the Euro-
pean Economic and Social Committee (EESC). In practice, 
some DAGs (or equivalent national bodies) also include 
representatives of human rights and other organisations, 
academics and even government representatives. Three 
members of each EU DAG, one per constituency, are del-
egated by the EESC and the rest are recruited by the Eu-
ropean Commission; in partner countries, procedures 
differ widely. 
Outputs of the DAGs can include letters, opinions, reports, 
studies and other documents. In practice, the most visible 
output comprises the joint declarations of the DAG-to-
DAG meetings, which are shared with the intergovernmen-
tal board and published on the website of the EESC (which 
serves as the secretariat for the EU DAGs). 
3 All EU FTAs, except for the EU trade agreement with Ukraine, refer 
explicitly to environmental stakeholders or organisations. Neverthe-
less, in practice this group also includes NGOs working on other to-
pics such as human rights or development (see below).
4 Purvis, Ben, Yong Mao, and Darren Robinson. 2019. ›Three Pil-
lars of Sustainability: In Search of Conceptual Origins.‹ Sustainabi-
lity Science 14 (3): 681–95. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1007/
s11625-018-0627-5.
While all TSD chapters to date have followed a similar blue-
print, specific provisions establishing DAGs vary.5 For in-
stance, while most agreements stipulate that DAG members 
should be independent, this is not the case as regards the 
Peru-Colombia-Ecuador free trade agreement (FTA). In addi-
tion, this FTA and the one with Central America also foresee 
that existing domestic mechanisms can be used as DAGs. 
Some of the agreements provide for DAGs to take part in 
the transnational civil society meeting, while others are less 
specific. There are also differing provisions on interaction 
between the DAGs and the parties (either all parties or the 
national one), and the transnational mechanisms or meet-
ings and the parties. In some cases, civil society entities are 
explicitly allowed to submit views or recommendations to 
governments, and the EU–Canada agreement even man-
dates that both sides respond to each other. Finally, in what 
concerns dispute settlement, different provisions exist on 
whether DAGs may proactively submit recommendations, or 
be asked to do so, and whether they will be informed of the 
results or even monitor the implementation of the panel of 
experts’ report. In the Korean case, parties can request con-
sultations on the basis of DAGs’ communications. Overall, 
this leads to a broad variation between the agreements and 
different levels of civil society involvement in practice.
The activity of the DAGs differs depending on the agree-
ment. On the EU side, the average frequency of meetings 
varies from zero to four meetings per year (see Table 3). 
Information concerning the EU DAG is centralised in the 
EESC. Similar information for Non-EU DAG meetings is not 
publicly available.
5 Martens, Deborah, Lore Van Den Putte, Myriam Oehri, and Jan Or-
bie. 2018. ›Mapping Variation of Civil Society Involvement in EU 
Trade Agreements: A CSI Index.‹ European Foreign Affairs Review 
23 (1): 41–62.
Source: EESC Members‘ portal, https://memportal.eesc.europa.eu/Meeting/CommitteeAgenda; secondary source: EESC Document Search, https://dmsearch.eesc.europa.eu/search/public.
Table 3
Number of DAG meetings on the EU side (excluding DAG-to-DAG meetings with partners)





Canada       2 3 1 6 2,00
Central America   2 4 3 4 3 3 1 20 2,86
Colombia-Peru-Ecuador    2 2 3 3 2 1 13 2,17
Georgia     2  1 1 1 5 1,00
Korea 2 3 2 2 3 3 2 2 1 20 2,22
Moldova    1 1 1 1 1  5 0,83
Ukraine     1 1 3 2 1 8 1,60
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In recent years, the debate about reforming TSD chapters 
and DAGs in particular has intensified. In 2017 and 2018, 
Commission services published two non-papers on the 
TSD chapters. The EESC, the European Parliament, civil so-
ciety, academics and some EU member countries have 
made further contributions to the debate. While the 2018 
non-paper contains a list of 15 actions intended to 
strengthen the TSD provisions – including an extension of 
DAGs’ monitoring mandate to the entire FTA6 – further re-
forms are possible as the debate continues. 
1.3 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK:  
›CLIMBING THE LADDER?‹
Evaluating the DAGs is not as straightforward as it might 
seem at first glance. A key problem for any assessment of 
the civil society meetings is that we lack clear criteria. Much 
confusion about the (ir)relevance of the DAGs in European 
trade policy-making revolves around the lack of clarity 
about benchmarks for measuring success. 
We have therefore developed an analytical framework that 
can be used pragmatically to evaluate the DAGs. This ›lad-
der of inclusiveness‹ combines two dimensions. First, it de-
notes that inclusiveness is a matter of gradation. It is 
commonly accepted among all stakeholders that inclusive-
ness is not a yes-or-no issue and that there are different 
degrees. Second, it captures the existence of several kinds 
of participation. Depending on what is considered the 
main purpose of the civil society meetings, different types 
of inclusiveness might be pursued.
This results in four steps or rungs of the ladder, which will 
be briefly explained below. 
6 Commission Services. 2018. ›Non Paper of the Commission Ser-
vices. Feedback and Way Forward on Improving the Implemen-
tation and Enforcement of Trade and Sustainable Development 
















Summary of the ›ladder of inclusiveness‹
Level Purpose Role Question Criteria




Forum Can they talk? -  Horizontal and vertical exchange
-  Independent, representative and balanced
-  Genuine dialogue
Medium Monitoring Watchdog Can they oversee? - Evaluation capacity
-  Accountability contracting parties
High Policy impact Policy-maker Can they influence? - Involved in decisions
-  Triggering dispute mechanism
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1  INSTRUMENTAL: CAN THEY MEET?
First, the instrumental step implies that DAGs are organ-
ised because this is required under the trade agreement; 
more specifically, by the commitments in the TSD chapter. 
Policy-makers’ main commitment is a logistical one, name-
ly to make sure that meetings are organised. This may in-
volve the assignment of organisational tasks to a secretariat 
or another body that guarantees that participants are invit-
ed and meeting facilities are available. 
At this level, inclusiveness is a formality. Meetings are un-
likely to produce meaningful results. Instead, they might 
serve merely to legitimise the free trade agreement. Hence 
the purpose is a rather cynical one: civil society dialogues 
are introduced in trade agreements in order to create 
goodwill and to ensure ratification. By accepting the invita-
tion, civil society members risk being co-opted and there-
fore less critical – the so-called ›participation trap‹. 
The logistical level is a necessary one, however, not always 
self-evident, especially outside the EU. Moreover, once 
meetings are starting to take place, they might entail more 
far-reaching forms of interaction that were not originally 
intended by the contracting parties. Hence, they might be 
stepping-stones for the next rungs on the ladder.
2  INFORMATION SHARING:  
CAN THEY TALK?
Second, the information-sharing step involves more sub-
stantive discussion of the implementation of the FTA and 
its impact on sustainable development. Participants share 
their expertise and broaden their networks. Information 
sharing can be ›horizontal‹, between the civil society mem-
bers of the DAG, or ›vertical‹, between the DAG members 
and their respective governments (the European Commis-
sion and partner-country government). Information shar-
ing could also extend to other DAGs and civil society 
groups (horizontally) and to the intergovernmental com-
mittee that deals with trade and sustainable development 
(vertically). 
The basic requirements are that civil society members be 
independent from government; that they be representative 
of their constituencies (for example, labour, business and 
environment); and that they be represented in a balanced 
way within the DAG. When these conditions are fulfilled, 
information sharing can turn into a real dialogue and 
therefore to a better understanding of the different posi-
tions relating to trade and sustainable development. Such 
›deliberation‹ may even make it possible to reach a consen-
sus and eventually to enhance the empowerment of mem-
bers that would otherwise be marginalised. 
Although there is more emphasis on having substantive 
discussions than on any possible outputs, adequate infor-
mation sharing is necessary in order to be able to play the 
watchdog role.
3  MONITORING: CAN THEY OVERSEE?
Third, monitoring means that civil society is able to oversee 
the sustainability dimension of trade. Knowledge and exper-
tise are key resources for enabling civil society to become an 
independent ›watchdog‹ that provides detailed opinions 
and critically evaluates policy decisions. In contrast to the 
previous purpose, monitoring entails a concrete output, 
namely policy evaluation. Output can be shared with policy- 
makers (vertically) or disseminated (horizontally) through 
traditional or social media and member outreach.
Accountability of the contracting parties is key at this 
stage. While the parties do not necessarily need to endorse 
the input from the DAG, they do take the recommenda-
tions seriously by engaging with their content and formu-
lating feedback; they may also proactively contact the 
DAGs for advice on trade and sustainable development is-
sues. Ideally, there are clear procedures on such interac-
tions between civil society and the parties.
Monitoring is often highlighted by the European Commis-
sion as being the primary objective of the DAGs. Although 
DAG evaluations are advisory and not enforceable, they 
may help to hold policy-makers accountable and potential-
ly induce policy changes. 
4  POLICY IMPACT: CAN THEY INFLUENCE?
Fourth, policy impact entails that decision-makers actively in-
volve civil society in decision-making. Hence the latter has a 
direct influence in decisions related to the implementation of 
the sustainable development chapter of the trade agreement. 
This may involve, for instance, the triggering of the dispute 
settlement mechanism. Policy impact may also result from a 
combination of the previous steps, for example when DAG 
evaluations successfully pressurise one of the parties to 
change or implement certain policies. Policy impact involves 
tangible results through legal or institutional changes (inter-
mediate impact) and possibly through compliance with the 
sustainable development commitments (ultimate impact).
A PRAGMATIC FRAMEWORK
This framework provides a pragmatic tool for the system-
atic examination of the DAGs’ role. The metaphor of the 
ladder denotes, first, that the lower steps need to be tak-
en before one can move up to higher levels, and second, 
that each rung represents a distinct type of inclusiveness. 
The ladder depicts how increasing inclusiveness is related 
to the growing power of civil society. The ladder does not 
necessarily imply any normative preference, however. A 
lower or higher degree and a different kind of inclusive-
ness is not automatically better or worse. While few 
would dispute that the bottom rung needs to be exceed-
ed, this study will show that there are different views 
among stakeholders on whether information sharing, 
monitoring or policy impact constitute the desirable levels 
to be achieved. 
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2.1 CAN THEY MEET? 
A1  Worldwide, DAG meetings are taking place.
In principle, DAGs have been established in all EU partner 
countries. That being said, there are important differences 
between the Non-EU DAGs: some DAGs were only very 
recently created (such as in Japan – no data was collected 
for this Non-EU DAG), while others do exist on paper but 
have been difficult to reach for our research (such as Nica-
ragua and Panama), leaving doubts about their function-
ing. In other cases, existing domestic mechanisms are 
being used nominally, but without actually discussing is-
sues related to the FTA (see Box 2). Thus, not all DAGs meet 
effectively. 
  »European Commission officials will say: ›we have 
achieved most of the TSD chapter because the chapter 
says we need two DAGs, a Civil Society Forum, and 
we’ve done that, so we’re 80 per cent there.‹ But just 
because you establish the institutions mentioned in the 




à  Yes, in principle most of the DAGs can hold meetings and 
meetings are taking place. (A1) 
à  DAGs’ functioning has taken off, but issues remain, espe-
cially in Non-EU DAGs, as regards to the frequency and 
timely notification of meetings, the support of a secretar-
iat, and funding. (A2)
à  Moreover, discussions on logistical issues still take up 
large parts of the meetings, at the expense of substantive 
issues. (A3)
à  DAGs are not considered to be merely a tool for legitimis-
ing the trade agreements, but some members remain sus-
picious about the legitimising effect of their participation. 
(A4)
Box 1
Main takeaways concerning  
the instrumental purpose
For several years, Peruvian civil society expressed concerns re-
garding its involvement in the trade agreement with the EU, in 
particular in view of Peruvian authorities’ unwillingness to cre-
ate a dedicated DAG for this purpose. In 2017, several Peruvian 
organisations that were already monitoring the implementa-
tion of the agreement established a DAG with the aim of de-
manding accountability and solutions from the government.* 
It has been called ›a shadow‹ or ›self-constituted‹ (autoconfor-
mado) DAG because it remains unrecognised by the Peruvian 
government. The shadow DAG includes environmental and hu-
man rights NGOs, as well as trade union organisations. Peruvian 
business representatives were invited, but did not wish to partic-
ipate, which in some cases was linked to the government’s fail-
ure to recognise the DAG. 
The ›shadow‹ DAG has been active both nationally – attempt-
ing to establish a better dialogue with the Peruvian authori-
ties and writing a number of letters – and internationally, in di-
alogue with the Colombian and Ecuadorian DAGs (belonging to 
the same regional trade agreement), the EU DAG and EU insti-
tutions (European Commission, EU delegation in Lima, European 
Parliament, EESC). It is demanding official recognition. Because 
it has managed to achieve international visibility, members’ ded-
ication and donor support, it can continue independent mon-
itoring of the FTA and manages to participate in transnational 
meetings.
As a result of the shadow DAG bringing attention to the par-
ticipation issues to the European Commission, and the latter to 
pressure the Peruvian government on more transparency con-
cerning its DAG, the Peruvian government entrusted the DAG 
roles to two existing mechanisms in 2018 (the National Com-
mission on Climate Change and the National Council for La-
bour and the Promotion of Employment) instead of entrusting 
it to nine bodies, as before. These mechanisms are led by gov-
ernment representatives, however, and have serious functional 
issues (for instance, the quorum needed to be able to take de-
cisions is almost never reached), which makes them weak plat-
forms and prevents real dialogue.** Moreover, their members 
are largely unaware that they are expected to monitor FTA im-
plementation. In 2019, only the National Commission on Cli-
mate Change discussed the FTA at only one meeting, without 
engaging in genuine dialogue on the matter. Government com-
munication with civil society at large has improved somewhat, 
but most civil society requests remain ignored.
Box 2
The Peruvian shadow DAG
à
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Figure 4
EU DAGs: Satisfaction with functioning by subgroup
Extremely dissatisfied Somewhat dissatisfied Extremely satisfied Somewhat satisfied





A2  Overall, the DAGs’ functioning has taken off.  
Issues remain in both EU and Non-EU DAGs,  
although they figure more prominently in  
the latter.
By ›functioning‹, we mean the organisational, operational 
and logistical aspects of the DAGs. Generally, the DAGs are 
functioning in the sense that meetings are taking place. DAG 
members prepare the meetings well (according to 65 per 
cent [30 / 46]7 of EU DAG and 56 per cent [36 / 64] of Non-EU 
DAG respondents) and attend them (according to 77 per 
cent [36 / 46] of EU DAG and 69 per cent [43 / 62] of Non-EU 
DAG respondents). The work of the chair is also considered 
mainly positively by the respondents (71 per cent [32 / 45] of 
EU and 49 per cent [35 / 72] of Non-EU DAG respondents). 
This functioning is still characterised by difficulties, how-
ever. Across the different EU and Non-EU DAGs, the ma-
jority of members are not satisfied with their functioning. 
Both in EU and Non-EU DAGs, the respondents represent-
ing business associations are more satisfied with the DAG 
functioning than the non-business (trade unions and 
NGOs) respondents (see Figure 4 and 5).
7 Blank and ›don’t know‹ answers have been omitted from the analy-
sis. Considering the relatively low number of observations, the ratio 
in absolute numbers is mentioned in addition to the percentage.
The Peruvian case demonstrates the importance of having 
strong treaty provisions able to enforce civil society participation 
in a dedicated, empowered and independent setting, as well as 
political accountability regarding sustainable development. The 
ambiguous provisions in the current agreement (the legal text 
doesn’t stipulate that the DAG members have to be independ-
ent) have enabled the Peruvian government to offer merely to-
kenistic participation managed by state representatives.
In addition, it shows the need for greater flexibility on the part 
of the EU when dealing with grassroots civil society initiatives. 
For instance, at the moment, the EU does not finance the par-
ticipation of ›shadow DAG‹ members in transnational meetings 
and does not include them in official communications unless 
they are delegated by an officially designated body. As the of-
ficially designated mechanisms do not meaningfully discuss the 
FTA, it leaves a consultation vacuum. 
*   RedGE, 2018. ›Campaña.‹ Available at:  
http://www.redge.org.pe/node/2841.
**  RedGE, 2019. ›Sociedad Civil: una participación  
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Evaluation of logistical support
Preferred changes to improve DAG functioning 
One major problem is that EU and Non-EU DAGs cannot 
always interact meaningfully because of the latter’s weak-
nesses. Issues concerning DAG functioning are more prom-
inent outside the EU, which is a concern for EU DAGs. 
›Issues related to DAG(s) in the partner country / region‹ is 
ranked third among the topics discussed by EU DAGs, and 
20 per cent (9 / 44) of EU DAG respondents would recom-
mend improving the functioning of DAG(s) in the partner 
country / region to improve DAG monitoring. This is under-
standable considering that the discussion within both EU 
and Non-EU DAGs is heavily concentrated on the situation 
in the partner countries; sustainability in the EU is barely 
discussed (see Figure 14). EU DAGs rely, to a large extent, 
on the information provided by their Non-EU counterparts, 
requiring close interaction between both sides. 
Whereas the majority of EU DAG respondents agree that 
their DAG has sufficient logistical support, most Non-EU 
DAG respondents argue that they do not (see Figure 6). 
For the active DAGs, the most important functional as-
pects identified in the surveys and interviews are the fre-
quency and timely notification of meetings, the support of 
a secretariat and funding.
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Respondents’ comments on the frequency of meetings im-
ply that the current system, whereby the DAGs meet up 
twice a year on average for several hours, is insufficient to 
enable DAGs to serve as a platform for meaningful dia-
logue. Some 45 per cent (21 / 47) of EU DAG respondents 
and 30 per cent (22 / 73) of Non-EU DAG respondents wish 
that meetings were held more frequently. In the case of 
the EU this is even the most preferred change to improve 
the functioning of DAGs.
  »We lack time, the DAG has only two meetings a year. 
It is not much and it is not enough to carry out this 
monitoring work.« (interview EU4)
  »I haven’t been invited to any regular meetings,  
there is no particular continuation of the work.«  
(interview NEU7)
  »The exchange between the DAGs is also essential 
and is made difficult by being limited to an annual 
meeting.« (open answer survey NEU)
Related to the frequency of the meetings, there is also crit-
icism that meetings are announced at too short notice. Es-
pecially in the case of the annual transnational meetings 
with the DAGs and the intergovernmental board, where 
travelling is required, the dates of the meetings should be 
announced sufficiently in advance. This also gives the im-
pression that the meetings are not a priority.
  »The final confirmation comes pretty late, there are 
often changes in the schedule. It gives the wrong po-
litical sign. There must be a 100 per cent commitment 
on proper scheduling. Commitment that whatever 
happens, the meeting will take place.«  
(interview EU10)
Given the fact that DAG members meet only occasionally 
and work on a voluntary basis, secretarial support is impor-
tant to ensure continuity of the meetings, information ex-
change and links to the counterpart DAG(s). The EESC 
provides the secretariat of all EU DAGs. Some 78 per cent 
(36 / 46) of EU DAG respondents consider that DAG meet-
ings are well prepared by the secretariat. Most Non-EU 
DAGs, however, do not have similar support to help them 
organise and prepare their work. The bulk of their work is 
often carried out by their president (and sometimes 
vice-presidents), who are limited in their capacity to dedi-
cate a lot of time to these activities. This explains why 
›more support from the secretariat‹ is highest on the wish 
list of Non-EU DAG respondents. 
  »The DAGs cannot maintain their dynamics due to 
lack of support in their operation. We have requested 
to have the help of a secretariat that takes care of the 
meeting dates and agenda, drafts the minutes, sup-
ports the follow-up, centralizes the information and 
exchanges it, etc.« (open answer survey NEU)
  »There should be a technical secretariat to coordinate 
activities and actions, and of course this with a 
budget from the EU and national governments.«  
(open answer survey NEU)
Funding, especially for Non-EU DAGs, has been considered 
a very critical issue over the years. Whereas the EU has al-
ways provided for financial support by making the secre-
tariat available and covering the travelling costs of at least 
one EU DAG member per group, Non-EU DAGs do not en-
joy similar support. Experts therefore consider the funding 
of Non-EU DAGs to be one of the weak points of the civil 
society mechanisms established in the TSD chapter, under-
mining DAGs as a whole. This issue does not appear par-
ticularly high on respondents’ agenda when it comes to 
DAG functioning, but it is an important concern with re-
gard to DAG monitoring capacity (see section 2.3, C2). The 
corollary is that meetings can indeed take place regardless 
of funding, but it is necessary for more effective participa-
tion. The lack of funding also imposes limitations on the 
ability to recruit support staff, such as a technical secretary 
or someone could follow-up on DAG recommendations, to 
travel outside formal meetings or organise events. 
  »Participation is limited since we do not have econom-
ic resources; the state does not support the logistics 
that are required.« (open answer survey NEU)
  »Each DAG should have resources for its operations 
and for executing actions that contribute to govern-
ment decision-making on the trade agreement.«  
(open answer survey NEU)
  »The DAG must have real financing for its activities be-
cause otherwise it will not cease to be simply a mecha-
nism without real action.« (open answer survey NEU)
  »If you decide that participation of civil society is im-
portant, you must finance participation. Participation 
of civil society organisations must be in the official 
budget of the agreement. This is a political position, 
and I’m insisting on this position, it’s a matter of co-
herence.« (interview EU5)
Box 3
Three-year EU project to support the civil  
society mechanisms in the TSD chapters
à
Several issues related to DAG functioning, as mentioned above, 
have been repeatedly criticised over the years. In order to ad-
dress them, in 2019 the EU launched a three-year project with a 
budget of 3 million euros to support the implementation of TSD 
chapters through increased civil society participation. The pro-
ject provides, through a consultant, assistance with the logis-
tics of organising meetings in and outside the EU and supports 
travelling costs for EU and Non-EU DAG members. In addition, 
the funding can also be used to commission studies and organ-
ise workshops. 
The project is still at an early stage, so it is too early to make a 
definitive assessment. Nevertheless, the feedback given on the 
first year of the project is mixed. Some Non-EU DAG members 
were not aware of the project (NEU2, NEU3, NEU5), whereas 
others confirmed a positive impact on the civil society partici-
pation and coordination in the case of Central America (NEU9) 
and the Andean countries (NEU4). On the EU side, some DAG 
members were less satisfied. According to them, the quality 




Content discussed during DAG meetings (ranked from most often to least discussed)
Ranking EU DAGs Non-EU DAGs
1 Impact of the trade agreement on sustainable  
development issues
Logistics (funding, meeting places & dates, etc.)
2 Logistics (funding, meeting places & dates, etc.) Impact of the trade agreement on sustainable 
development issues
3 Issues relating to DAG(s) in the partner country /
region
Participation (membership, representativeness, 
attendance)
4 Rules of procedure Rules of procedure
5 Impact of the trade agreement on other issues General sustainable development issues
6 Participation (membership, representativeness, 
attendance)
Impact of the trade agreement on other issues
7 General sustainable development issues Issues relating to EU DAG
8 Other Other
ß
when they were organised by the Commission and the EESC, 
because the consultants hired for this purpose are still unfamil-
iar with the topic (EU8). In addition, the funding can be con-
sidered merely ›a temporary present‹ (EU5) as it remains ad hoc 
financial support and does not improve the resources of the 
DAGs in a sustainable way. 
A3  Logistics are still (too) high on the agenda.
Even though most DAGs have already been operating for 
more than five years, they still struggle with logistical and 
procedural issues. This takes valuable time and human re-
sources away from their primary substantive tasks, as de-
fined in the agreements. While the situation is worse in the 
Non-EU DAGs, EU DAGs also face issues in this area, despite 
the support provided by the Commission and the EESC. 
Table 5 gives an overview of the ranking of the topics dis-
cussed in the meetings. It should be noted that the differ-
ences between the top three of the Non-EU DAGs are 
extremely small. Logistics, impact on sustainable develop-
ment issues and participation basically share first place.
  »We should spend less time on procedures and oper-
ating rules and more time on substance and topics«.  
(open answer survey EU)
A4  The DAGs are not considered to be merely a tool 
for legitimising trade agreements. However, 
some members, especially non-business re-
spondents, remain suspicious about the legiti-
mising effect of their participation.
In both EU and Non-EU DAGs there is broad consensus as 
to what the purpose of DAGs should be: they should moni-
tor the agreement, enhance policy impact, be a platform 
to voice opinions and give access to information (see Ta-
ble 7). But when we look at how DAGs function currently, 
we find that the actual purpose (see Table 6) differs from 
the above mentioned aspired purpose(s). 
The survey also shows that in general the DAGs are not 
considered to be mechanisms created to legitimise trade 
agreements (see Table 6). This means that the establish-
ment of the civil society mechanism and the organisation 
of the meetings, while weak, is still recognised as serving 
meaningful ends. The purpose ›control critical voices‹ is 
ranked as the least important for both the EU and Non-EU 
DAG respondents. Opinions are more divided about the 
actual purpose of ›creating goodwill for the trade agree-
ment‹: while it has been ranked as unimportant by the ma-
jority of the Non-EU DAG respondents, it takes fourth spot 
(out of eight) in the EU DAG’s ranking. A closer look at the 
numbers reveals that this opinion is held mainly by 
non-business members, especially NGOs. This means there 
is divergence between the different groups concerning the 
evaluation of the purpose of the EU DAGs and that 
non-business representatives are more sceptical of the ra-
tionale behind the establishment of these mechanisms. 
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When looking into the achievements of the DAGs, we 
learn that 20 per cent (10 / 50) of the EU DAG respondents 
thinks the DAGs have legitimised the agreement with the 
larger public (see Figure 17). Moreover, the risk of being 
used as a tool to legitimise the agreement has been men-
tioned in both the open answers of the survey and during 
our interviews. This shows that some DAG members do 
take this risk into account when participating, leading to an 
insider / outsider dilemma: either to stay in a consultation 
format that might be used to legitimise the trade agree-
ment against their own interests, or to refuse to participate 
and thereby lose a formal channel of communication 
through which to make one’s views heard.
  »I will be frank, I think they’re ›tick the box‹ meet-
ings.« (interview NEU7)
  »The DAGs should stop being a simple artificial mech-
anism to comply with what the agreement requires 
and must be a real instance of advocacy, monitoring 
and exchange with the government on the progress 
and limitations of the agreement.«  
(open answer survey NEU)
  »My impression is that the Commission wants to have 
those kinds of DAGs just on paper and in reality they 
just want to take a picture and say yes we have sever-
al DAGs.« (interview EU8)
That being said, a large majority of DAG members who 
participated in the survey want to stay in the DAGs (see 
Figure 8). This indicates that, although a lot of members 
are critical of the intentions behind the mechanisms, they 
do want to make use of the DAGs and to continue to ad-
vocate functional improvements. They also advocate com-
bining insider and outsider strategies. 
  »We will continue to fight to get it installed and work-
ing.« (open answer survey NEU)
  »Yes, it is worth continuing to participate, however its 
operation must be considerably improved.«   
(open answer survey NEU)
  »We’re reflecting on whether we want to stay in this 
DAG. It serves more as a pretext for the European 
Commission to say ›we have an advisory group, 
everything is fine.‹ But we cannot leave this space to 
the business sector alone, it is necessary to have a 
counter-power and also for the Andean organisations 
it is important to have allies in this space.«  
(interview EU8)
Table 6
Ranking of actual purpose of the civil society meetings (What is the purpose of the civil society meetings?)
Ranking EU DAGs Non-EU DAGs
1 Voice opinions Voice opinions
2 Access to information Access to information
3 Network with civil society organisations Network with civil society organisations
4 Create goodwill for the trade agreement Monitor the agreement
5 Network with officials Network with officials
6 Monitor the agreement Policy impact
7 Policy impact Create goodwill for the trade agreement
8 Control critical voices Control critical voices
Table 7
Ranking of desired purpose of the civil society meetings (What should be the purpose of the civil society meetings?)
Ranking EU DAGs Non-EU DAGs
1 Monitor the agreement Monitor the agreement
2 Policy impact Voice opinions
3 Voice opinions Policy impact
4 Access to information Access to information
5 Network with civil society organisations Network with officials
6 Network with officials Network with civil society organisations
7 Create goodwill for the trade agreement Create goodwill for the trade agreement
8 Control critical voices Control critical voices
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2.2 CAN THEY TALK? 
Figure 8
Continue DAG participation





Wish of DAG members to continue DAG participation
Box 4
Main takeaways concerning the information- 
sharing purpose
à  Information sharing is considered an important purpose of 
the DAGs (even though it is not the most desired goal). (B1)
à  Dialogue happens and independence, representativeness 
and the composition of DAGs are evaluated positively. (B2)
à  Horizontal relations between DAG members are consid-
ered positive, but there still is need for more genuine di-
alogue and a better-defined work programme. Mainly in 
Non-EU DAGs, important tensions exist between business 
and non-business representatives. (B3)
à  The DAG-to-DAG interaction is considered very useful. 
Most Non-EU respondents demand greater involvement of 
the DAGs in the annual transnational civil society meeting. 
(B4)
à  So far, vertical relations between governments and their 
DAGs are evaluated more negatively. The latter do not share 
sufficient information on the implementation of the trade 
agreements and there is insufficient interaction between 
the governments and the DAGs. Non-EU DAG respondents 
are more vocal about these issues than their EU DAG col-
leagues. (B5)
à  The impact of the trade agreement on sustainable devel-
opment is being discussed during the DAG meetings. La-
bour issues are generally high on the agenda. Especially EU 
DAGs often address compliance with labour rights in part-
ner countries, while the impact of the agreements in the EU 
remains largely unaddressed. (B6)
B1  Information sharing is considered to be an 
important purpose of the DAGs (even though it 
is not the most desired goal). 
In practice, information sharing has proved to be one of 
the most important purposes of the DAGs. On the positive 
side, it is mentioned much more often than mere legitimi-
sation, but on the negative side, this data shows that much 
DAG activity stops at this rung of the ladder without reach-
ing monitoring or policy impact. Two answer options that 
fit into this category – ›access to information‹ and ›net-
working with civil society organisations‹ – are ranked fairly 
high as the actual purpose of DAGs by both EU and Non-
EU DAG members (see Table 6). Building alliances with oth-
er civil society organisations was mentioned as one of the 
most important achievements both in the EU (58 per cent 
[25 / 43]) and in the partner countries (42 per cent [27 / 65]) 
(see Figure 17). 
Additionally, DAG members attribute high importance to 
engaging with policy-makers, as most of them ultimately 
aim to have policy impact. This is also a major value added 
of the DAGs, which, at least for some civil society organisa-
tions, open a new channel of communication with offi-
cials. Even though the third answer option in the 
information sharing category – ›network with officials‹ – is 
not indicated to be an important actual or desired purpose 
by either EU or Non-EU respondents, ›facilitate discussions 
with officials‹ is considered to be the most important 
achievement of DAGs by EU DAG respondents and ranks 
second for Non-EU DAG respondents.
  »The meetings empowered and gave visibility to civil 
society organisations that have little recognition from 
their government; it enabled the exchange of best 
practices and meaningful discussions by relevant 
stakeholders on issues that matter.«  
(open answer survey EU)
B2  The independence, representativeness and 
composition of DAGs are evaluated positively. 
Nevertheless, improved representativity of  
Non-EU DAG members features high on the 
recommendations list.
Our data shows that, in general, DAGs are able to promote 
free and balanced exchange of independently sourced in-
formation, and that this exchange happens among repre-
sentative stakeholders. These are the basic preconditions 
for meaningful information exchange. 
The majority of the respondents consider that the DAGs 
function independently of governments. In addition, ›more 
independent DAG members‹ has not often been selected 
as a preferred improvement by either group of respondents 
(11 per cent [5 / 45] of EU DAG and 14 per cent [10 / 71] of 
Non-EU DAG respondents). There is, however, a notable 
difference between DAGs: whereas 87 per cent (39 / 45) of 
EU DAG respondents confirm the DAG’s independence, on-
ly 58 per cent (37 / 64) of the Non-EU DAG respondents 
agree with regard to their DAG. Thus, lack of independence 
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is one more shortcoming of Non-EU DAGs, which also neg-
atively affects their EU counterparts’ ability to receive infor-
mation, conduct monitoring and have policy impact. 
Figure 9
Independence, representativeness, composition of DAGs: Respondents agree with statements
20 40 60 80 10010 30 50 70 90
The DAG composition is
balanced between the
different groups
The DAG members represent
relevant stakeholders
The DAG functions independ-




In line with the previous positive assessments, most re-
spondents consider that DAG members represent relevant 
stakeholders’ organisations (83 per cent [39 / 47] of EU DAG 
and 75 per cent [52 / 69] of Non-EU DAG respondents). 
That being said, better representativity of DAG members 
also scores quite high on the list of preferred changes to 
improve DAGs: 23 per cent (11 / 47) of the EU DAG and 
33 per cent (24 / 73) of the Non-EU DAG respondents chose 
this improvement. Representativity is important for making 
sure that DAGs, in fact, contribute to promoting sustaina-
ble development by being able to represent the most af-
fected societal groups. Thus, issues with representativeness 
affect DAG effectiveness and may also contribute to a lack 
of legitimacy of the EU’s FTAs. 
Many of the members, albeit to a lesser extent than for the 
two other statements, consider DAG composition to be 
balanced between the different groups, namely the busi-
ness, labour and diverse interest organisations (65 per cent 
[30 / 46] of EU DAG and 66 per cent [42 / 64] of Non-EU DAG 
respondents). It should nevertheless be mentioned that the 
treaty provisions (except the EU trade agreement with 
Ukraine) refer explicitly to environmental organisations, in 
addition to employers and trade unions. In practice, this 
has become the ›various interests‹ group, including devel-
opmental and human rights NGOs. This is the group that 
experiences the most difficulties attracting members in the 
EU DAGs.
  »We have three groups, overall, we can monitor the 
situation, if there are problems affecting a particular 
sector, we know it immediately because representa-
tives of this sector can raise the problem … Only with 
the participation of civil society organisations, repre-
sentatives of employers and trade unions, can you 
have real control and really work together for real 
benefits.« (interview EU5)
  »The first step is having the right people at the table 
because otherwise you cannot have meaningful dis-
cussions; once this was achieved, we started to talk 
about substance. It’s a big achievement.«  
(interview EU9)
  »I don’t think the DAG really represents the wider so-
ciety.« (interview NEU3)
  »Representatives of organised civil society and the or-
ganised business sector should be equitably represent-
ed in the DAGs. It is obvious that the organised 
business sector is always in the majority participation, 
so decisions are taken by majority and not by consen-
sus.« (open answer survey NEU)
As already indicated, some problems remain concerning 
the composition of DAGs, especially in Non-EU DAGs. 
Moreover, we should recall that these DAGs also face logis-
tical problems – described in the previous section – which 
means they cannot always dedicate sufficient time and re-
sources to information exchange.
Response on statements concerning the independence, representativeness and composition of the DAG
à
The representativeness of the Korean DAG and the independ-
ence of its members has been a thorny issue, especially in the 
early days. To start with, these civil society meetings were the 
first of their kind and both the EU and the Korean government 
and civil society had to learn how to develop such mechanisms. 
However, given the distinct cultures and Korea’s different take 
on civil society, the parties had different starting points. The tri-
partite structure of the EESC was used as a basis for the DAG, 
even though Korean employers and trade unions are not used 
to this type of dialogue. Also, »the environmental NGOs are 
not the same, they have different functions than we have in 
our European DAG« (EU1). In addition, academics and research-
ers were included as Korean DAG members, more concretely 
as public interest representatives. They currently account for al-
most half of the DAG. Their legitimacy is being challenged as, 
Box 5
Representativeness and independence  
of Korean DAG members
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B3  Overall, horizontal relations between DAG 
members are considered positive, but there  
still is need for more genuine dialogue and a 
better-defined work programme. Mainly in  
Non-EU DAGs, important tensions exist between 
business and non-business representatives. 
Information exchange among DAG members is a first step 
on the way to genuine dialogue. It involves opening and 
using communication channels without the need to actual-
ly consider the position of the other or to make joint deci-
sions. In general, information exchange between the DAG 
members seems to have taken off, whereas genuine dia-
logue and setting priorities for collaboration remain more 
difficult to achieve.
When it comes to information sharing between DAG mem-
bers a difference is noted between the EU and Non-EU DAGs: 
whereas 63 per cent (25 / 40) of EU DAG respondents agrees 
there is sufficient information sharing amongst DAG mem-
bers, only 44 per cent (28 / 63) of the Non-EU DAG respond-
ents think alike, 16 per cent even strongly disagrees with this 
statement. Similarly, where 62 per cent (28 / 45) of the EU DAG 
respondents say the availability of information has a positive 
impact on the functioning of the DAG, 53 per cent (36 / 67) of 
the Non-EU DAG respondents share this view. Again, issues on 
the Non-EU side can affect the EU DAGs as well.
Even though most respondents state that the relationship 
between the DAG members has a positive impact on the 
functioning of the DAG, there is a notable difference be-
tween the EU DAG (86 per cent, [39 / 45]) and Non-
EU DAG (60 per cent [40 / 66]) respondents. Some of the 
probable reasons for this include the novelty of engaging 
in this kind of dialogue (which is very much based on the 
EU tripartite tradition), as well as conflicts or tensions be-
tween business and non-business DAG members (see al-
so Box 6). Antagonistic relations between these two 
groups have, in some (Non-EU DAG) cases, been very 
strong and have even paralysed the functioning of the 
DAG. 
  »It is also sometimes difficult in the Andean region to 
bring together civil society and companies. There is no 
culture of social dialogue like in Europe, it is not easy 
to reach consensus. I think that sometimes it is better 
to collect the observations of civil society, and of com-
panies separately. (open answer survey NEU)
  »The DAGs should be restructured completely and 
they should not include actors whose purpose is to 
dismantle the participation of civil society.«  
(open answer survey NEU)
  »In our case, decisions are mainly made by the busi-
ness sector.« (open answer survey NEU)
  »I think it is a process of learning and maturing. We 
do not have a culture of civil society participation. 
However, it seems important to me to continue the 
process to achieve greater interaction between the 
groups and greater ownership about our role.« 
(open answer survey NEU)
Figure 10
Preferred changes for horizontal information sharing
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Preferred changes as regards information sharing between civil society
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even though these actors might have substantial expertise, »they 
don’t represent a constituency« (EU1).
The independence of Korean DAG members has also been questioned. 
Some of the employers and academics are perceived to have strong 
ties with the government. In addition, the Korean government seems 
to hold the reins of DAG membership. There is no open call for mem-
bers. The Ministries of the Environment and of Labour ask relevant or-
ganisations to put forward members, who are then nominated, except 
for the public interest group, where it is the ministry that nominates 
and appoints. Nevertheless, EU DAG members have witnessed an evo-
lution: »the Korean government somewhat changed its attitude and 
nominated slightly more people from European style civil society, but 
it was a process« (EU7). An important event in this context was the 
membership of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions, one of the 
country’s most important unions. They were not included in the DAG 
at first, which caused major criticism. An interviewee explained how 
»in Korea the government has the right to select members but it can-
not be a unilateral decision« (NEU1). That being said, the Korean gov-
ernment still keeps a close eye on its DAG as »it attends the Korean 
DAG meeting but they do not engage. They present, then stay the 
whole meeting and monitor what is being said.« (NEU2).
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The majority of the EU and Non-EU DAG respondents – 
67  per cent (31 / 46) and 56 per cent (36 / 64), respec-
tively – agree that there is genuine dialogue between DAG 
members. At the same time, genuine dialogue is the most 
demanded change as regards the functioning of Non-
EU DAGs, at 52 per cent (38 / 73), and also ranks high for 
EU DAG respondents, at 34 per cent (16 / 47). This is an 
important call for improvements in the quality of dialogue. 
Constructive interaction among DAG members seems to 
be the main factor. 
DAG members’ wish for improved information exchange is 
also reflected in the fact that a (better defined) work pro-
gramme is also very high on their wish list: for EU DAG re-
spondents, it is the most preferred improvement related to 
functioning, at 51 per cent (24 / 47); for Non-EU DAGs, the 
work programme ranks second, at 41 per cent (30 / 73). At 
the moment, not all DAGs have clearly defined and up-to-
date work programmes, which makes discussions less 
structured and productive. 
  »There are no clear deliverables, no clear targets for a 
specific year.« (interview EU10)
  »We only have random meetings, and no follow up,… 
for instance, we’re also part of another council, a pro-
gress-oriented organisation, it’s a functional place, we 
have the chance to speak to the government on a reg-
ular basis, when we are mandated to work on this or 
that topic, we create a working group, we bring in ex-
perts, we exchange ideas, we come up with a position 
paper, we present it to the government and things are 
done. That’s what I call a working process.«  
(interview NEU7)
B4  DAG-to-DAG interaction is considered very 
useful. Most Non-EU respondents demand 
greater involvement of DAGs in the annual 
transnational civil society meeting. 
The majority of respondents want more interactions be-
tween the DAGs of particular agreements – to date, DAG-
to-DAG meetings between the EU and partner countries’ 
stakeholders have not been formally included in the agree-
ments (except for the EU–Korea FTA), but have become a 
stable practice carried out once a year. This form of infor-
mation exchange is considered especially useful in foster-
ing the impact of DAGs. More concretely, 62 per cent 
(37 / 60) of Non-EU respondents and 68 per cent (28 / 41) of 
EU respondents think the interaction with DAG(s) of the 
partner country(-ies) has a positive effect on their own 
DAG’s impact. 
More involvement of the DAGs in the annual transnational 
civil society meeting therefore ended up high on the wish 
list of the Non-EU DAG respondents: 31 per cent (20 / 64) 
indicated this as a preferred change to increase the impact 
of the DAG. The open annual meetings – often called the 
Forum – as they are organised today are not considered 
very useful.
  »The DAGs don’t have privileged space or recognition 
in the Forum, it does not allow for dialogue, it’s just a 
series of questions and very formal answers.«  
(interview EU4)
  »It is important to institutionalise the DAGs’ structure, 
to provide permanent coordination for communica-
tion and monitoring between the DAGs.«  
(open answer survey NEU)
Box 6
Tensions, mainly between business and non-business participants, in attempting to reach joint conclusions 
An important obstacle to the DAGs’ work surfaced in the case stud-
ies. In all three cases, the DAG-to-DAG meetings encountered sig-
nificant difficulties as regards reaching joint conclusions because 
of disagreements between business and non-business DAG mem-
bers on the content of the statements to be shared with the inter-
governmental board. The conflicts mainly concerned the wording of 
statements on labour issues, as the positions of business actors (of 
Non-EU DAGs in particular) and of non-business actors diverge with 
regard to the level of ambition. 
In Georgia, this situation has led to ›tough discussions‹ (NEU5); it 
has also been described as a ›painful process‹ (NEU7). The solution 
to the disagreements has been to include a disclaimer in the joint 
conclusions referring to the issues that are not supported by Geor-
gian business DAG members. 
Similarly, in Peru, the collaboration between the groups has been 
difficult and confrontational: ›Every year we are faced with this 
Group 1, with whom it is very difficult to talk, they block the actions 
that we want to do‹ (EU4). In 2018, the Colombian and Ecuadorian 
employers group decided not to sign the joint statement: ›we have 
not achieved a joint statement, because we cannot reconcile many 
things with the business sector‹ (NEU5). Another interviewee ex-
plained that ›Group 2 [trade unions] and 3 [NGOs] are not as strong 
in South America. Business is always taking a big part, changing all 
the documents.‹ (EU8). 
In Korea, relations between employers and trade unions in the Ko-
rean DAG are rather hostile, making it difficult or even ›impossible‹ 
(NEU2) for them to work together. Another interviewee confirmed 
that the atmosphere in the Korean DAG has ›not been harmonious 
or peaceful‹ (NEU1). The main controversy concerns the labour ob-
ligations in the TSD chapter. Especially on the occasion of the last 
transnational meeting in 2018, when it came to deciding on the 
joint conclusions concerning the ratification and implementation of 
the core ILO conventions, in particular freedom of association and 
the incarceration of two Korean trade union members, ›things be-
came rather tense‹ (EU1). In the end, the Korean employers left the 
room and some academics were also not supportive, which meant 
that no common position could be concluded. A joint statement 




B5  Vertical relations between governments and their 
DAGs are evaluated more negatively. Discussions 
with officials are much appreciated when they 
happen. However, DAG members demand more 
interaction, more information sharing and more 
interest from governments. Non-EU DAG re-
spondents are particularly vocal about this.
The majority of DAG members appreciate that the DAGs 
facilitated discussions with officials, as indicated by the 
achievements mentioned above. Most EU DAG respond-
ents – namely 69 per cent (31 / 45) – consider the attend-
ance of the European Commission at DAG meetings to be 
positive. In contrast, only 48 per cent (30 / 63) of Non-
EU  DAG respondents think similarly about their govern-
ments attendance at their DAG meetings, which is probably 
related to their concerns about DAGs’ independence of 
government and less cordial relations between govern-
ments and civil society. There is also more variation in how 
these governments participate. For instance, in some cases 
government officials attend as members (Honduras), or 
preside over the meetings (Peru).
  »Relations between the DAG and the European 
Commission are good, the Commission comes to 
every DAG meeting, they report on progress, we tell 
them what we feel, regular dialogue, it is working 
well. The Commission is generally approachable I 
think… there is always room for improvement but I 
cannot say that the Commission isn’t listening.«  
(interview EU9)
  »The government attends the DAG meeting but they 
do not engage. They present [their position], then stay 
for the whole meeting and monitor what is being 
said.« (interview NEU2)
  »The government has met with us but not to conduct 
real dialogue nor to take joint decisions.«  
(interview NEU4)
  »Relations with government officials are very limited, 
same goes for real decision-makers.«  
(open answer survey NEU)
Nevertheless, both EU and Non-EU DAG members want 
more from the vertical information exchange with the gov-
ernments. The majority of respondents consider that there 
is insufficient interaction between governments and DAGs. 
Here we notice a difference, however, as the EU DAG re-
spondents are more divided about this issue: 57 per cent 
(24 / 42) disagree with the statement that there is sufficient 
interaction between the European Commission and the 
DAG, whereas for the Non-EU DAG respondents 80 per 
cent (47 / 59) disagreed there is sufficient interaction with 
their national government, of which 44 per cent (26 / 59) 
strongly disagreed. These numbers show that the vast ma-
jority of DAG members want to interact more with their 
government.
  »There has not been a real interaction between the 
DAG and the Commission, and the DAGs of the part-
ner countries do not have resources and legitimacy 
from their governments, so all the effort and invest-
ment that is being made does not produce the desired 
impact.« (open answer survey EU DAG)
Moreover, both EU and Non-EU DAG respondents indicate 
that the government does not share sufficient information: 
61 per cent (26 / 43) of EU DAG respondents and 64 per 
cent (39 / 61) of Non-EU DAG respondents disagree with 
the statement that the European Commission / own gov-
ernment shares sufficient information about the imple-
mentation of the trade agreement. Some 41 per cent 
(25 / 61) of Non-EU DAG respondents even strongly disa-
gree with this statement, showing greater dissatisfaction 
than their EU counterparts. Consequently, more informa-
tion sharing by governments has been indicated in the sur-
vey as a much-desired change to improve monitoring by 
both EU DAG respondents (43 per cent [19 / 44]) and Non-
EU DAG respondents (32 per cent [21 / 65]). 
  »Access to pseudo-information, because yes there is 
access to information but not really relevant [informa-
tion]!« (open answer survey EU)
Figure 11
There is sufficient interaction between the government and the DAG







Response on statement concerning the interaction between DAG and European Commission / own government
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Figure 13
The parliament is interested in the DAG’s work 
Box 7
Relations between the DAGs and their respective parliaments
Finally, the majority of Non-EU respondents perceive that 
their government is not interested in the work of the DAG. 
This explains criticisms of vertical dialogue with govern-
ments, but also the low government accountability (see 
below) and low policy impact. It also resonates with the 
finding that there is a risk that DAGs are convened merely 
for legitimising purposes. Some 68 per cent (39 / 57) of 
Non-EU respondents disagree with the statement that ›the 
government is interested in the DAG’s work‹, and 47 per 
cent (27 / 57) even strongly disagree. Accordingly, the 
change ›more interest by own government in the DAG’s 
work‹ ranked high (34 per cent [22 / 65]) on the list of im-
provements for monitoring. The EU DAG respondents have 
mixed views on this issue: 52 per cent (22 / 42) agree that 
the European Commission is interested in their work, while 
48 per cent (20 / 42) do not.
  »DAGs should be real interlocutors of the governments 
of the region and the EU. This is not the case because 
for the governments of both regions, the requirements 
of civil society are not important or significant. Govern-
ments are only interested in the requirements of the 
business sector.« (open answer survey NEU)
  »There is no interest from the government or parlia-
ment in this matter; the government carries out activi-
ties only to comply with protocols. It does not 
disseminate information and it is not interested in the 
participation of civil society; it is interested only in the 
economic aspect of the agreement, it does not care 
about the social. (open answer survey NEU)
  »It is necessary to improve the institutional system to 
reflect the results of open exchange of opinions, lis-
tening to the opinions of the advisory group and dis-
cussions.« (open answer survey NEU)
The European Parliament and the national parliaments of the differ-
ent trade partners have to ratify the trade agreement before it enters 
into force (the FTAs are usually applied provisionally, awaiting the Eu-
ropean Parliament’s ratification). In addition, parliaments – at least 
in the case of the EU – have been influential proponents of civil soci-
ety in their endeavours to be more involved in trade policy and their 
quest for sustainable development. As parliaments traditionally have 
the power to hold governments accountable, they could therefore be 
important allies for DAG members. 
Nevertheless, the parliaments have been remarkably absent con-
cerning civil society involvement in the TSD chapter. Overall, DAG 
members consider that their parliament is not interested in the 
DAG’s work: 64 per cent (22 / 34) of EU DAG respondents and 
94 per cent (49 / 52) of Non-EU DAG respondents indicate this. It is 
very explicit in the case of Non-EU DAGs, with 69 per cent strongly 
disagreeing that their parliament is interested in the DAG’s work. 
Consequently, the vast majority of respondents disagree that there 
is sufficient interaction between their own parliament and the 
DAGs: 84 per cent (30 / 36) of EU DAG respondents disagree (of 
which 53 per cent strongly disagree) and 91 per cent (52 / 57) of 
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B6  The impact of the trade agreement on sustaina-
ble development is discussed in the DAG meet-
ings, but most discussions evolve around the 
situation in partner countries. 
Table 5 shows how ›Impact of the trade agreement on sus-
tainable development issues’ is the main topic discussed in 
the EU DAGs, although it also ranks very high for Non-EU 
DAGs. The fact that both EU DAGs and Non-EU DAGs rank 
the impact of the FTA as so important is a testament to the 
DAGs‹ ability to serve as platforms for information ex-
change. Side issues such as logistics, DAG membership and 
rules of procedure also take up much of the limited time in 
DAGs’ meetings, however. 
In the EU DAGs, most attention is given to labour issues out-
side the EU (see Figure 14). This shows, on one hand, that 
labour issues are not being swept under the rug, as some 
have feared. On the other hand, in some cases labour issues 
tend to dominate the agenda, which can be at the expense 
of other sustainable development issues. This importance 
given to labour issues can be explained by the high level of 
organisation, institutionalisation and motivation of EU and 
Non-EU trade unions to use the DAGs as a platform to advo-
cate for improved labour conditions, while environmental 
organisations are less active on trade issues in the EU and 
indeed are often underrepresented in the DAGs. In addition, 
even though the scope of the TSD chapter is quite broad (and 
in the latest EU FTAs the scope of the DAGs’ monitoring role 
has been expanded to the whole agreement), the time pro-
vided for discussing these matters is very limited.
Figure 14
Sustainable development issues discussed 












Sustainable development topics discussed in the DAGs
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That being said, the European Parliament has been involved in the 
follow-up of the implementation of FTAs and their TSD chapter, for 
instance through diplomatic missions, oral and written questions to 
the Commission and resolutions. They have also put pressure on the 
European Commission to increase trade partners’ compliance with 
the commitments made in the TSD chapter. For instance, the Euro-
pean Parliament’s request to trigger the dispute settlement mech-
anism in the EU–Korea FTA played a crucial role in this process. It 
has also organised hearings and listened to Non-EU DAG members, 
which has been evaluated positively. There is, however, no institu-
tional dialogue between the DAGs and the European Parliament: 
»it’s still formal-informal in a way, they sometimes take part in the 
meetings as observers, but their participation is not mandated by 
any decision.« (EU1)
In the trade partners covered in the case studies, no interviewees 
were aware of existing links between the DAGs and their national 
parliament: »I don’t think they know we exist.« (NEU2)
A more institutionalised dialogue between these potential allies 
could be beneficial in terms of information exchange, monitoring 
and, ultimately, policy impact.
Nevertheless, some respondents expressed a wish to focus 
more on economic issues during the meetings.
  »Almost no business opportunities have been discov-
ered in recent years, no new direct business coopera-
tion was highlighted.« (open answer survey EU)
  »In my view, all negotiations of the DAGs should re-
sult in tangible / concrete business outcomes, specific 
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à  Monitoring is the key purpose for DAG members, mirror-
ing the European Commission’s discourse. However, it has 
not materialised. (C1)
à  DAG members don’t have sufficient resources to monitor. 
(C2)
à  Governments’ limited accountability constrains the DAGs 
in playing their monitoring role: there is no feedback loop 
between DAGs and their governments and governments 
do not sufficiently follow up on DAGs’ input. (C3)
à  This accountability deficit also occurs at transnational 
level. Nevertheless, Non-EU DAGs appreciate the poten-
tial leverage enabled by the European Commission and 
EU DAG. (C4)
Box 8
Main takeaways concerning the monitoring 
purpose
business cooperation, FDI, high level education ex-
change, advice on EU standards in energy, climate 
change and environmental issues. This is all needed to 
establish a better level playing field for the parties, to 
create new jobs or at least job opportunities, clearly 
demonstrating for the other side why this cooperation 
is much needed.« (open answer survey EU DAG) 
We see that, across the board, the discussions are heavily 
centred on the situation in the partner countries, while the 
impact of the agreements on the EU itself (and potentially 
unsustainable practices within the EU) remain largely un-
addressed. Trade partners such as South Korea and Cana-
da have already shown their interest in also discussing EU 
issues, such as labour conditions in certain EU member 
states, which could give a new turn to the content of 
these DAGs.
2.3 CAN THEY OVERSEE? 
C1  Monitoring is a key purpose for DAG members. 
However, it has not materialised 
Monitoring is ranked as the purpose of the civil society 
meetings to which both the EU and Non-EU DAG respond-
ents aspire above all (Table 7). Thus, while not all of them 
aim to have (direct) policy impact, DAG members nonethe-
less are in favour of a direct and accountable dialogue with 
policy-makers that goes beyond (occasional) information 
exchange. The DAGs are generally capable of providing 
quality recommendations to policy-makers. Most respond-
ents evaluate the expertise of the DAG members as ade-
quate for DAG monitoring. Some 93 per cent (40 / 43) of 
EU DAG respondents are convinced that their expertise has 
a positive effect on monitoring (of whom 30 per cent are 
extremely positive). Non-EU DAG are also positive, albeit to 
a lesser extent, at 74 per cent (44 / 59).
The monitoring purpose is ranked only sixth (EU DAGs) and 
fourth (Non-EU DAGs), respectively, as the actual purpose 
of the meetings. This mismatch between expectations and 
implementation with regard to the purpose of the meet-
ings and the role of civil society was expressed explicitly by 
several respondents:
  »DAGs should have a clearly defined role in monitor-
ing the agreement; but they are so far only a talking 
shop without any political relevance (not even regard-
ing TSD questions!). If there was this clear role, then 
the DAGs could serve as a contact point for prob-
lems /violations of standards etc.«  
(open answer survey EU)
  »The DAGs must be recognised by governments as 
advisers on the implementation of the trade and sus-
tainable development chapter of trade agreement, 
otherwise, they are only an adornment.«  
(open answer NEU)
Accordingly, the majority of the respondents is not sat-
isfied with the DAG monitoring. Similarly to the evalua-
tion of the DAG functioning, business respondents in 
both EU and Non-EU DAGs are more positive than 
non-business respondent (trade unions and NGOs) (see 
Figure 15 and 16).
Figure 15
EU DAGs: Satisfaction with monitoring by subgroup 
Extremely dissatisfied Somewhat dissatisfied Extremely satisfied Somewhat satisfied





Satisfaction EU DAG respondents per group with DAG monitoring
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Satisfaction Non-EU DAG respondents per group with DAG monitoring
Achievements of the DAGs
Figure 16
Non-EU DAGs: Satisfaction with monitoring by subgroup 
Extremely dissatisfied Somewhat dissatisfied Extremely satisfied Somewhat satisfied





Accordingly, the achievements related to the monitoring 
role do not score very high (see Figure 17). ›Promoted sus-
tainable development‹ is in fourth place (EU DAGs, 26 per 
cent [11 / 43]) and fifth place (Non-EU DAGs, 22 per cent 
[14 / 65]), whereas ›criticised the sustainable development 
dimension of the agreement‹ was ranked sixth (EU DAGs, 
23 per cent [10 / 43]) and fourth (Non-EU DAGs, 25 per 
cent [16 / 65]). Below, we discuss the most important obsta-
cles in the way of the DAGs playing a greater monitoring 
role in the FTAs. 
Figure 17
DAG achievements
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Figure 18
Impact of available financial resources on conducting research








C2  DAG members don’t have sufficient  
resources to monitor adequately. 
The limited financial resources available for conducting re-
search are considered to have a very negative impact on 
the monitoring role of the DAGs, both in the EU and out-
side. Some 44 per cent (19 / 43) of the EU DAG respondents 
indicated this, and 62 per cent (38 / 61) of the Non-EU DAG 
respondents, of whom 33 per cent were extremely nega-
tive. In line with these results, more financial resources for 
conducting research are important aspired-to changes for 
EU DAGs (36 per cent [16 / 44]) and Non-EU DAGs (54 per 
cent [35 / 65]). 
It should be noted that the complaint concerning the lack 
of resources is stronger for Non-EU DAG respondents. We 
should recall that, even though DAG-related activities are 
in the line of work of the members, both EU and Non-EU 
DAG members perform their functions voluntarily. While 
EU organisations have, on average, relatively more resourc-
es than most partner country representatives – which also 
explains the differences in assessment – all civil society or-
ganisations need to prioritise their activities and, given the 
DAGs’ limited policy impact, they are often not their high-
est priority.
Impact of available financial resources on conducting research
  »The biggest problem for civil society organisations as 
regards participating actively and constructively in 
DAGs is very often the lack of resources, especially the 
lack of people in organisations who work on trade is-
sues and who could follow various trade agree-
ments.« (open answer survey EU)
  »Resources are required to improve the investigation 
of the impact of agreement and from there improve 
the recommendations.« (open answer survey NEU)
  »Monitoring is the result of research, which is expen-
sive and difficult to carry out.« (interview NEU5)
C3  An accountability deficit persists: there is no 
procedural feedback loop between DAGs and 
their governments. In addition, governments do 
not sufficiently follow up on input provided by 
DAGs. 
Given the difficulties in vertical information sharing be-
tween DAGs and their governments discussed above, it is 
indeed not surprising that there are issues concerning gov-
ernment accountability. 
The accountability deficit has two main elements: the lack 
of established procedures to provide input to and receive 
feedback from the governments, and the lack of follow-up 
by governments. In other words, while the DAGs want to 
raise concerns, there are no dedicated procedures to for-
malise this input. In addition, there are no clear proce-
dures for governments to consider such input, incorporate 
it into policy-making, and report on the decisions made. 
Because such procedures are lacking, follow-up depends 
on the goodwill of government officials. There is no pre-
dictability or continuity of engagement at the government 
level, and recommendations may easily fall into the void, 
obliging DAGs to issue basically unchanged statements 
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The data shows that both EU and Non-EU DAGs do not see 
properly defined procedures (see Figure 19): respondents 
disagree whether procedures exist for providing govern-
ments with input (EU DAG respondents: 55 per cent [23 / 42]; 
Non-EU DAG respondents: 65 per cent [37 / 57]). They also 
disagree whether procedures exist for governments to fol-
low up on DAG input (EU DAG respondents: 68 per cent 
[25 / 37]; Non-EU DAG respondents: 81 per cent [43 / 53]). 
The situation is worse outside the EU, but the European 
Commission is also criticised for the same reason. 
  »A strict follow-up session should take place at each 
DAG session, focusing on whether any step was taken 
based on the above lists, and government and Com-
mission representatives have to be invited to explain or 
look into reasons for failure.« (open answer survey EU)
  »A better (quicker, clear procedures, powerful instru-
ments) and obligatory follow-up process for the viola-
tions raised by the DAG for EU institutions and 
partner-countries is necessary. It has to be clear and 
transparent what happens if a violation is confirmed: 
mere ›dialogue‹ is so meaningless and seems to 
change nothing.« (open answer survey EU)
  »I would like them to have more competences, other 
instruments, other possibilities to act, not only to send 
these letters that can be left unanswered.« 
(interview EU4)
  »The DAGs should be an instrument of accountability 
for trade early reviews and subsequent reviews. DAG 
work should also be shared with parliament and par-
liamentary committees responsible for the oversight of 
trade agreements.« (open answer survey NEU)
In addition, governments do not follow up on DAGs’ rec-
ommendations, according to many respondents, which 
has a negative impact on the DAGs’ work. As a result, both 
EU and Non-EU DAGs put a high priority on improving the 
process of giving feedback and holding governments ac-
countable. More concretely, the majority of respondents 
disagreed that governments follow up on the input provid-
ed by DAGs (EU DAGs: 63 per cent [24 / 38]; Non-EU DAGs: 
82 per cent [45 / 55], of which 40 per cent strongly disa-
gree). This lack of follow-up has a negative impact on the 
DAGs’ work, according to many respondents (EU DAGs: 
48 per cent [19 / 40], Non-EU DAGs: 48 per cent [27 / 56], of 
which 27 per cent are extremely negative). 
Figure 20
Own government / European Commission follows up on DAG input
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  »The European Commission is willing to provide info, 
but when it comes to the final result we’re still wait-
ing, they attend the meetings, they provide info, they 
create workshops, they facilitate meetings with coun-
terparts, the EU Delegation is also working very well, 
but then when we present the final declaration, the 
results of work of the year or several years, they don’t 
have capacity to provide an answer or a follow-up, 
that’s the pity. Yes, they are committed to the DAGs 
but just to be able to say, yes we have a DAG, that’s 
done.« (interview EU8)
  »DAGs can provide research assistance, and should be 
consulted by officials in a true advisory role – not just 
receiving updates. Officials could take notes on the 
key takeaways / points of advice from DAGs and recap 
on this at each meeting. Officials also keep DAGs as 
informed as possible about updates so there is rele-
vant info to work with.« (open answer survey NEU)
  »We need really a strong commitment from the Com-
mission. If we send a document, we need to receive 
an answer; that is not the case now.« (interview EU1)
When looking into the preferred changes for improving 
the impact of the DAGs, Non-EU DAG respondents ranked 
›more accountability of own government‹ as their most 
preferred change (38 per cent [24 / 64]) (see Figure 28). 
Similarly, 37 per cent (16 / 43) of the EU DAG respondents 
wish for »a better follow-up by the European Commission 
on the DAG’s input«.
C4  The accountability deficit also occurs between 
the DAG-to-DAG meetings and intergovernmen-
tal boards. Nevertheless, Non-EU DAGs appreci-
ate the potential leverage that is enabled by the 
European Commission and EU DAGs.
Both EU and Non-EU DAG respondents lament the lack of 
follow-up by their governments on the joint statements is-
sued during the annual transnational meetings. Neverthe-
less, as indicated above, the DAG-to-DAG meetings and 
their joint statements are considered to be very important, 
especially by the Non-EU DAG members. The connections 
they have with the EU DAG and the European Commission, 
which is increasingly willing to meet with Non-EU civil soci-
ety, are considered highly useful leverage in advocating for 
policy changes when their own governments are not ac-
cessible or do not follow up on their input.
  »I believe that without the exchange with the EU DAG, 
the Korean DAG has no role, because without this ex-
change or forum, the Korean government isn’t willing 
to meet us and to listen to us.« (interview NEU2)
  »I think these changes come very much from this in-
ternational encouragement, the government is much 
more responsible when it comes to international rec-
ommendations than national ones, so it’s a very good 
way to encourage government to make changes.«  
(interview NEU5)
2.4 CAN THEY INFLUENCE? 
D1  The DAGs have very limited impact on  
decision-making, which is a major source  
of dissatisfaction for their members.
Given what we have already learned about numerous 
logistical, communication, accountability and other diffi-
culties affecting the DAGs, it is not surprising that their 
policy impact has been very low. Accordingly, the majority 
à  The DAGs’ influence is very limited. This is an important 
source of dissatisfaction for their members. (D1)
à  Governments do not act upon the recommendations of the 
DAGs, which is the major cause for the little impact in the 
DAGs have on decision-making. (D2)
à  The non-enforceable nature of the TSD chapter limits the 
DAGs’ potential policy impact. However, not all respondents 
agree on the need for sanctions and views on the enforce-
ability of sustainable development commitments tend to be 
polarised. (D3)
à  Especially EU DAG members wish to have the capacity to 
trigger the dispute settlement mechanism. However, there 
is little confidence that the current dispute system can make 
a difference. (D4)
Box 9











Satisfaction with the impact of the DAGs
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of respondents are dissatisfied with the impact of DAGs 
(EU DAGs: 61 per cent [26 / 43]; Non-EU DAGs: 56 per cent 
[36 / 64]). Nevertheless, when looking at the evaluation 
across the different interest groups, business respondents 
are – in line with their position on the DAG functioning and 
monitoring – more satisfied than their non-business col-
leagues (trade unions and NGOs), both in the EU and Non-
EU DAGs. 
  »It has not achieved anything concrete.«  
(open answer survey NEU)
  »It has allowed space for dialogue, but none of the 
criticisms of the agreement have had an impact.« 
(open answer survey NEU)
  »The DAG has met frequently and works, but has had no 
significant impacts to date.« (open answer survey NEU)
  »I’m very critical of the DAGs because, in the end, we 
spent a lot of time talking and writing letters but in 
the end we got nothing.« (interview EU8)
Satisfaction EU DAG respondents per group with DAG impact
Satisfaction Non-EU DAG respondents per group with DAG impact
Figure 22
EU DAGs: Satisfaction with impact by subgroup
Extremely dissatisfied Somewhat dissatisfied Extremely satisfied Somewhat satisfied






Non-EU DAGs: Satisfaction with impact by subgroup
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D2  Governments do not act upon  
DAG recommendations 
While most DAGs have by now spent years discussing the 
implementation of commitments made in the TSD chapter, 
little can be shown in terms of tangible results of these 
meetings. In line with governments’ limited accountability, 
they also do not act upon DAGs’ recommendations. Most 
DAG members observe little impact at present and wish to 
have more policy impact in the future (see Figure 17). Only 
five per cent (2 / 43) of the EU DAG respondents and 8 per 
cent (5 / 65) of the Non-EU DAG respondents indicated that 
the DAGs have had an impact on decision-making. More 
respondents believe the DAGs have achieved nothing 
(EU DAGs: 12 per cent; Non-EU DAGs: 17 per cent). 
  »So far the DAG seems to be a purely formal space for 
national governments, without any of the opinions on 
the agreement being taken into account.«  
(open answer survey NEU)
  »Governments do not take DAGs into account; it is 
more of an obstacle that must be tolerated, and they 
try to be as inactive and ineffective as possible.«  
(open answer survey NEU)
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  »It’s not yet clear how the DAGs can actually be used 
as an accountability tool of the trade agreement.« 
(open answer survey NEU)
  »There was no real impact. European Commission 
and DAG interactions only serve for the legitimation 
of EU trade policy, it does not guarantee sustainable 
development: all violations on the TSD chapters 
raised only had a pseudo-follow up by the EU-Com-
mission without any larger impact.«  
(open answer survey EU)
  »The set-up doesn’t allow [DAGs] to have a big impact 
on policy making… We recognise that it is good to 
have civil society meetings, but they need to be opti-
mised to have greater impact.« (interview EU10)
The case studies in this report provide some examples in 
which the DAGs did contribute to policy changes. Never-
theless, they are often one of a number of channels used 
to advocate for sustainable development issues and it is 
difficult to isolate a DAG’s impact.
Box 10
Policy impact of the DAGs on Georgian labour code reform
D3  The non-enforceable nature of the TSD chapter 
limits the DAGs’ potential policy impact. Not all 
respondents agree on the need for sanctions, 
however.
The enforceability of the sustainable development commit-
ments has been much debated as regards both the imple-
mentation of the TSD chapter and its consequences for the 
DAGs. At the moment, parties cannot be sanctioned for 
violating trade and sustainable development provisions. 
Unlike the rest of the agreement, TSD chapters are subject 
to a specific dispute settlement mechanism, which fore-
sees government consultations and potentially the conven-
ing of a panel of experts, but no sanctions. The DAGs’ role 
in dispute settlement varies slightly, but none of them play 
an influential role or can automatically trigger the proce-
dure. The majority of respondents perceive the non-enforce-
able nature of the dispute settlement mechanism to have a 
negative effect on DAGs’ impact (EU DAG: 56 per cent 
[18 / 32]; Non-EU DAG respondents: 53 per cent [23 / 44]). 
Protection of labour rights remains very weak in Georgia, both at 
the practical and the legislative level. Labour legislation reform has 
been advocated by civil society for years. Some progress has been 
achieved in 2020, with new legal provisions set to be adopted soon, 
introducing such measures as protecting female workers against 
discrimination, protection for minors, and further strengthening la-
bour inspection.* Additionally, improvements are already observa-
ble in such areas as occupational health and safety legislation, as 
well as the creation and gradually expanded mandate of the labour 
inspectorate (interview EU2; NEU5). However, labour rights protec-
tion remains insufficient and faces strong business opposition, also 
within the DAG.
One actor that has consistently advocated for improvements in la-
bour rights has been the Georgian DAG, together with their EU 
counterparts. Indeed, there is a significant overlap between the rec-
ommendations of both DAGs and the content of the labour reform. 
At the same time, any direct influence of the Georgian DAG is dif-
ficult to identify. The Georgian government receives DAG recom-
mendations, but does not – or rarely – act upon them. In this re-
gard, one of the suggestions from civil society was the appointment 
of a paid DAG employee who would ensure follow-up of its docu-
ments and put pressure on the authorities. This is because currently 
dialogue between the Georgian government and civil society is 
very occasional and formalistic and does not touch on the problems 
raised by the DAG (NEU5). 
At the same time, the Georgian government is much more recep-
tive towards recommendations from international organisations, the 
European Union in particular. Pressure on the side of the European 
Commission has been one of the key factors in reforms to date 
(EU2). Labour reforms have been advocated not only by the EU but 
also by the International Labour Organization, Eastern Partnership 
Civil Society Forum (a coalition of civil society organisations estab-
lished on the initiative of the European Commission, whose Geor-
gian National Platform has more resources than the DAG, as well as 
memoranda of understanding with Georgian government and par-
liament), and other actors. They have been discussed in the Geor-
gian tripartite commission and in other forums. The actions of var-
ious actors are generally complementary. As a result, the DAG, 
which is not particularly visible in the Georgian context, is only an 
additional platform (NEU3; NEU5). 
Moreover, under the association agreement itself, the TSD chapter 
is not the only part containing provisions on labour rights. In par-
ticular, Article 354 in Part III of the agreement (Economic Cooper-
ation) refers to Annex XXX, obliging Georgia to implement a sub-
stantial list of items in the EU acquis communautaire related to 
employment, social policy and equal opportunities, and including 
several Council Directives on occupational health and safety, as well 
as equal treatment in employment and occupation (AA 2014). As a 
result, occupational health and safety is also discussed in the Civil 
Society Platform created under the AA, which discusses the imple-
mentation of the agreement as a whole, and it is difficult to sepa-
rate the impact of the Platform and the DAG (EU2; NEU5). In turn, 
the strengthening of labour inspection could be linked mainly to 
the ILO Conventions referred to in the TSD chapter, although it is 
also mandated in the EU-Georgia Association Agenda. In fact, for a 
long time, labour inspection was concerned only with occupational 
health and safety issues, which is part of the mandatory acquis. It 
was criticised by the Georgian and EU DAGs for this reason.**
*   OC Media, Sweeping labour reforms go ahead in Georgia  
despite opposition from business groups. Available at:  
https://oc-media.org/sweeping-labour-reforms-go-ahead-in-
georgia-despite-opposition-from-business-groups/.
**  Conclusions of the 4th joint meeting of the European and 
Georgian Domestic Advisory Groups within the EU-Georgia As-
sociation Agreement, 2019; Emerson, M. and Kovziridze, T., 
eds., 2018. Deepening EU–Georgian Relations: What, why, and 
how? Brussels, Tbilisi, London: CEPS, Reformatics, Rowman & 
Littlefield International; Tchanturidze, G., 2018. Abolition of La-
bour Inspection in Georgia. Tbilisi: Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung.
33
EVALUATION OF DAGS
  »The non-binding nature of the recommendations 
means that there is no greater interest from the  
government and makes it difficult for the DAGs  
to influence.« (open answer survey NEU)
  »DAG’s main purpose should be to allow civil society 
organisations to intervene in and contribute to chang-
ing policies. The problem is related to the voluntary 
approach in the sustainable chapter, where there isn’t 
any useful provision or binding mechanism to protect 
human and environmental rights.«  
(open answer survey EU)
  »We lack the means for complaints about breaches of 
the agreement to be verified by the authorities.« 
(open answer survey NEU)
Figure 24
Effect of non-enforceable nature of dispute settlement mechanism on DAG’s impact 
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Effect of non-enforceable nature of the dispute settlement mechanism on the DAG’s impact
Different evaluation of the effect of the dispute settlement mechanism on DAG’s impact across groups in the EU DAGs
A substantial proportion of respondents are in favour of in-
troducing sanctions to enforce the TSD chapter. The ›possi-
bility to enforce sustainable development commitments 
through sanctions‹ is one of the preferred changes aimed at 
improving the DAGs’ impact, selected by 33 per cent (21 / 64) 
of EU DAG respondents and 28 per cent (12 / 43) of Non-EU 
DAG respondents. Nevertheless, not all respondents sub-
scribe to the idea that there should be a stick to enforce the 
TSD commitments. The majority of ›extremely negative‹ an-
swers is remarkable, showing a relatively high degree of po-
larisation, especially in the EU. In addition, a closer look at 
the number shows that only non-business respondents 
(both EU and Non-EU) responded with ›extremely negative‹, 
showing that there is a discrepancy between business and 
non-business on this issue (see Figure 25 and 26). 
  »It should not be a forum to present disputes, but rath-
er to support governments in implementing practices 
that facilitate making sustainability an integral part of 
trade.« (open answer survey NEU)
  »If you know that there are breaches or a situation is 
getting out of hand, you report the problem to the 
institutions, and you hope that this is taken up by 
the institutions. After reporting, for me, it’s the high-
est level you can have. You should stop there. It’s for 
the government to take action. Sometimes there is a 
variation between what CS has identified and what 
government chooses to work on.«  
(interview EU9)
Figure 25
EU DAGs: evaluation by subgroup on effect of non-enforceable nature of dispute settlement 
mechanism on DAG’s impact
Extremely negative Somewhat negative Neither positive nor negative Extremely positive Somewhat positive
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Figure 26
Non-EU DAGs: evaluation by subgroup on effect of non-enforceable nature of dispute settlement 
mechanism on DAG’s impact
Extremely negative Somewhat negative Neither positive nor negative Extremely positive Somewhat positive





D4  Especially EU DAG members wish to have the ca-
pacity to trigger the dispute settlement mecha-
nism. However, there is little confidence that the 
current dispute system can make a difference. 
The most favourite change to improve DAG impact of EU 
DAG respondents (40 per cent [17 / 43]) is to be able to 
trigger the dispute settlement mechanism. There is, how-
ever, little interest in increasing involvement in the current 
dispute settlement mechanism (EU DAG: 19 per cent 
[8 / 43]; Non-EU DAG: six per cent [4 / 64]), or in enforcing 
the current dispute settlement mechanism more asser-
tively (EU DAG: 19 per cent [8 / 43]; Non-EU DAG: five per 
cent [3 / 64]). The debate on the dispute settlement mech-
anism seems to be less intense or polarised than the one 
on the enforceability of the TSD chapter.
   Involvement in review processes (enforceability provi-
sions) should be a purpose of the DAGs.«  
(open answer survey EU)
Different evaluation of the effect of the dispute settlement mechanism on DAG’s impact across groups in the Non-EU DAGs
Preferred changes to improve DAG impact related to the enforceability of the TSD chapter
Figure 27
Preferred changes for DAG impact related to the enforceability of the TSD chapter
More assertive enforcement of current dispute 
settlement mechanism




Possibility to enforce sustainable development 
commitments through sanctions
Increased involvement of the DAG in the dispute 
settlement mechanism
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Figure 28 shows an overview of the preferred changes to 
improve the impact of the DAGs. Given the ›ladder of in-
clusiveness‹ and the need to fulfill the instrumental, infor-
mation sharing and monitoring steps before reaching the 
final one on policy impact, some of the favourite changes 
put forward are related to these other steps. This table 
helps to put the desired changes concerning the enforcea-
bility of the TSD chapter into perspective, illustrating their 
importance for the EU DAG respondents.
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Overview of preferred changes for improving DAG impact
Figure 28
Overview of preferred changes for improving DAG impact
Nothing should change
More involvement of the DAGs in annual 







Better monitoring activities 
of the DAG 
More accountability of the European 
Commission / partner country / region
More accountability of own government /
the European Commission
More assertive enforcement of current 
dispute settlement mechanism
Increased involvement of the DAG 
in the dispute settlement mechanism
Better instruments at DAG’s disposal to give input 
to own government / the European Commission
Possibility to enforce sustainable development 
commitments through sanctions
Having a separate meeting between all the 
trade agreements' DAGs and governments 
Ability of DAG to trigger dispute 
settlement mechanism
More involvement of the DAGs in annual 
transnational meeting with government 
Better follow-up by own government /
the European Commission on DAG’s input
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36
FRIEDRICH-EBERT-STIFTUNG – DOMESTIC ADVISORY GROUPS IN EU TRADE AGREEMENTS
Box 11
The first dispute settlement to be triggered: the EU-South Korea case
The EU-South Korea trade agreement is the first and to date the 
only FTA regarding which a dispute settlement mechanism has been 
triggered under the TSD chapter.
Korea has not ratified four out of eight fundamental ILO Conven-
tions, dealing with the right of association, collective bargaining 
and forced labour, and has imprisoned trade union members and 
leaders. In view of this, in 2014 and 2016, the EU DAG sent two let-
ters to the EU’s trade commissioners De Gucht and Malmström, de-
manding that they instigate intergovernmental consultations. It did 
not prompt immediate action by the commissioners, however, de-
spite the progressively deteriorating situation in Korea. Only after 
the European Parliament adopted a resolution in 2017 urging the 
Commission to launch formal consultations did the Commission 
proceed with the dispute settlement procedure. 
The procedure has proved lengthy and, so far, inconclusive. More-
over, the ITUC, the ETUC, the International Federation for Human 
Rights and subsequently the EESC have criticised the EU for limiting 
the list of breaches it aims to address through the dispute settlement 
procedure. The EU formally requested consultations in December 
2018. They took place in January 2019, but ›unfortunately, the con-
sultations did not lead to the matters being satisfactorily addressed 
and thus failed to settle all the issues raised by the EU‹. Therefore, in 
July 2019, the EU requested the establishment of a Panel of Experts. 
The Panel started its work on 30 December 2019 (announcement 
on 19 December) and was supposed to deliver its report by March 
2020, with submissions of amicus curiae briefs allowed only until 10 
January 2020. So far, no report has been delivered. 
Within South Korea, the dispute settlement procedure has helped 
to draw attention to the linkage between labour rights and trade. 
However, Korea has also demonstrated some ›whitewashing‹ ac-
tivities, for instance, submitting a motion of convention ratification 
to the Parliament while simultaneously introducing an amendment 
bill that would take away the newly acquired rights (interview KR2, 
19.06.2020). 
The South Korea case sets a very important precedent for the EU. 
Some EU stakeholders see it as an important learning opportunity 
and wish to apply their lessons in the future (interview 10.06.2020). 
Nonetheless, the added value of the precedent will depend on the 
outcome of the dispute settlement procedure. If the verdict is leni-
ent, or not implemented / enforced (also in view of the lack of ›bind-
ing enforcement tools‹), it may discourage further complaints and 
actions by stakeholders. Implementation of the panel report, in 
partnership with the newly appointed Chief Trade Enforcement Of-
ficer, will be a key test for the EU’s commitment to the TSD chapter, 
as expressed in, among other things, the 2018 fifteen-point plan.
This case has demonstrated the importance of collaboration be-
tween civil society and the European Parliament in promoting trade 
and sustainable development, as the DAGs alone were not success-
ful in advancing their complaints. This case has also demonstrated 
the weak accountability of the Commission and the limited impact 
of monitoring conducted by stakeholders. While the best way to en-
hance the role of the DAGs would be to allow civil society to auto-
matically trigger the dispute settlement procedure, at the very least, 
Commission’s accountability to civil society should be strength-
ened, for example, allowing possibilities of appeal. It is important to 
note that there was a consensus among business and non-business 
actors, and this arguably facilitated the triggering of the dispute 
settlement procedure. On the other hand, the Korean case also 
demonstrates that some Korean DAG members strongly prefer the 
dialogue approach and would like to avoid any sort of dispute set-
tlement procedure, even a non-binding one, which is seen as overly 
confrontational. Thus, while some believe that the Commission’s 
current approach is too lenient, others consider it too strict.
37
The objective of this study was to take stock of how the 
domestic advisory groups (DAGs), established in the chap-
ters of trade and sustainable development (TSD) in EU 
trade agreements, have developed and what they have 
achieved, as well as to identify their main challenges. For 
this purpose, original data was collected through a survey, 
to which 50 EU and 74 Non-EU DAG members responded, 
and 18 interviews with EU and Non-EU DAG members. The 
analysis was structured along a ›ladder of inclusiveness‹, 
comprising fours steps: instrumental purpose, information 
sharing, monitoring, and policy impact. Analogous to a 
physical ladder, the lower steps need to be passed before 
being able to move up the ladder.
The first step, instrumental purpose, seems to have been 
achieved in the EU and several partner countries. Some 
Non-EU DAGs are still facing severe organisational short-
comings, hindering their proper functioning, however. 
Overall, the main issues in this context are the frequency 
and timely notification of meetings, support for a secretar-
iat, and funding. The DAGs are not considered to be mere-
ly a tool for legitimising the trade agreement. Some 
members, especially non-business respondents, do remain 
vigilant about this potential risk.
In information sharing, the second step, we see that the 
essential elements for dialogue are present. Horizontal re-
lations between DAG members are considered to be posi-
tive. Nevertheless, genuine dialogue between DAG 
members is still lacking. There are often tensions between 
business and non-business DAG members, especially in 
Non-EU DAGs and at transnational level. The vertical rela-
tions between civil society and governments are evaluated 
negatively as there is insufficient interaction, information 
sharing and interest from governments. The second step is 
therefore only partly achieved, which will undermine the 
fulfilment of the following steps.
Indeed, even though the third step, monitoring, is the ob-
jective DAG members most aspire to, it has not material-
ised. DAG members do not have enough resources to 
conduct research and outreach to broader society in order 
to monitor the implementation of the TSD commitments. 
Moreover, an accountability deficit persists as there is no 
clear procedural feedback loop between the DAGs and 
their governments, and the latter do not sufficiently follow 
up on input given by the DAGs. Interestingly, Non-EU DAGs 
do appreciate the potential leverage provided by the Euro-
pean Commission and EU DAGs to access and influence 
their own government. 
Finally, the fourth step, policy impact, has not been realised 
either. The DAGs’ influence is very limited. DAG members 
are not actively involved in decision-making and govern-
ments do not act upon DAGs’ recommendations. The 
non-enforceability of TSD chapters and the impossibility 
for DAGs to directly trigger disputes also play a role here, 
even though views on enforceability are polarised.
In sum, even though there are still organisational issues in 
some cases, the main challenges start with the lack of gen-
uine dialogue between DAG members, and between DAGs 
and governments. This culminates in the accountability 
deficit, which undermines civil society efforts to monitor 
adequately, which, in turn, leads to very limited policy im-
pact. 
Because of this dynamic the DAGs have had little political 
relevance, which is a source of frustration for their mem-
bers. It is therefore crucial for all actors involved that ac-
tions be taken to address these bottlenecks. While practical 
or organisational tweaks are necessary, they are in them-
selves insufficient. A mentality shift on the part of poli-
cy-makers to get them to take the DAGs and their work 
more seriously and to increase the DAGs’ political relevance 
is much needed. Otherwise there is a risk that the DAGs 
will get stuck (if this isn’t already the case) in a negative 
feedback loop, as a result of which no progress will be 
made, and the interest and commitment of civil society 
would be eroded. In other words, much effort is being 
made to move up the ladder, but if participants feel it is 
impossible to climb further, the DAGs risk losing meaning 
and the ladder might tip over. This would, in turn, contrib-
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4
POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
In this final section, we formulate recommendations to im-
prove the success of the DAGs. We follow the same struc-
ture as in the report, namely the different steps of the 
›ladder of inclusiveness‹. As already mentioned, it is impor-
tant to achieve the lower steps before moving up the lad-
der. More concretely, it means that the DAGs need to 
function properly before expecting the desired information 
sharing, which is in turn fundamental to the DAGs’ moni-
toring role. Similarly, good monitoring is a precondition for 
policy impact.
The research presented in this report has shown that the vast 
majority of DAG members agree that monitoring is the pur-
pose to which the DAGs most aspire. It is therefore crucial for 
all actors involved that actions be taken to achieve this par-
ticular step, especially concerning government accountability. 
Otherwise there is a risk that DAGs will get stuck (if this has 
not happened already) in a negative feedback loop, as a re-
sult of which no progress is made, and that the interest 
and commitment of civil society is eroded. In other words, 
much effort is being made to move up the ladder, but if 
participants feel it is impossible to climb further, the DAGs 
risk losing meaning and the ladder might tip over. 
Recent initiatives to improve the organisational aspect of 
the DAGs by the European Commission can be applauded, 
as it is indeed essential to get the functioning of these 
mechanisms right. However, while practical tweaks are 
necessary, they are in themselves insufficient. In particular 
a mentality shift is much needed on the part of policy mak-
ers to take the DAGs and their work more seriously and to 
increase the DAGs’ political relevance. 
*  With the word ›governments‹ we refer to the governments of all the parties, namely the European Commission 
and the national governments of the trade partners. The same logic applies to ›parliaments‹.
Table 8
Summary of the recommendations
Step ladder Recommendation Directed to
Instrumental 
purpose
Ensure regular meetings take place and set dates for the DAG and 
transnational meetings well in advance to allow for substantive 
preparation
DAG members, secretariats and governments*
Provide sufficient resources for participation and the support of a 
secretariat 
DAG members and governments




Ensure independent, representative and balanced  
DAG membership
DAG members and governments
Foster genuine dialogue within the DAGs DAG members
Establish a clear work programme DAG members
Institutionalise and invest in DAG-to-DAG relations DAG members and governments
Forge and sustain thematic transnational alliances DAG members
Improve the process of developing joint statements DAG members (and governments)
Establish more and better interaction between the DAGs 
 and governments
Governments and intergovernmental board




4.1 INSTRUMENTAL PURPOSE:  
HOW CAN THEY MEET BETTER?
ENSURE REGULAR MEETINGS TAKE  
PLACE AND SET MEETING DATES WELL 
IN ADVANCE
An often repeated criticism is that DAGs do not meet fre-
quently enough for their work to progress substantially 
and in a timely manner. Another frustration is that the 
dates of meetings are decided too late, hindering the ef-
fective participation of DAG members.
For DAG meetings, the DAG chair and secretariat should, 
in agreement with the other DAG members, plan to con-
vene frequently (this could be quarterly or even monthly if 
DAG members wish it), set the dates at least one month in 
advance and provide for the possibility for DAG members 
to attend virtually. The organisation of transnational meet-
ings is more complicated as more agendas need to be 
aligned. DAG-to-DAG meetings and meetings between 
civil society and the intergovernmental board depend on 
when the latter meets. It is therefore up to governments to 
set a date early on, for instance at least three months in 
advance, in order to allow civil society to be informed and 
prepare for participation. Practice shows that often meet-
ings occur during the same period every year. It should 
therefore be possible for government officials to commit to 
a date well in advance, showing the DAG members their 
commitment, interest and respect. DAG members should 
organise additional (virtual) DAG-to-DAG meetings be-
tween annual meetings in order to maintain momentum. 
PROVIDE SUFFICIENT RESOURCES FOR  
PARTICIPATION AND THE SUPPORT OF  
A SECRETARIAT
Insufficient resources for the organisation of DAG mem-
bers to employ staff to prepare and attend the meetings, 
as well as resources to cover the travelling costs of DAG 
members are concrete obstacles to the functioning of most 
DAGs. In addition, a large majority of Non-EU DAGs can-
not rely on a secretariat for organisational support and pre-
liminary work.
These issues should be addressed by securing long-term 
funding dedicated to the functioning of DAGs. This should 
ideally be provided by each signatory of the EU trade agree-
ment, hence committing to the establishment of a DAG. 
This funding could, for instance, be derived from economic 
benefits engendered by the trade agreement. If this funding 
is unavailable, a common EU-partner country funding 
scheme should be envisaged or, as a last resort and as is 
currently the case, only EU funding. The experience of the 
current three-year Partnership Instrument dedicated to in-
crease the participation of civil society in the TSD chapters 
could be helpful in determining how much funding is re-
quired and what the range of tasks of the secretariat 
should be. A detailed assessment of this funding instru-
ment, involving the evaluation of the DAG members, 
would therefore be pertinent. In any case, funding needs 
to be extended beyond this particular instrument and 
should be included in the legal provisions establishing the 
DAGs. 
Secretariats can be organised differently depending on the 
local context of each country and the existing institutions. 
It can be managed by an official existing institution (for 
example, EESC), a government agency (for example, within 
the economic, environmental or labour ministry), as long as 
the DAG’s independence is guaranteed, a civil society or-
ganisation, an external private consultant or an organisa-
tion established for this purpose. 
PROACTIVELY ADDRESS REMAINING  
ORGANISATIONAL AND LOGISTICAL ISSUES
 
Given the persisting issues concerning DAG functioning, 
especially the Non-EU DAGs, it is necessary to repeat that 
it is critical to get the basics right as they influence the 
other steps of the ladder and consequently the overall suc-
cess of the DAGs. 
The practical obstacles to the organisation of meetings or 
member attendance need to be identified and addressed 
in a timely matter. Since the introduction of DAGs in EU 
trade agreements, a lot of work has been done in the EU 
and abroad. Experiences and lessons from other trade 
agreements can be shared in order to speed up the smooth 
organisation and well-functioning of the DAGs. Given the 
high percentage of DAG members dissatisfied with their 
DAG’s functioning, it would be appropriate to have a year-
ly evaluation on how the practicalities of these mechanisms 
should be improved. 
Monitoring 
purpose
Provide structural resources to conduct research DAG members and governments
Establish feedback loop procedures with governments Governments and intergovernmental board




Maximise enforceability of the TSD chapter European Commission and EU-Parliament
Clarify expectations on DAGs’ impact DAG members and Governments
Peeping outside the box DAG members and Governments
ß
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DAG members should be self-critical and determine how the 
functioning of their DAG should improve. In parallel, their 
government should be a partner in the success of the DAG, 
creating and supporting an enabling environment for DAGs 
to prosper. If the DAG’s voice is too weak and / or its govern-
ment is neglecting or curbing the DAG’s potential, the other 
DAG of the agreement and its government have the respon-
sibility to raise the matter and exert pressure for changes.
4.2 INFORMATION PURPOSE:  
HOW CAN THEY TALK BETTER?
ENSURE INDEPENDENT, REPRESENTATIVE 
AND BALANCED DAG MEMBERSHIP 
Obviously, who the DAG members are matters for substan-
tive discussions within the DAGs. The basic requirements 
are that the DAG members be independent from govern-
ment and represent relevant stakeholders. In addition, they 
should represent their constituencies in a balanced way 
within the DAG. 
If it is necessary to adapt the EESC tripartite model to the 
domestic context of the trade partner – in other words, 
to move beyond the current business, labour and envi-
ronmental or other interest organisations – then an open 
debate should be held about this topic among the DAGs, 
as well as between the DAGs and intergovernmental 
board. In addition, it is important that sufficient aware-
ness is raised and the visibility of the DAGs increased 
among relevant civil society organisations. This can be 
done, for instance, by circulating DAG outputs more 
widely, holding open debate sessions at the national lev-
el, and even organising press conferences. Moreover, ap-
plication procedures should simple, transparent and 
unbiased. In other words, the DAG should be easily ac-
cessible for all organisations that can contribute to its 
objectives. For the EU that should entail communicating 
and recruiting beyond the currently used DG Trade Civil 
Society Dialogue database. The membership of all DAGs 
should be monitored and, if necessary, addressed. It is 
therefore essential that governments are transparent 
about their DAG’s members.
Governments should create an enabling environment and 
establish an accessible and transparent application proce-
dure. Governmental interests should never be criteria for 
DAG membership. Civil society plays an important role in 
raising awareness and informing peers about the DAG. The 
membership should be monitored by civil society in both 
trading partners so they can give notice if there are issues 
concerning these aspects of membership.
FOSTER GENUINE DIALOGUE  
WITHIN THE DAGS
Even though there is currently interaction between DAG 
members and information is being shared, this should be 
scaled up to genuine dialogue in order to optimise rela-
tions between the members, the working method of the 
DAGs, the content of their discussions and, consequently, 
the quality of their work. 
Genuine dialogue involves members’ really listening to 
each other, building bridges between their positions and 
moving away from representing solely their primary inter-
ests and from power asymmetries. In order to allow the 
DAGs to be deliberation forums of proper, power imbal-
ances between the members should be acknowledged and 
addressed, if necessary by an impartial moderator and by 
allocating sufficient speaking time to all participants and 
developing adequate decision-making procedures.
This should be done firstly by the DAG members them-
selves. If the partner DAG and / or government observes 
problematic dynamics in a DAG, however, they also have 
the responsibility to report this and insist on improvements, 
both at governmental and civil society level.
ESTABLISH A CLEAR WORK PROGRAMME 
A better-defined work programme is very high on the wish 
list of DAG members. Indeed, many respondents com-
plained about the lack of a clear working programme or 
concrete targets. In some cases, respondents recognised 
that their DAG does not has a true internal dynamic and 
that it is only active around the time of the annual transna-
tional meetings. 
Given that the lack of a better-defined work programme 
is often the result of a combination of inadequate re-
sources to participate substantively and poor relations 
between the DAG members, it is important to take the 
previous recommendations into account. If the govern-
mental board’s work programme has been shared with 
the DAGs, they can for instance take this document as a 
starting point to decide which issues the DAG will work 
on. If this is not the case, DAG members can proactively 
develop their own agenda, setting targets both for the 
short and long term and organise accordingly to achieve 
their objectives. 
DAG members play an important role here as it is their re-
sponsibility to be committed and constructive, to find com-
mon ground and move forward. Governments can assist 
them by being transparent as regards their own pro-
grammes, making the DAGs’ work more politically relevant. 
INSTITUTIONALISE AND INVEST  
IN DAG-TO-DAG RELATIONS
The research presented in this report shows how beneficial 
good relations between DAGs can be to empower civil so-
ciety and increase the policy impact of the relevant mech-
anisms. It is therefore important to establish ties between 
civil societies in the different trade partners and to rein-
force existing ones. Moreover, the civil societies of all par-
ties should be attentive to dynamics that undermine the 
DAGs’ legitimacy, such as excluded or silenced voices.
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DAG-to-DAG relations can be fostered in several ways. 
First, even though DAG-to-DAG meetings have been tak-
ing place de facto during the annual meetings on the im-
plementation of the TSD chapter, it would be better to 
specify such meetings or mechanisms in the treaty provi-
sions. Future trade agreements could even provide for 
more DAG-to-DAG meetings, for instance a minimum of 
two per year. Second, DAG members should liaise proac-
tively with their counterparts. In doing so, continuity be-
tween the annual meetings would be ensured, avoiding 
that annual meetings become isolated, one-off events. 
Virtual meetings or joint work can boost DAG-to-DAG re-
lations. In addition, the interest of DAGs in one another 
and the commitment of their members increases partici-
pants’ motivation and DAGs’ relevance. Third, DAG mem-
bers and their respective governments have a responsibility 
to ensure that transnational meetings are prepared and 
organised with attention to existing power asymmetries. 
These should at least be acknowledged and ideally be neu-
tralised in order to enable genuine dialogue.
DAG members should connect proactively across the DAGs 
and be vigilant in relation to dynamics that affect these 
mechanisms’ potential. There is also an important role for 
governments, however, as they should provide an enabling 
environment for the DAGs, for instance by providing for an 
official DAG-to-DAG meeting (and with this constellation) 
or make available infrastructure for meetings (as EU dele-
gations have been doing). 
FORGE AND SUSTAIN THEMATIC  
TRANSNATIONAL ALLIANCES
The study has shown that existing ties across the DAGs 
were reinforced through their activities and that collabora-
tion among DAGs increases their potential impact. This has 
especially been the case for labour issues.
Forging and sustaining thematic transnational alliances are 
therefore recommended in order to pool resources, in 
terms of both capacity and expertise. In addition, if a cer-
tain group or DAG does not have access to the policy-mak-
ing level, then its counterpart can try to address this 
through its own government. This can be done by collabo-
rating formally or informally on a certain topic, sharing in-
formation and resources, and supporting each other’s 
endeavours.
Even though this strategy is already being implemented in 
several DAGs, it should be reinforced where possible by 
DAG members. Collaboration should not be limited to or-
ganisations with similar interests.
IMPROVE THE PROCESS OF  
DEVELOPING JOINT STATEMENTS
 
Reaching joint DAG-to-DAG statements has proven to be a 
thorny endeavour. This is due mainly to conflicting and ir-
reconcilable interests, often between business and 
non-business actors. DAG-to-DAG conclusions are consid-
ered to be one of, if not the most important deliverable for 
DAG members as they are the only formal statement 
shared with the intergovernmental board (even though the 
DAG-to-DAG meeting is not formally provided for in the 
trade agreement). 
Given the conflicting interests, one should consider whether 
joint statements endorsed by all DAG members are really the 
only way forward. Can and should tensions resulting from 
disagreements about compliance with the commitments 
made in the TSD chapter be overcome during DAG-to-DAG 
meetings? In some cases it could be more fruitful to agree to 
disagree and, at the same time, to aspire to achieve some 
sort of rapprochement on disputed issues in the future. It 
would be worth considering the help of a neutral facilitator 
or establishing coalitions among DAGs to draft the state-
ments. Ultimately, even if a joint statement is not endorsed 
by all members, the intergovernmental board should take 
up the signals sent by the DAGs in their statement. 
Again, both DAG members and governments have a 
shared responsibility to address this issue. First, it is up to 
the DAG members to try to find solutions to deal with con-
flicting interests. If no compromise is satisfactory, they 
should be able to communicate this situation to their gov-
ernments or the intergovernmental board. If a statement 
has been endorsed by all DAG members, it should still be 
considered by the intergovernmental board. 
ESTABLISH MORE AND BETTER  
INTERACTION BETWEEN THE DAGS  
AND GOVERNMENTS
In general, the DAGs are considered to have facilitated dis-
cussions with officials. Nevertheless, there is still a lot of 
room for improvement concerning relations between DAGs 
and their governments.
To start with, more interaction should be arranged. The 
DAGs should be able to meet on a regular basis with their 
government to exchange views, not only once a year to 
prepare the annual transnational meeting. In addition, for-
mal interaction should be foreseen at this transnational 
meeting between the DAGs and the intergovernmental 
board. The quality of the interaction should also be im-
proved. It is important for a government to show interest in 
the DAG’s existence and work. Moreover, continuity in the 
official dealing with the DAGs would be beneficial as it al-
lows for a relationship to develop between the DAG mem-
bers and the government representatives. In addition, 
governments should share more information about the 
implementation of the trade agreement in general and the 
TSD chapter in particular. If this information is not availa-
ble, it can be developed in collaboration with the DAGs. 
INSTITUTIONALISE THE RELATIONS  
BETWEEN THE DAGS AND PARLIAMENTS
In both the EU and the trade partners, parliaments are rarely 
involved in the work of the DAG. Nevertheless, parliaments 
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ratify trade agreements and should also keep the govern-
ment accountable for implementation. They therefore could 
and should be more effective allies for the DAGs.
To this end, an institutionalised dialogue between the par-
liament and the DAG should be established. Depending on 
the local context, this dialogue can be organised in differ-
ent ways, such as regular meetings, written debriefs, or ad 
hoc follow-up when certain issues persist. The most impor-
tant objective here is that the parliaments take up more 
responsibility in enforcing the commitments made in the 
TSD chapter and assist the DAGs in their work as parliament 
can support the DAGs’ monitoring and policy impact. 
More concretely, the DAGs and the relevant parliamentary 
services should have contacts and develop a working 
method to collaborate.
4.3 MONITORING PURPOSE:  
HOW CAN THEY OVERSEE BETTER?
PROVIDE STRUCTURAL RESOURCES  
FOR CONDUCTING RESEARCH
In both EU and Non-EU DAGs, limited financial resources 
for conducting research are considered to have a substan-
tial negative impact on the DAGs’ monitoring role. Even 
though the implementation of the TSD chapter already 
lies within the remit of the DAG members, they often do 
not have sufficient means for supplementary monitoring 
activities concerning the complexities of a specific trade 
agreement and its impact on sustainable development. 
Enlarging the scope of the DAGs’ work to the whole 
agreement will only make additional resources for moni-
toring more critical.
In line with the suggestion made above concerning re-
sources for participation and secretarial support, different 
avenues for funding can be envisaged. Individual DAG 
members could try to secure their own funding for re-
search, as some have done in the past. In addition, DAG 
members could pool available resources and conduct / com-
mission research for the DAG as a whole.
Nevertheless, in most cases own funding is not possible, 
not only because is not available, but also because the 
(perceived) political relevance of the DAGs has been rather 
low, making DAG members reluctant to invest more in the 
DAGs than their precious time. The parties should there-
fore also step in and support the DAGs in fulfilling their 
monitoring role. If the EU and its trading partners are seri-
ous about tasking a group of experts with monitoring a 
complex issue such as the impact of a trade agreement on 
sustainable development, it only seems logical that con-
comitant funding should be provided. The three-year Part-
nership Instrument foresees a limited amount of studies 
per DAG. Even though at the time of writing no concrete 
studies have been conducted, this initiative can only be ap-
plauded. Equally, it should be sustained and extended.
ESTABLISH FEEDBACK LOOP PROCEDURES 
WITH GOVERNMENTS
A major bottleneck for the DAGs is the lack of government 
accountability. One aspect of this weak accountability is 
that few to no established procedures exist for the DAGs to 
give input to and receive feedback from their government. 
This recommendation, along with the next one, apply to 
relations between DAGs and their respective governments, 
as well as DAG-to-DAG relations and relations with the in-
tergovernmental TSD board.
A feedback loop should therefore be established with clear 
procedures on how to provide governments with input. 
This includes accessible instruments that enable the DAG 
to raise questions and share concerns or findings, on one 
hand, and for governmental replies on the other hand. In 
addition, governments could more often initiate a feed-
back cycle by consulting the DAG on a particular matter. 
This feedback loop is not supposed to be too rigid and it 
can differ between the parties. The main objective is to 
increase the responsiveness and good governance of the 
governments involved.
For DAGs, several avenues can be explored, such as physi-
cal meetings between government officials and the DAG, 
be it only with the DAG’s presidency or the whole DAG on 
the occasion of the latter’s meetings. Written communica-
tion is also possible. At transnational level, ways to ensure 
that DAG input feeds into the intergovernmental board 
meeting should be pursued. Existing best practices include 
the submission of joint conclusions, the organisation of 
back-to-back meetings between the DAG-to-DAG and in-
tergovernmental meetings, or the invitation of DAGs’ 
chairs to this meeting.
Governments have an important responsibility here to es-
tablish such clear procedures. This can best be coordinated 
with the DAGs. 
FOLLOW UP ON DAGS’ INPUT
 
A second aspect of weak governmental accountability, is 
that when input is given by the DAGs, governments’ fol-
low-up is generally extremely (s)low. 
In relation to the feedback loop mentioned above, govern-
ments should reply to input from the DAGs. Of course, this 
recommendation does not require that governments nec-
essarily take into account or accept DAGs’ input. Rather, it 
implies that no matter what the content of the contribu-
tion, the government acknowledge it, consider it and reply 
to the DAG in a timely manner. Without such follow-up, 
DAGs’ work loses its relevance. In addition to preventing 
›DAG fatigue‹, such an approach would improve predicta-




4.4 POLICY IMPACT PURPOSE:  
HOW CAN THEY INFLUENCE BETTER?
MAXIMISE ENFORCEABILITY  
OF THE TSD CHAPTER 
A debate on the weak implementation of the TSD chapters 
is ongoing at EU level, and the European Commission has 
recognised the need for improvements on this matter in its 
fifteen-point plan.8 The EU shies away from trade sanctions 
as they do not correspond to its preferred cooperative ap-
proach. Because of the non-enforceable nature of this par-
ticular chapter, there does not seem too much at stake if 
the commitments made are not respected. Hence, civil so-
ciety organisations and governments do not have many 
incentives to be interested and invest in the DAGs.
For existing trade agreements, the EU should continue its 
efforts to develop a conducive setting for the enforcement 
of the TSD chapter. The newly appointed trade enforce-
ment officer,9 as well as the triggered dispute settlement 
mechanism in the EU-Korea trade agreement are two con-
crete examples of such efforts. Nevertheless, the proof of 
the pudding is in the eating, and the burden of proof to 
show how these recent developments will lead to timely, 
effective and assertive implementation of the TSD chapter 
remains with the EU and its trading partners who have 
chosen a cooperative approach.
For new trade agreements, there are several ways to in-
crease enforceability. For instance, France and the Nether-
lands10 have suggested lowering or raising tariffs based on 
trade partners’ progress in implementing the TSD chapter. 
This, in essence, is equivalent to sanctions, but from the 
diplomatic standpoint it is a much milder measure. In addi-
tion, the dispute settlement mechanism could be optimised 
by foreseeing a formal role for the DAGs to trigger cases, 
to give input during investigations, and to be kept informed 
of the proceedings. In addition, this mechanism should be 
a last resort if governmental consultations and panels of 
expert do not bring about the desired changes. When a 
free trade agreement has a demonstrably negative impact 
on sustainable development and fails to foster the parties’ 
commitments in this regard, suspending the agreement 
should not be ruled out. 
As already described, the European Commission has an im-
portant role to play in this context. Moreover, the Europe-
an Parliament should be even more vigilant and demanding 
8 Commission Services. 2017. ›Non-Paper of the Commission Ser-
vices: Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) Chapters in EU 
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs).‹ Available at: http://trade.ec.europa.
eu/doclib/docs/2017/july/tradoc_155686.pdf.
9 European Commission, European Commission appoints its first 
Chief Trade Enforcement Officer. Available at: https://trade.ec.eu-
ropa.eu/doclib/docs/2017/july/tradoc_155686.pdf.
10 Non-paper from the Netherlands and France on trade, social  
economic effects and sustainable development. Available at:  
https://nl.ambafrance.org/Non-paper-from-the-Netherlands-and-
France-on-trade-social-economic-effects-and.
to make sure that the TSD chapters are being implement-
ed. In doing so, there should also be sufficient focus on 
possible shortcomings of the EU and its member states. 
CLARIFY EXPECTATIONS REGARDING  
DAGS’ IMPACT 
While it seems obvious that the DAGs are created to have 
an impact on sustainable development, there is significant 
confusion and vagueness as regards what DAGs are sup-
posed to achieve and how this could be done. 
Therefore, it is important to specify what is the expected 
process of change or causal linkage between DAGs’ activi-
ties and sustainable development. For instance, a theory of 
change, a method explaining the process of change by de-
scribing the causal linkages in an initiative with regard to 
the potential influence of DAGs on sustainable develop-
ment should be elaborated in order to make explicit what 
can realistically be expected. Such theorisation would 
specify what the impact of information sharing and moni-
toring between DAG members could / should be (common 
positions? better monitoring? empowerment of weaker 
members?) and what kind of tangible impact may be ex-
pected (institution building? ratification of conventions? 
transnational advocacy alliances?).
In doing so, the parties to the trade agreement would con-
tribute to managing expectations with civil society organi-
sations that participate in the DAGs. For DAG members, an 
explicit ›theory of change‹ would have the advantage of 
setting benchmarks in terms of what they want to achieve 
through these mechanisms. 
PEEPING OUTSIDE THE BOX
DAGs are part and parcel of free trade agreements. While 
they might contribute to enhancing the sustainability of 
these trade arrangements, especially if the abovemen-
tioned recommendations are taken to heart, it still remains 
doubtful that they would be able to counterbalance the 
major effects of free trade. Also trade sanctions may not 
entail desirable effects, as they risk targeting the most vul-
nerable people and reproducing neo-colonial logic. And to 
the extent that DAGs would have an impact on sustainable 
development in practice, this may be undone by (f)actors 
outside the trade framework. 
DAG members and the parties should be aware of the 
structural limitations within which they are operating. In 
order to have a meaningful impact, they should not only 
narrowly account for the impact of free trade on sustaina-
ble development, but also address underlying factors that 
reinforce inequalities and injustices within and across coun-
tries. Otherwise, there is a risk that DAGs will merely serve 
to legitimise the free trade agreement. 
DAG members should therefore envisage both an ›insider‹ 
and an ›outsider‹ impact strategy and remain critical of the 
framework in which they operate. Their participation can 
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only be one element of a wider sustainable development 
strategy. Meanwhile, the parties should refrain from pre-
senting the TSD chapter, and the DAGs that form part of it, 
as a magic bullet for sustainable development. In order to 
seriously address wider issues of global justice, more needs 
to be done than advancing sustainable development com-
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5.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
The EU-Georgia Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area 
(DCFTA) is part of the Association Agreement (AA), signed 
on 27 June 2014. The AA, in turn, is one of the three such 
agreements concluded with Eastern Partnership countries 
(the other two being Moldova and Ukraine). Unlike many 
other EU trade agreements, the DCFTA foresees ›gradual 
regulatory approximation‹ of Georgia’s legislation ›towards 
key elements of the EU acquis‹ (hence ›deep and compre-
hensive‹).1 
Georgia is a staunch supporter of free trade. Already be-
fore the DCFTA, since 2006 it has undertaken unilateral 
liberalisation of its trade and investment policy towards the 
EU.2 Until the end of 2016, it was a beneficiary of the EU’s 
GSP+ scheme. Nonetheless, its trade relationship with the 
EU is highly asymmetrical. While the EU is Georgia’s largest 
trade partner, responsible for 23.4 per cent of its external 
trade in goods, Georgia only accounts for 0.1 per cent of 
the EU’s external trade in goods.3 
The DCFTA with Georgia is seen by many Georgian and EU 
stakeholders in geopolitical, not only economic terms, and 
as a means to bring the country closer to the EU. Arguably, 
the political support to a certain extent overshadows an 
objective appraisal of the DCFTA’s economic and sustain-
ability aspects (EU3 and EU6). 
While Georgia undertakes to promote ›common values‹ 
with the EU in the AA framework, at the moment, Free-
dom House classifies it as ›partly free‹. According to Free-
dom House, ›oligarchic influence affects the country’s 
political affairs, policy decisions, and media environment, 
1 ›Association Agreement between the European Union and the Eu-
ropean Atomic Energy Community and Their Member States, of 
the One Part, and Georgia, of the Other Part.‹ 2014. Official Jour-
nal of the European Union. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/
legal-content/en/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:22014A0830(02).
2 Messerlin, Patrick, Michael Emerson, Gia Jandieri, and Alexandre Le 
Vernoy. 2011. ›An Appraisal of the EU’s Trade Policy towards  
Its Eastern Neighbours.‹ CEPS. 1 March 2011. Available at:  
https://www.ceps.eu/ceps-publications/appraisal-eus-trade-po-
licy-towards-its-eastern-neighbours-case-georgia/.
3 European Union, Trade in goods with Georgia. Available at:  
https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb_results/factsheets/country/de-
tails_georgia_en.pdf.
and the rule of law is undermined by politicization. Civil 
liberties are inconsistently protected.‹4 At the same time, 
while ›the civil society sector in Georgia is fairly robust‹, 
nevertheless ›some groups are included in policy discus-
sions, though others report facing political pressure, large-
ly in the form of public criticism by government officials 
and opposition figures.‹ Similarly, freedom of trade unions 
scores 2 out of 4. This demonstrates that large business 
interests may prevail over trade unions and non-govern-
mental organisations representing other interests, which 
manifests in such cases as labour market reforms. Civil so-
ciety also faces other challenges, such as (in some cases) 
politicisation, limited ties with society at large, and high 
dependency on donors.5
Both Georgia and the EU have established their own do-
mestic advisory groups within the framework of the DCFTA. 
Unlike in the case of Peru, the Georgian DAG has been 
created as a new mechanism, which includes representa-
tives of business, trade unions, environmental NGOs and 
one NGO dealing with human rights, including labour 
rights. According to the Civil Society Involvement Index de-
veloped by Martens et al. (2018), treaty provisions in the 
case of Georgia put it in the intermediate group; provisions 
on communication with the parties are quite strong, but 
provisions on submitting input to the dispute settlement 
mechanism are relatively weaker. 
5.2 PARTICULARITY: OVERLAPPING  
CIVIL SOCIETY MECHANISMS 
The civil society mechanisms established in the TSD chap-
ter of the EU-Georgian DCFTA (the DAG and the Forum), 
are not the only civil society mechanisms existing in the 
EU-Georgia relations. At least four other mechanisms ex-
ist: the EU-Georgia Civil Society Platform of the Associa-
tion Agreement and the Georgian National Platform, 
which is part of the Eastern Partnership Civil Society Fo-
rum (see Table 9). 
4 Freedom House, Georgia. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/
country/georgia/freedom-world/2020.
5 Piñol Puig, Gemma. 2016. ›Situation Analysis of Civil Society in Ge-
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The purpose of these mechanisms is to monitor and discuss 
the implementation of the policy instruments in which they 
have been established and to make recommendations to a 
joint council or their respective governments. As there is an 
overlap between the content of these different policy in-
struments working on broad topics such as sustainable de-
velopment, good governance, economic integration, there 
is also an overlap in participation in these mechanisms.
Table 9
Main civil society mechanisms in EU-Georgia relations






Georgian mechanism To support the Eastern 
Partnership and represent the 
interests of Georgian civil 
society at the Eastern 
Partnership Civil Society Forum
- Democracy, good governance 
- Economic & EU integration 
-  Energy, climate change &  
environment 
-  Network in country, across 








incl. Members of the EESC 
and the Eastern Partnership 
Civil Society Forum
To meet and exchange views 
and to make recommendations 
to the Association Council 





TSD Chapter  
of the DCFTA
Separate EU and Georgian 
mechanism
To advise, submit views or 
recommendations, including on 
its (their) own initiative 





TSD Chapter  
of the DCFTA
Joint, not membership-based Conduct a dialogue Sustainable development 









Georgian mechanism To ensure involvement of civil 
society in the process of 
effective implementation of the 
DCFTA
DCFTA implementation as  
a whole
The existence of multiple similar civil society mechanisms is 
not unique to EU-Georgian relations and occur in the EU’s 
relations with several parts of the worlds. However, the 
number of mechanisms is quite particular to Ukraine, Geor-
gia and Moldova, three EU Eastern Partnership countries 
that have concluded an Association Agreement, including 
a DCFTA. Georgia is the frontrunner in the Eastern Partner-
ship, strongly committed to European integration. It is also 
a staunch supporter of trade liberalisation and considers 
trade to be key to its economic development. 
There are different opinions about this situation among the 
(EU and Georgian) DAG members. For some, these multi-
ple platforms are a maze: 
»It’s confusing, I don’t have a straight idea of what is con-
nected to what, I only hear abbreviations, these random ad 
hoc meetings, quick, quick, we need to meet and there’s no 
follow-up« (NEU7); or »I cannot see a difference between 
these meetings« (EU6). Indeed, another interviewee states 
that »when you understand where you do what, know the 
history etc., you can follow and use it. But for those that are 
just coming, it’s a nightmare to understand« (EU2).
The EU and Georgian DAG members who are involved in 
different mechanisms and can differentiate between them, 
evaluate this overlap more as an advantage than a disad-
vantage. They explain how, even though there is no explic-
it substantial link between the Association Agreement, its 
TSD chapter, and the Eastern Partnership mechanisms, they 
use them to reiterate their point of view, ensuring that the 
messages are similar in the documents these mechanisms 
produce. In addition, membership of one mechanism can 
lead to involvement in another mechanism, for instance as 
a speaker. 
Some mechanisms are preferred to others. The Civil Society 
Forum of the Eastern Partnership has (EU-funded) resourc-
es and a secretariat, making it more efficient, whereas the 
Georgian DAG has no resources and it is mainly the chair 
who takes care of the substantive preparations and coordi-
nation. In addition, according to some stakeholders, the 
recommendations given by the Eastern Partnership Civil 
Society Forum and the EU-Georgia Civil Society Platform 
(under the AA) are considered to provide a more compre-
hensive and consolidated view of civil society and have 
therefore more political weight. They are used, for exam-
ple, as a reference document by the European Parliament. 
Government actors tend to participate more in the 
EU-Georgia Civil Society Forum, which also explains why 
more organisations are interested in joining these mecha-
nisms than the DAG and why some have suggested merg-
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ing the civil society mechanism of the Association 
Agreement and the TSD chapter. Nevertheless, the DAGs’ 
focus is narrower than the other mechanisms and there is 
direct contact with DG Trade, which can be useful in terms 
of influence, too. In addition, the TSD chapter in which the 
DAGs and Forum operate, has a higher level of obligation 
than the other policy instruments, which has been put for-
ward as an advantage as regards potential policy impact.
Finally, tensions exist between the mechanisms regarding 
legitimacy, and their representativeness is also questioned. 
The Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum and its Nation-
al Platforms wished to be involved in the selection of the 
members of the civil society mechanisms of the Associa-
tion Agreement and the TSD chapter. This has been per-
ceived as a desire to monopolise the interaction of Georgian 
civil society with the EU and has been opposed by EU civil 
society actors. This is also linked to issues of representative-
ness. As one interviewee stated, »for some members you 
know what or who they represent, for others it’s difficult 
to say. Certain personalities used this to promote their own 
organisations« (EU2). The EU-Georgia Civil Society Forum 
is a joint mechanism and is considered to be more repre-
sentative by EU members. The DAGs, on the other hand, 
are national mechanisms and there is not a lot of room for 
the EU side to influence its formation. 
In sum, the existence of multiple civil society platforms 
helps civil society to convey their messages to the EU and 
the Georgian authorities. Their set-up tends to be pre-
ferred by several civil society organisations and this situa-
tion therefore dilutes the potential clout of the DAGs. In 
addition, most mechanisms deal with representativeness, 
efficiency, visibility and influence.
 
5.3 LADDER OF INCLUSIVENESS OF  
THE EU AND GEORGIAN DAGS
5.3.1 Instrumental: Can they meet?
As for all EU trade agreements, the organisation of EU DAG 
meetings is taken care of by the secretariat in the EESC. 
They meet three times a year, on average. The Georgian 
DAG, which doesn’t have a secretariat or its own resources, 
does not meet regularly. Its activity is centred around the 
annual transnational meeting. Coordination is carried out 
mainly by the chair of the Georgian DAG. Several inter-
viewees stressed that the lack of resources has had a neg-
ative impact on the work of the DAG and participation in 
meetings. The limited frequency of the meetings was also 
put forward as an obstacle to achieving more.
The annual meetings have been taking place at transna-
tional level. There are, however, complaints that the dates 
for these meetings are communicated too late, which ham-
pers participation. When meetings take place in Brussels, 
they are organised by the EESC. In Georgia, »it’s always a 
last-minute arrangement« (EU2). 
Despite the attainment of this instrumental purpose of the 
civil society mechanism, there is also a perception among 
some DAG members that these meetings »only take place 
for the sake of having meetings« and that they are »tick 
the box meetings’« (NEU7). Another called the meetings a 
»courtesy call from the government« (EU6).
5.3.2 Information sharing: Can they talk?
The information-sharing purpose also seems to be achieved, 
even though the DAGs’ level of activity and their represen-
tativeness have been criticised.
Concerning content, labour issues have always been high 
on the agenda. More concretely, labour inspection, occu-
pational health and safety, social dialogue, women’s rights 
and child labour and the Georgian labour code reform 
have been discussed. Over the years, more attention has 
been paid to the implementation of the environmental 
agreements covered in the TSD chapter and to a limited 
extent the economic pillar of sustainability. There have 
been calls from business representatives to discuss more 
trade-related questions in the DAGs.
Information exchange has been mentioned as an import-
ant objective of the DAGs: »the possibility to discuss with 
people from both sides, not to give formal information, but 
humanized information about what we really do in our 
countries, not what’s written in papers but how it really 
works. That is a strong part of the DAG« (EU6). A Georgian 
member considers there is still a lot of room for improve-
ment, nevertheless, »the DAGs could be a good instrument 
for networking between players from different sides. It’s 
always good to exchange« (NEU7).
Horizontal exchange seems strongest between trade union 
members from both sides, especially because they already 
had ties prior to the trade agreement. For the other groups, 
this exchange is limited to the actual meetings. There have 
been tensions in DAG-to-DAG meetings with regard to 
agreeing on joint conclusions as the Georgian business side 
did not always agree on the content. This has led to »tough 
discussions« (NEU5) and has also been described as a »pain-
ful process« (NEU7). The solution to the disagreements has 
been to include a disclaimer in the joint conclusions, refer-
ring to the issues that are not supported by Georgian DAG 
members. Vertical exchanges between DAGs and govern-
ments occur at EU level and are evaluated positively (see 
monitoring). The situation in Georgia is different as accord-
ing to some DAG members there have been sporadic meet-
ings between the Georgian DAG and the Ministry of the 
Economy, while others are not aware of such meetings. 
All members agree that the DAGs lack activity, frequent 
contact and interested members, which tends to be a vi-
cious circle. The lack of activity and frequency of contacts 
within and between the DAGs go hand in hand. Neverthe-
less, the members acknowledge that a more proactive ap-
proach from both sides would be beneficial for the DAGs’ 
work. In addition, there is little interaction between the 
DAGs, and the Georgian DAG members perceive a lack of 
interest from EU civil society organisations, which has been 
confirmed by an EU DAG member.
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The representativeness of the DAG members has also been 
questioned. First, the selection procedure is not clear to all 
DAG members. Some state that the procedure is biased by 
the Georgian government, while others claim that it is just 
fine. Second, DAG members acknowledge that the Geor-
gian DAG does not represent Georgian society and some 
organisations are missing. NGOs are well represented and 
trade unions are also active. Questions have been raised, 
however, whether other Georgian trade union organisa-
tions should also be included in the DAGs. One of the most 
active business representatives is from the American 
Chamber of Commerce in Georgia, although this organisa-
tion does not represent the majority of Georgian business-
es. As regards the EU DAG, some Georgian DAG members 
appreciate the collaboration with it, while others feel they 
operate in an ivory tower. 
5.3.3 Monitoring: Can they oversee?
Several achievements have been made concerning the 
monitoring purpose of the DAGs, especially concerning la-
bour issues. However, this is not only due to the DAGs’ 
work. For example, there remains an accountability deficit 
on the part of the Georgian government towards the 
Georgian DAG, and on the part of the European Commis-
sion and the Georgian government towards the joint con-
clusions and recommendations made by the DAGs.
Georgian interviewees made clear that their DAG does not 
have the capacity to conduct formal monitoring. Their mon-
itoring activities are limited to updating their priorities – 
which do not change much, given the limited progress – on 
an annual basis, and collecting relevant information on 
these topics from DAG members. Substantive preparation 
for the annual DAG-to-DAG meeting is done mainly by the 
Georgian DAG, coordinated by its chair. No specific monitor-
ing activities are carried out as regards implementation of 
the TSD chapter. 
When it comes to procedures for advising governments, 
EU DAG members, especially labour representatives, have 
access to European Commission officials and are fairly sat-
isfied with their follow-up. The picture is different on the 
Georgian side, where there are no established or institu-
tionalised ties between the DAG and government. A Geor-
gian DAG member nevertheless notes an evolution in the 
government’s attitude: »Working with our government is a 
problem. However, there is growing access to [it]. It is still 
difficult, but it is expanding« (NEU3).
The joint conclusions are agreed during the DAG-to-DAG 
meeting (this meeting is not provided for in the formal in-
stitutional set-up of the civil society mechanisms) and are 
considered to constitute the most important document, as 
it is submitted to the intergovernmental board, the Trade 
Sustainable Development Sub-Committee. The recommen-
dations given in these conclusions have been fairly similar 
over the years, although they have become more specific.
Government accountability is mixed. The EU DAG mem-
bers seem satisfied with the European Commission’s fol-
low up, even though there is no real formal communication. 
One interviewee explained that on some issues the Com-
mission prefers to work behind closed doors with Geor-
gian officials instead of through official communications. 
In contrast, the Georgian DAG has never received a sub-
stantial follow-up to their input: »there is no real consulta-
tion, they only send the work plans immediately after the 
meetings«(NEU3). The accountability concerning the joint 
conclusions is very low. The conclusions contain recom-
mendations for prioritising government work. However, 
the DAGs »don’t receive a written answer. In the next [an-
nual] meeting we speak about it but it is not a formal some 
statement about the execution of our paper« (EU6).
Turning to the potential to induce policy changes, inter-
viewees acknowledge that the DAGs’ work has helped to 
push the labour code reforms through. They emphasise, 
however, that the reforms cannot be attributed to the DAG 
alone, as different channels were necessary. According to 
the Georgian interviewees, international pressure was 
needed because »the Georgian government feels more ac-
countable to the European side than to national organisa-
tions. The DAGs are a very good way to encourage 
government to make changes« (NEU5). 
5.3.4 Policy impact: Can they influence?
The previous section made clear that the DAGs have in-
duced at least some policy impact. 
The European Commission, both in DG Trade and DG EM-
PL, have been listening to the recommendations made by 
the EU DAG, especially by the labour representatives. The 
Georgian DAG, however, needs to use its contacts with the 
EU DAG to reach the Georgian government. That being 
said, the DAGs have not been involved in decision-making 
and have no direct influence on government decisions. 
5.4 CONCLUSION
There is something of a paradox as regards the EU and 
Georgian DAGs in the fact that, even though there has not 
been much activity or coordination between them, their 
existence has helped to put – and keep – a number of la-
bour issues on the agenda. Moreover, they have also man-
aged to contribute to policy changes in this area. Georgian 
civil society has used these mechanisms mainly as channels 
to reach the Georgian government as the latter responds 
more to international pressure than to national demands. 
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6.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION
The EU–South Korea Free Trade Agreement was the first of 
the new generation of FTAs launched by the ›Global Eu-
rope‹ EU trade strategy (2006). Since then the conclusion 
of bilateral trade agreements securing reciprocal market 
access to foster EU competitiveness has been an explicit 
trade policy objective. Korea was identified as a priority 
partner for EU FTA negotiations, given its large market po-
tential, high level of protection as regards EU imports, and 
active trade negotiations with the EU’s trade competitors.1 
The negotiations on this FTA were concluded in 2009. The 
agreement was provisionally applied in July 2011 before 
being formally ratified in December 2015. 
At the time, this FTA was the most comprehensive trade 
agreement ever negotiated by the EU. It includes extensive 
tariff liberalisation and addresses non-tariff barriers to 
trade in various sectors. It also contains provisions in the 
areas of competition policy, government procurement, in-
tellectual property rights and sustainable development. As 
the first of its generation, it served as a blueprint or bench-
mark for subsequent EU FTAs.
The EU is Korea’s third largest export market, while Korea 
is the EU’s eighth largest export destination for goods.2 
The trade balance between the two trade partners has 
fluctuated, with both parties achieving positive balances at 
various points over the years.3 The EU’s most important 
goods exports to the country are machinery and applianc-
es, transport equipment and chemical products. In turn, 
the main EU imports from South Korea are machinery and 
appliances, transport equipment and plastics.
Civil society in Korea has contributed significantly to both 
the transition to and the consolidation of democracy in the 
1 European Commission (2018). Evaluation of the Implementation of 
the Free Trade Agreement between the EU and its Member States 
and the Republic of Korea: Final report.
2  European Commission, Trade picture South Korea. Available at:  
https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/
south-korea/.
3 European Commission (2020), Trade in goods with South Korea. 
Available at: https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb_results/factsheets/
country/details_south-korea_en.pdf.
country.4 Nevertheless, it has become divided and embat-
tled, which has considerably diminished its unity, influence, 
credibility and legitimacy vis-à-vis the state, political society 
and the market. Human rights groups and other NGOs are 
active and generally operate freely, though they face polit-
ical pressure when criticising the government or other 
powerful interests.5 Turning to labour rights, Korea has 
been given the rating ›no guarantee of rights‹ by the Inter-
national Trade Union Confederation (ITUC).6 
The treaty provisions establishing the civil society mecha-
nisms in the EU-Korea FTA are considered to be high, ac-
cording to the Civil Society Involvement Index developed 
by Martens et al.7 This score is attributed mainly to the 
emphasis on participants’ independence, membership 
scope and, most of all, dispute settlement. 
6.2 PARTICULARITY: TRIGGERING OF  
 THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM
The EU-South Korea trade agreement is the first – and to 
date the only – FTA in which a dispute settlement mecha-
nism under the TSD chapter has been triggered.
Korea has not ratified four out of eight fundamental ILO 
Conventions, dealing with the right of association, collec-
tive bargaining and forced labour, and has imprisoned 
trade union members and leaders. In view of this, in 2014 
and 2016, the EU DAG sent two letters to the EU’s trade 
commissioners De Gucht and Malmström, demanding the 
instigation of intergovernmental consultations. This did not 
prompt immediate action by the commissioners, however, 
despite the progressively deteriorating situation in Korea. 
Only after the European Parliament adopted a resolution in 
2017 urging the Commission to launch formal consulta-
tions did it proceed with the dispute settlement procedure. 
4 Fiori, A. and S. Kim (2018). Civil Society and Democracy in South 
Korea: A Reassessment. Korea’s Quest for Economic Democratiza-
tion. Y. Kim. New York, Springer International Publishing.
5 Freedom House, South Korea. Available at: https://freedomhouse.
org/country/south-korea/freedom-world/2020.
6 ITUC (2019). Global Rights Index. Available at: https://www.ituc-csi.
org/IMG/pdf/2019-06-ituc-global-rights-index-2019-report-en-2.pdf.
7 Martens, D., et al. (2018). ›Mapping Variation of Civil Society Invol-
vement in EU Trade Agreements: A CSI Index.‹ European Foreign 
Affairs Review 23(1): 41-62.
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The procedure has proved lengthy and, so far, inconclusive. 
Moreover, the ITUC, the ETUC, the International Federa-
tion for Human Rights and subsequently the EESC have 
criticised the EU for limiting the list of breaches it aims to 
address through the dispute settlement procedure. The EU 
formally requested government consultations in December 
2018. They took place in January 2019, but ›unfortunately, 
the consultations did not lead to the matters being satis-
factorily addressed and thus failed to settle all the issues 
raised by the EU.‹8 Therefore, in July 2019, the EU request-
ed the establishment of a Panel of Experts. The Panel 
started its work on 30 December 2019 (announcement on 
19 December) and was supposed to deliver its report by 
March 2020, with submissions of amicus curiae briefs al-
lowed only until 10 January 2020. So far, no report has 
been delivered. 
Within South Korea, the dispute settlement procedure 
helped to draw attention to the linkage between labour 
rights and trade. However, Korea has also engaged in a 
number of ›whitewashing‹ activities, such as submitting a 
motion to the parliament to ratify the ILO Convention, 
while simultaneously introducing an amendment bill that 
would take away the newly acquired rights (NEU2). 
The South Korea case sets a very important precedent for 
the EU. Some EU stakeholders see it as an important learn-
ing opportunity and wish to apply their lessons in the fu-
ture (EU1). Nonetheless, the added value of the precedent 
will depend on the outcome of the dispute settlement pro-
cedure. If the verdict is lenient, or not implemented or en-
forced (also in view of the lack of binding enforcement 
tools), it may discourage further complaints and action by 
stakeholders. Implementation of the panel report, in part-
nership with the newly appointed Chief Trade Enforcement 
Officer, will be a key test for the EU’s commitment to the 
TSD chapter, as expressed in, among other things, the fif-
teen-point plan of 2018.
This case has demonstrated the importance of collabora-
tion between civil society and the European Parliament in 
promoting trade and sustainable development, as the 
DAGs alone were not successful in advancing their com-
plaints. It also demonstrates the rather weak accountability 
of the Commission and the limited policy impact of stake-
holders’ monitoring. The best way to enhance the DAGs’ 
role would be, at the very least, to allow civil society to 
trigger the dispute settlement procedure automatically. But 
the Commission’s accountability to civil society should be 
strengthened, for example, by allowing possibilities of ap-
peal. It is important to note that there was consensus be-
tween business and non-business actors, and this arguably 
facilitated the launch of the dispute settlement procedure. 
On the other hand, some Korean DAG members strongly 
prefer the dialogue approach and would like to avoid any 
sort of dispute settlement procedure, even a non-binding 
8 European Union, ›Request for the establishment of a Panel of Ex-
perts by the European Union‹, Brussels, 4 July 2019, http://trade.ec.
europa.eu/doclib/docs/2019/july/tradoc_157992.pdf.
one, because this is seen as overly confrontational. Thus, 
while some believe that the Commission’s current ap-
proach is too lenient, others consider it too strict. 
6.3. LADDER OF INCLUSIVENESS OF THE 
EU AND KOREAN DAGS
6.3.1 Instrumental: Can they meet?
Concerning organisation, both the EU and Korean DAGs 
have a secretariat. The former has the EESC, while in Korea 
the Labour and the Environment ministries alternate in the 
role. Similar to the EESC, its Korean counterpart communi-
cates with members to convene meetings, which it also 
prepares, and communicates with the EU DAG secretariat.
The EU DAG’s rules of procedure stipulate that the Europe-
an Commission provide funding for its operations. The EU 
DAG has been meeting two to three times a year. The Ko-
rean DAG has also been meeting regularly, with between 
two and four meetings a year. In Korea, there have occa-
sionally been separate meetings on environmental and la-
bour issues.9 Both Korean and EU DAG interviewees agreed 
that the logistical aspect of meetings is taken care of. 
The annual transnational civil society meetings established in 
the EU-Korea trade agreement – known as the Civil Society 
Forum – are closed meetings for the DAGs of both parties. 
This is a unique feature, as in the other EU trade agreements, 
these meetings are open to civil society at large. This feature 
entails that the annual EU–Korea transnational civil society 
meeting established in the agreement is the equivalent of 
the DAG-to-DAG meetings organised in the context of oth-
er EU trade agreements. In addition to the official transna-
tional civil meeting, DAG members of the EU Korea trade 
agreement requested the addition of a further day to the 
existing Forum to organise a seminar open to the wider 
public on topics of mutual interest. This was granted by the 
governments and has become common practice for trans-
national meetings in other trade agreements as well. These 
seminars and the prolongation of the meetings in general, 
help members socialise and help to make travelling such a 
distance worthwhile. No transnational meetings have been 
organised since 2018, however, when the dispute settle-
ment mechanism was triggered (see above). 
Interviewees have lamented that the dates and schedule of 
the DAG and transitional meetings are not set long enough 
in advance and are subject to change. DAG meetings are 
sometimes scheduled only one or two weeks in advance, 
hindering members’ participation. The dates of the trans-
national meetings are set by the governments. Interview-
ees consider the late notice of the dates and rescheduling 
of the agendas as a sign of weak commitment on the part 
of the governments. In general, it has been difficult to 
»reconcile or ›tetris‹ all the agendas« (EU9). 
9 European Commission (2018). Evaluation of the Implementation of 
the Free Trade Agreement between the EU and its Member States 
and the Republic of Korea: Final report.
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The perception that the civil society meetings may be ex-
ploited as tools to legitimise the trade agreements has 
been tempered because of the activation of the dispute 
settlement mechanism (see below). Nevertheless, some 
scepticism prevails in the EU as the design of the civil soci-
ety mechanism and the dispute settlement mechanism re-
mains suboptimal. On the Korean side, an interviewee 
explained how, in his view, Korean negotiators underesti-
mated the potential importance of the TSD chapter and 
the civil society mechanisms it established. Because the EU-
South Korea trade agreement is the first of its kind, there 
was no precedent or reference. The Korean government 
was nevertheless reluctant to give civil society a formal role 
within the institutional mechanisms of the trade agree-
ment.10 As one interviewee explained: »the Korean gov-
ernment accepted because the EU insisted, but they were 
more interested in the trade aspect of the agreement. It is 
not something culturally established in South Korea« 
(EU10).
6.3.2 Information sharing: Can they talk?
The information-sharing purpose is only partly achieved as 
there are issues concerning horizontal relations within the 
Korean DAG and vertical relations between the DAGs and 
governments, especially in Korea, and between the DAGs 
and the intergovernmental board. 
Concerning the content of the domestic and transnational 
meetings, attention has been given to economic, environ-
mental and labour issues. Topics such as digitalisation, the 
circular and green economy, the emissions trading system 
and climate change, have been regularly on the agenda of 
the transnational meetings. Labour issues have always 
been high on the agenda. As one interviewee states, »in 
other EU DAGs we can have a lot of topics, but for Korea 
the DAG is more focused on labour issues« (EU2).
Fairly uncontested topics such as the gender pay gap, cor-
porate social responsibility and non-discrimination have 
been addressed. In 2016, two labour projects were devel-
oped: one on corporate social responsibility and another 
on the implementation of the ILO Convention on non-dis-
crimination. These topics were, especially in the early years 
of the civil society meetings, »a strategic choice« (NEU1) as 
they represented »a good starting point because they are 
less sensitive« (EU9). In addition to labour issues in Korea, 
the transnational civil society mechanism has also been 
used to request, on the initiative of the Korean DAG, that 
EU member states address labour issues domestically 
based on comments made by the ILO. 
But much more sensitive and contested issues, such as the 
ratification and effective implementation of the ILO funda-
mental conventions and, more concretely, freedom of as-
sociation and collective bargaining have been given a lot of 
importance. They have been reiterated annually and have 
10 Smith, A., et al. (2020). Free Trade Agreements and Global La-
bour Governance: The European Union’s Trade-Labour Linkage in a 
Value Chain World. London, Routledge.
also been included in the recommendations of the Civil So-
ciety Forum. Even though the agenda is agreed upon by 
both DAGs, the contested labour issues in particular have 
created tensions between the members of the Korean 
DAG, especially between employers and trade unions, as 
well as between the EU and the Korean DAG (see below). 
In addition, some EU DAG members have lamented that 
»everything was dominated by ILO conventions and free-
dom for trade union leaders and they felt as if there was 
insufficient space to raise other issues« (EU7).
In addition to these substantive matters, both EU and Ko-
rean DAG members state that they still dedicate a consid-
erable amount of time at meetings to logistical issues and 
to preparing the next transnational meeting. 
Information exchange, and especially the exchange of best 
practices, has been suggested as an important purpose of 
the DAGs. On the EU side, a DAG member confirmed that 
»it’s an exchange of practices and different perspectives« 
(EU9). From the Korean DAG an interviewee stated that 
»from the treaty point of view the Forum should be a place 
for the shared evaluation of implementation by both par-
ties, but some members believe that this is a space for gen-
eral exchange or where they can have seminars or 
workshops on broad issues« (NEU2). This shows that there 
is disagreement among the members about what the civil 
society meetings are for. 
Similar to the EU-Georgia civil society meetings, horizontal 
exchange is strongest between trade union members from 
both sides. They also had good connections prior to the 
agreement, which were reinforced by the transnational 
meetings. There are, however, communication issues be-
tween the two DAGs, as a lack of contact between the 
annual transnational meetings and the need for simultane-
ous translation hamper the interaction. Within the EU DAG, 
there seems to be good relations between the members, 
also across the different groups. In contrast, the relations 
between employers and trade unions in the Korean DAG 
are fairly hostile, making it difficult or even »impossible« 
(NEU2) for them to work together. Another interviewee 
confirmed that the atmosphere in the Korean DAG has 
»not been harmonious or peaceful« (NEU1). The need for 
regular contact and continuity of membership was high-
lighted both for the relations within the DAGs – »you can 
work if you have a bit of trust, an atmosphere which helps 
you to work together, by meeting each other a few times a 
year« (EU9) – and across the DAGs: »in Asia it’s very im-
portant that people know each other, they will not trust 
you immediately» (EU7).
Similarly, it has proven to be challenging for the EU and 
Korean DAGs to find common positions. The main contro-
versy concerns the labour obligations in the TSD chapter. 
Especially on the occasion of the last transnational meeting 
in 2018, when it came to deciding on the joint conclusions 
on the ratification and implementation of the core ILO 
Conventions – in particular freedom of association and the 
incarceration of two Korean trade union members – 
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»things became rather tense« (EU1). In the end, the Korean 
employers left the room and some academics, too, were 
not supportive. As a result, no common position could be 
reached. Instead, a joint statement by the chairs of each 
DAG was presented to the intergovernmental board. The 
fact that the EU DAG did manage to have a common posi-
tion, even though, according to some, it amounted to the 
lowest common denominator, it has been perceived across 
the different groups as a positive signal that helped things 
to move forward.
There are differences between the EU and Korean DAGs 
concerning vertical exchanges. At EU level, there is infor-
mation exchange between the DAG and the European 
Commission at least once a year, as a Commission official 
usually attends a part of the DAG meetings. There are also 
contacts with the European External Action Service. The 
high turnover of officials, however, means that there is lit-
tle continuity of attendance, which has been criticised. In 
addition, there have been contacts between the EU DAG 
and the European Parliament, although there is no formal 
or institutionalised dialogue between them. The EU DAG 
also met twice with the Korean ambassador to receive 
first-hand information. Even though there is regular ex-
change between the EU DAG and official institutions, ac-
cording to one interviewee the problem is that »the 
government and the DAG are not considered to be equal 
partners« (EU10). In Korea, the government is considered 
to be »pretty difficult to get in contact with« (EU10). The 
Korean DAG has received little recognition from their gov-
ernment – as one interviewee stated, »the government has 
not done much, there is no respect« (NEU1). Nevertheless, 
an EU DAG member emphasised how they have tried to 
empower civil society through the DAG: »for me, it’s a big 
achievement that the DAGs have created a platform for 
discussion and it has obliged the Korean government to 
acknowledge that trade unions and business and trade or-
ganisations are independent, because they are members of 
the Korean DAG« (EU9).
The representativeness of the Korean DAG and the inde-
pendence of its members has been a thorny issue, espe-
cially in the early days. To start with, these civil society 
meetings were the first of their kind, and both the EU and 
Korean governments and civil society had to learn how to 
develop such mechanisms. Given the distinct cultures and 
Korea’s different take on civil society, however, the two 
parties had different starting points. The tripartite struc-
ture of the EESC was used as a basis for the DAG, even 
though Korean employers and trade unions are not used to 
this type of dialogue. Also, »the environmental NGOs are 
not the same … they have different functions than we 
have in our European DAG« (EU1). In addition, academics 
and researchers were included as Korean DAG members, 
more concretely as public interest representatives. They 
currently account for almost half of the DAG members. 
Their legitimacy has been challenged because, even though 
these actors might have substantial expertise, »they don’t 
represent a constituency« (EU1). A final point on DAG rep-
resentativeness concerns the membership of environmen-
tal organisations. Korea has an important environmental 
movement, which is not reflected in the DAG. Similarly, the 
EU DAG, and basically all the EU DAGs except for the one 
pertaining to the trade agreement with Canada, lacks en-
vironmental – or ›diverse interests‹ – members.
The independence of Korean DAG members has also been 
questioned. Some of the employers and academics are 
perceived to have strong ties with the government. In ad-
dition, the Korean government seems to hold the reins of 
DAG membership. There is no open call for members. The 
ministries of the environment and of labour ask relevant 
organisations to put forward members, who are then 
nominated, except for the public interest group, where it is 
the ministry that nominates and appoints. Nevertheless, EU 
DAG members have witnessed an evolution: »the Korean 
government has changed its attitude somewhat and nom-
inated slightly more people from European style civil soci-
ety, but it was a process« (EU7). An important event in this 
context was the membership of the Korean Confederation 
of Trade Unions, one of the country’s most important. 
They were not included in the DAG at first, which led to 
major criticisms. One interviewee explained how »in Korea 
the government has the right to select members but it can-
not be a unilateral decision« (NEU1). That being said, the 
Korean government still keeps a close eye on its DAG: »it 
attends the Korean DAG meetings but do not engage. 
They stay for the whole meeting and monitor what is being 
said« (NEU2).
6.3.3 Monitoring: Can they oversee?
Concerning labour rights in Korea, the monitoring purpose 
has been achieved to a certain extent for the EU DAG in 
collaboration with the Korean trade unions. 
Monitoring activities have taken place on both sides. One 
of the EU DAG’s most significant outputs has been its 
»Opinion on the fundamental rights at work in the Repub-
lic of Korea. Identification of areas for action«, issued in 
2013. Its content is based on ILO evaluations, and the re-
port laid the foundations for the monitoring of labour is-
sues in Korea. The DAG also published reports on green 
growth (2013), corporate social responsibility (2014) and 
climate change (2015). Nevertheless, one interviewee ex-
plained that »because of budgetary issues, the scope of 
activities is very limited« (EU7). In the Korean DAG, mem-
bers have mainly worked individually, as they »never at-
tempted to make a joint statement in the name of the 
Korean DAG« (NEU2). According to another interviewee, 
»each DAG member does their own independent monitor-
ing. But this should be better organised in order to develop 
a common position and to [facilitate] exchange between 
both DAGs« (NEU1). That being said, Korean and EU trade 
unions collaborate on the monitoring of labour issues.
Concerning the procedures to provide governments with 
input, the EU DAGs have several options. First, there are 
the DAG meetings, at which the members can address the 
European Commission during the dedicated time or ap-
proach them less formally during the coffee break. Second, 
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there is the possibility to send written statements, such as 
the opinions mentioned above. The EU DAG also wrote 
two formal letters to the European Commissioner for Trade 
concerning serious violations of the TSD chapter in the 
EU-Korea trade agreement in 2014 and 2016, urging the 
Commission to initiate the dispute settlement mechanism. 
Even though relations between the DAG and the European 
Commission »could be more structured, they contribute to 
global institutional development in the area of trade and 
labour governance» (EU1). In sum, the EU DAG members 
know how to reach the Commission, even though this in-
teraction could be organised better. The communication 
channels for the Korean DAG seem to be less open. Even 
though Korean officials attend the DAG meetings, there is 
little to no possibility to interact with the Korean govern-
ment. Korean DAG members emphasised the importance 
of the DAG-to-DAG meeting: »personally I believe that 
without the exchange with the EU DAG, the Korean DAG 
has no role. Without this exchange or the Civil Society Fo-
rum, the Korean government isn’t willing to meet the Ko-
rean DAG and to listen to our recommendations and what 
we have to say about implementation« (NEU2).
This brings us to the joint conclusions of the DAG-to-DAG 
meetings. These statements, including their wording, are 
considered to be very important, as »it goes to the inter-
governmental board, which then has to acknowledge it. It 
is the official outcome produced by the institution man-
dated to monitor and advise, so it is the most official doc-
ument we would give them« (EU1). It has, however, proven 
very difficult for the DAG members, especially labour on 
both sides and Korean employers, to agree on a common 
position, more concretely concerning the requirements 
concerning the ratification and implementation of the 
core ILO Conventions (see above). Even though the em-
phasis has mostly been on labour issues, the statements 
always include references to economic and environmental 
issues. The EU-Korea Civil Society Forum has another 
unique feature (in addition to being a closed DAG-to-DAG 
meeting). A practice has developed of organising back-to-
back meetings between the Forum and the intergovern-
mental board. The chairs of each DAG are invited together 
»for a few minutes to present and then go out, because 
the Korean government did not want to have any exter-
nals at the meeting, and they treat civil society as external« 
(EU7). This entails that the joint conclusions of the DAGs 
are presented to officials of both parties by the chairs of 
the DAGs. This practice has »always been requested by 
civil society« (EU10) and is considered to be »very import-
ant institutionally. If you don’t do that, it becomes a 
talking shop that is responsible for thousands of tonnes of 
CO2 emissions a year and nothing else. You need struc-
tured processes« (EU1). 
Differences can be observed as regards government ac-
countability. In the EU, the DAG members agree that the 
Commission reacts to their input: »basically, we send a let-
ter and get a letter back« (EU10). However, another inter-
viewee explains that »when we ask for something, we 
need something back … the Commission does reply to us 
but they don’t address the core of our concerns« (EU1). In 
Korea, the government has been less reactive as »they 
have never responded« (NEU2). At transnational level, the 
fact that the DAGs’ input feeds into the discussions of the 
board does not guarantee that the DAGs will receive a re-
sponse: »we don’t receive a response from the board, the 
communication lines are EU–EU and Korea–Korea« (EU10).
The DAG members agreed that their pressure concerning 
labour issues in Korea has the potential to induce policy 
change. There are complaints about the lengthy process 
and the DAGs’ recommendations mainly not taken into ac-
count. However, the ongoing dispute settlement proce-
dure gave an important signal that their work has not been 
in vain. For Koreans, the DAG-to-DAG meeting (more than 
the DAG) is an additional platform for advancing their con-
cerns: »actually we make use of all the mechanisms we can, 
[including] the Civil Society Forum« (NEU2).
6.3.4 Policy impact: Can they influence?
Civil society has not been involved directly in the EU’s deci-
sion-making. Its constant pressure over the years, however, 
has contributed significantly to the activation of the dis-
pute settlement mechanism (see below). At the time of 
writing, all eyes are on the outcome of the Panel of Experts. 
According to some, there is a limit to the DAGs’ influence: 
»it’s up to the government to take action, because of 
course civil society is one level, and we have an agenda 
and have agreed priorities, and then you have intergovern-
mental level. They establish their own priorities. Sometimes 
it coincides, sometimes there is variation between what 
civil society has identified and what the government choos-
es to work on« (EU9). Nevertheless, »the fact that Korean 
government decided to look into the ratification of the ILO 
conventions is partly the result of our activities, but of 
course if many people knock on the door sooner or later it 
will open« (EU7).
6.4 CONCLUSION
In this case, the EU DAG has been very active for several 
years. Even though the DAGs have worked on other sus-
tainable development issues, their main substantive focus 
has been on labour issues. Their constant pressure, in addi-
tion to that of the European Parliament, contributed to the 
activation of the dispute settlement mechanism. Neverthe-
less, this position has also created tensions between the 
DAGs and, within the Korean DAG, between employers, 
trade unions and other stakeholders. The question of 
whether it will be possible to maintain constructive rela-
tions across the different interests remains inconclusive as 
no joint transnational civil society meetings have taken 
place since the dispute settlement mechanism was trig-
gered in 2018. All eyes are currently on policy changes in 
Korea and the outcome of the Panel of Experts. The EU–
Korean civil society meetings were the first of their kind 
and all the actors involved shaped these mechanisms along 





The free trade agreement between the EU, Peru and Co-
lombia was signed in 2012 and, in the case of Peru, provi-
sionally applied from 1 March 2013. Ecuador joined in 
2016 (in force since 2017). Before the conclusion of the FTA, 
these countries benefited from preferential access to the 
European market under the EU Generalised System of Pref-
erences (GSP). More specifically they were beneficiaries of 
a special incentive arrangement geared toward promoting 
good governance and sustainable development, known as 
GSP+. Due to the reform of the GSP, the countries risked 
losing this preferential market access to the EU in 2014. 
This potential loss led to the negotiation and conclusion of 
the FTA.
The trade relationship between the EU and Peru is asym-
metrical. In 2019, the EU27 was Peru’s third largest trading 
partner in goods, accounting for 12.5 per cent of its total 
external trade. In turn, Peru accounted for 0.2 per cent of 
the EU’s external trade in goods.1 The economic impact 
assessment predicted that the EU’s exports to Peru would 
increase by a much larger proportion (48 per cent) than the 
EU’s imports from Peru (15 per cent), and that Peru’s GDP 
growth would be limited to 0.2–0.25 per cent.2 Addition-
ally, while Peru mainly exports products with low added 
value (food, raw materials, fuels and mining products), it 
imports from the EU mostly manufactured goods with 
high added value.3
Peru conducts a liberal trade policy, characterised by a high 
level of foreign trade. The country has concluded numer-
ous free trade and bilateral investment agreements over 
the years. In comparison with trade liberalisation, sustain-
1 European Union, Trade in goods with Peru. Available at:  
https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb_results/factsheets/country/de-
tails_peru_en.pdf.
2 European Parliamentary Research Service. 2018. Trade Agreement 
between the European Union and Colombia and Peru: European 
Implementation Assessment. Brussels: European Union. Available 
at: https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2861/846773.
3 European Commission, Peru: Main Indicators. Available at:  
https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/isdb_results/factsheets/country/over-
view_peru_en.pdf; European Parliamentary Research Service. 2018. 
Trade Agreement between the European Union and Colombia and 
Peru: European Implementation Assessment. Brussels: European 
Union. https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2861/846773. 
able development has not been prioritised. Additionally, 
Peruvian business is generally against implementing the 
sustainable development provisions of the EU FTA.4 This 
situation reflects the generally weak position of civil society 
organisations (apart from business associations, which 
support the government’s neoliberal economic policy5) in 
Peru. Peru has a strong anti-union climate and low unioni-
sation.6 It also has high levels of socio-economic inequality 
marginalising, among others, regional and indigenous 
communities and women.7 Civil society is weak and frag-
mented, cannot effectively hold the government account-
able8 and some NGOs, such as environmental activists, 
who dare to protest against land development have been 
subjected to intimidation.9 These are structural constraints 
on the possibility for civil society to promote sustainable 
development in the country.
The conclusion of the agreement with the EU was strongly 
opposed by EU civil society, due to concerns about human, 
labour and environmental rights, while EU business associ-
ations expressed their support for the trade deal.10 Before 
concluding the FTA, the European Parliament asked Peru 
and Colombia to make improvements in the area of human 
rights, to establish a ›binding road map on human, envi-
ronmental and labour rights‹ and to prepare action plans 
on sustainable development. Peru and Colombia have duly 
4 European Parliamentary Research Service. 2018. Trade Agreement 
between the European Union and Colombia and Peru: European 
Implementation Assessment. Brussels: European Union. Available 
at: https://data.europa.eu/doi/10.2861/846773.
5 Alberto Vergara and Aaron Watanabe, ›Peru since Fujimori‹, Jour-
nal of Democracy 27 (3) (2016).
6 Orbie, Jan, and Lore Van Den Putte. 2016. ›Labour Rights in Peru 
and the EU Trade Agreement: Compliance with the Commitments 
under the Sustainable Development Chapter.‹ Working Paper 58. 
Vienna: ÖFSE.
7 Center for Economic and Social Rights, Peru: Financing a Just Re-
covery to Achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, [2020]. 
Available at: https://www.cesr.org/peru-financing-just-reco-
very-achieve-sustainable-development-goals.
8 Alberto Vergara and Aaron Watanabe, ›Peru since Fujimori‹, Jour-
nal of Democracy 27 (3) (2016).
9 Freedom House, Peru. Available at: https://freedomhouse.org/coun-
try/peru/freedom-world/2020.
10 European Parliamentary Research Service. 2018. Trade Agreement 
between the European Union and Colombia and Peru: European 
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prepared road maps and action plans, and the EU has es-
tablished dialogues on human rights with both countries.11 
The European Parliament continues to strongly advocate 
for sustainable development in this FTA.12
Despite the concerns expressed by civil society and the Eu-
ropean Parliament before the conclusion of the agreement, 
the FTA with Colombia, Peru and Ecuador is one of the 
weakest in terms of its provisions on civil society involve-
ment.13 Unlike other new-generation FTAs, the parties are 
not obliged to set up a dedicated ad hoc DAG, but could 
instead use existing consultative mechanisms, with no re-
quirement for them to be independent of the government. 
Moreover, provisions on participation in the dispute settle-
ment process are also very weak. 
7.2 PARTICULARITY:  
THE PERUVIAN SHADOW DAG
For several years, Peruvian civil society has expressed con-
cerns regarding its involvement in the trade agreement 
with the EU. This refers in particular to the Peruvian author-
ities’ unwillingness to create a dedicated DAG for this pur-
pose, as well as the lack of real dialogue in the existing 
mechanisms and the fact that the implementation of the 
TSD chapter was not being discussed. In 2017, several Peru-
vian organisations that were already monitoring the imple-
mentation of the agreement, established a DAG with the 
aim of demanding accountability and solutions from the 
government.14 It has been called ›a shadow‹ or ›self-consti-
tuted‹ (autoconformado) DAG because it remains unrec-
ognised by the Peruvian government. The shadow DAG 
includes environmental and human rights NGOs, as well as 
trade union organisations. Peruvian business representa-
tives were invited, but did not wish to participate. In some 
cases this was linked to the government’s refusal to recog-
nise the DAG. 
The ›shadow‹ DAG has been active both nationally – at-
tempting to establish better dialogue with the Peruvian 
authorities and writing a number of letters – and interna-
tionally, in dialogue with the Colombian and Ecuadorian 
DAGs (belonging to the same regional trade agreement), 
the EU DAG and EU institutions (European Commission, EU 
delegation in Lima, European Parliament, EESC). It main-
tains its demands for official recognition. Because it has 
been able to achieve international visibility, as well as be-
11 Parliamentary questions, Answer given by Ms Malmström on behalf 
of the Commission, Question reference: P-002362/2016, 31 May 
2016. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/docu-
ment/P-8-2016-002362-ASW_EN.html.
12 European Parliament resolution of 16 January 2019 on the imple-
mentation of the Trade Agreement between the European Union 
and Colombia and Peru (2018/2010(INI)). Available at: https://www.
europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2019-0031_EN.html.
13 Martens, D., et al. (2018). ›Mapping Variation of Civil Society Invol-
vement in EU Trade Agreements: A CSI Index.‹ European Foreign 
Affairs Review 23(1): 41-62.
14 RedGe, Campaña. Available at: http://www.redge.org.pe/
node/2841.
cause of the dedication of its members and donor support, 
it can continue independent monitoring of the FTA and 
manages to participate in the transnational civil society 
meetings.
The shadow DAG was able to draw the attention of the 
European Commission to the problems concerning partici-
pation, causing the latter to pressure the Peruvian govern-
ment to increase transparency concerning its DAG. As a 
result, the government assigned the DAG role to two exist-
ing mechanisms in 2018 (the National Commission on Cli-
mate Change and National Council for Labour and the 
Promotion of Employment), having previously entrusted it 
to nine bodies. However, these mechanisms are led by gov-
ernment representatives and have serious functional issues 
(for instance, the quorum to be able to take decisions is 
almost never reached) which makes them weak platforms 
and prevents real dialogue.15 Moreover, their members are 
largely unaware of the fact that they are supposed to mon-
itor FTA implementation.16
7.3 LADDER OF INCLUSIVENESS OF THE 
EU AND PERUVIAN DAGS
7.3.1 Instrumental: Can they meet?
The instrumental purpose is achieved in the EU, but not in 
Peru. On both sides, civil society is concerned about the 
legitimising potential of their participation.
Similar to the other EU DAGs, the secretarial duties for the 
EU DAG of this particular agreement are taken care of by 
the EESC. The DAG has been meeting regularly, between 
two and four times a year, since 2014. 
Each of the parties to this regional agreement has their 
own DAG: at first Colombia also used existing national 
mechanisms but decided to create an ad hoc DAG in 2016. 
Ecuador also established a dedicated DAG when it joined 
the agreement and, as described above, the Peruvian DAG 
comprises existing Peruvian bodies. Until 2018, nine Peru-
vian councils had been entrusted with this role. Since then, 
this has been limited to two bodies: the National Labour 
Council and the National Commission for Climate Change. 
These bodies meet several times a year (the Commission for 
Climate Change, for instance, met approximately six times 
in 2019). This is irrelevant for the purpose of analysing the 
work of DAGs, however, because these bodies do not dis-
cuss the FTA. They are aware neither of their mandate nor 
of when the annual transnational meetings are supposed 
to take place. This means that there is no activity whatso-
ever on the part of the Peruvian official DAG: »this is the 
weakest part of our job, the Peruvian DAG doesn’t really 
exist. We can only count on people that participate volun-
15 RedGE, Sociedad Civil: una participación que no espera. Available 
at: http://www.redge.org.pe/sites/default/files/8%20%20Info%20
sociedad%20civil%20%20GMI%20%282%29.pdf.
16 Orbie, J., et al. (2017). ›The Impact of Labour Rights Commitments 




tarily to the shadow DAG« (EU5). The shadow DAG, which 
was created in 2017, meets around two to three times a 
year.
The annual transnational civil society meetings have been 
taken place since 2014. It was one of the first agreements 
concluded after the first new-generation FTA, EU–Korea, 
and also one of the first with no formal DAG-to-DAG 
meetings. DAG members »decided to force the interpreta-
tion of the rules. There was nothing written excluding that 
the DAGs couldn’t meet, and we decided to do it« (EU5). 
This practice has continued ever since for all the transna-
tional civil society meetings. From 2016 onwards, it was 
possible to attend the transnational meeting through video 
conferencing in order to allow more civil society partici-
pants to attend.
Funding has been an issue for Peruvian civil society. In or-
der to allow Peruvian organisations to participate in the 
transnational civil society meetings, they have been funded 
by European and international civil society organisations. 
Even though the interviewees agree that »each govern-
ment should fund its own DAG [and] this should be provid-
ed for in the agreement« (EU4), they acknowledge that the 
current EU funding project has improved coordination and 
participation of civil society from the three Andean coun-
tries. Nevertheless, the concerns about funding are not lim-
ited to the capacity to attend meetings. There is a bigger 
underlying issue in Peru, namely the general lack of re-
sources of civil society, which affects the quality and quan-
tity of what it can do.
Within both the EU DAG and Peruvian civil society there is 
a strong feeling that the DAGs are a tool to legitimise the 
trade agreement. The existence of the civil society mecha-
nisms has helped opponents of the FTA to accept that the 
governments involved were going to sign it anyway, as 
»there was a place where we could play a role« (EU5). Nev-
ertheless, civil society from both regions faces the insider /
outsider dilemma. In the EU, one interviewee stated that 
»we’re reflecting on whether we want to stay in this DAG. 
It serves more as a pretext for the European Commission to 
say ›we have an advisory group, everything is fine‹. But we 
cannot leave this space to the business sector alone, it is 
necessary to have a counter-power and also for the Ande-
an organisations it is important to have allies in this space« 
(EU4). As for Peru, there is a consensus among our inter-
viewees that Peru does not want to create an ad hoc DAG 
and that it does the absolute minimum to comply with its 
legal obligations. They therefore do not expect the shadow 
DAG to be recognised any time soon. At the same time 
there are hesitations concerning this recognition because if 
the shadow DAG were to be officially recognised there is a 
risk that it would be – or at least it would be perceived as 
being – co-opted by the government. In other words, on 
one hand the shadow DAG wants to be a mechanism for 
real civil society participation; on the other hand, »we were 
criticised a lot from other platforms for endorsing the FTA, 
because if we want to enter a mechanism of this FTA in 
some way you are accepting it« (NEU5). 
7.3.2 Information sharing: Can they talk?
The information-sharing purpose has been achieved for the 
EU DAG and the joint DAG-to-DAG meetings (which also 
include representatives of the Peruvian shadow DAG) as 
they have been able to exchange information and have 
fairly good horizontal relations. Nevertheless, the relations 
between the Latin American business sector and the other 
groups are confrontational. The vertical relations with the 
governments have been evaluated positively only in the 
case of the EU. The Peruvian official DAG bodies are nei-
ther independent nor representative.
The legitimacy and representativeness of the EU DAG has 
not been questioned, even though one interviewee sug-
gested that »it would be better to have more members but 
you can’t force people to be in that kind of group« (EU8). 
In contrast, the legitimacy of the official Peruvian DAG 
bodies has been strongly criticised. First, the selected offi-
cial bodies are not independent. They are organised and 
chaired by the relevant minister or high-level officials: »the 
purpose of the DAG is to have a platform to exchange with 
the government, but if the government is also part of the 
DAG, there is a big contradiction« (EU5). Second, these 
bodies are heavily dominated by the Peruvian business sec-
tor: »they have direct access to the government. We are 
not sitting at a table as equals« (NEU5). To illustrate: 
»unions tend not to participate in the National Labour 
Council because the business weight is so strong that 
when they attend, they basically validate the agenda of the 
private sector against their own interests. Many times the 
unions have even withdrawn, they officially renounced 
their participation« (NEU8). The business sector is well-rep-
resented at the transnational meeting as they »were al-
ways present, because they have money and contact with 
the government. The problem is with Group II or III, they 
don’t have money or people to attend the meetings« (EU8). 
Third, according to the interviewees, these bodies do not 
function properly, no real dialogue is happening and no 
decisions are taken there: »the council does not function as 
an advisory group, it only exists on paper« (NEU4) and »it 
is a merely formal space, we almost never reached a quo-
rum, the existing procedures hinder dialogue instead of 
facilitating it« (NEU8). Fourth, the official bodies are not 
aware of their mandate to monitor the FTA and they don’t 
have the expertise to do so: »in reality, if it weren’t for in-
formation we receive from the shadow DAG, we wouldn’t 
be aware of this… The people constituting the Climate 
Change Commission do not have expertise in this field« 
(NEU8).
Because of the inadequacy of the official bodies as regards 
functioning as a DAG, several voices in both regions would 
prefer to see the shadow DAG official recognised and 
mandated: »I sincerely believe that it should be another 
group; that is, the self-convened group should be accredit-
ed, because they are the ones who are following up on the 
agreement and there is no one else who is doing that« 
(NEU8). The shadow DAG does not include representatives 
of the business sector, however. They have been invited, 
but are not interested in joining. It does include a number 
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of international NGOs. The shadow DAG is open to all rel-
evant organisations and they proactively liaise with poten-
tial members: »the door is always open and we are always 
looking for other organisations to join us« (NEU4).
In the case of Peru, the interviews indicated that informa-
tion exchange was of minor importance compared with 
exerting pressure for changes concerning civil society par-
ticipation, as well as monitoring implementation of the TSD 
chapter. Sharing experiences among the Andean DAGs 
and the EU DAG was nonetheless considered beneficial. 
Concerning horizontal relations within the DAGs, there 
have been tensions and robust debates among the groups 
in the EU DAG, especially between business and the two 
other groups, as »perhaps there are more economic inter-
ests involved than in other FTAs, which makes people more 
insistent on defending them« (EU8). Nevertheless, the EU 
DAG has agreed on a working programme with their prior-
ities, which are shared with the European Commission. In 
the Peruvian mechanisms, as mentioned above, the ten-
sions between the business sector and the others are much 
more explicit. Between other civil society organisations re-
lations are cordial and they coordinate and share informa-
tion. There is also an ongoing dialogue between members 
of the shadow DAG and members of the official DAG bod-
ies. One criticism has been that there should be more coor-
dination with organisations outside Lima. Regional 
coordination between the Andean DAGs has also been 
advanced as necessary and beneficial for grappling with 
country-specific and common regional issues. 
Concerning horizontal relations across the DAGs, there are, 
in addition to existing strong ties between the trade unions 
of the regions, also established relations between develop-
mental and human rights organisations. These existing 
contacts have been crucial for the shadow DAG, as these 
particular EU DAG members have supported its creation 
and tried to give it as much access to the official civil soci-
ety meetings as possible. That being said, there is not much 
coordination between the DAGs of both regions. There are 
for instance no regular videoconference meetings among 
the DAGs between the annual meetings. In addition, there 
is limited or no contact between the EU DAG and the offi-
cial Peruvian DAG bodies: »I don’t know anyone in the of-
ficial DAG« (EU4).
According to the interviewees, the DAGs have yet to reach 
a common understanding of what the DAGs are and what 
they are for. This has led to clashes, especially between 
business and non-business actors. That is why a workshop 
was organised recently on the content of the TSD chapter. 
As in the cases of Georgia and Korea, these tensions culmi-
nate, or are most explicit when the joint declaration is be-
ing drafted. Whereas the EU DAG is ultimately fairly united 
and the members have a similar vision during the transna-
tional meetings, this is not the case at all in the Andean 
countries, between the business sector on one side and 
the trade unions and NGOs on the other. Both Peruvian 
and EU civil society representatives confirmed that business 
actors have been more involved since 2018. The reason for 
this increased engagement could be the complaint filed by 
a coalition of Peruvian and EU civil society (see below), but 
this remains unclear. In any case, the collaboration be-
tween the groups has been difficult and confrontational: 
»Every year we are faced with this Group 1, with whom it 
is very difficult to talk, they block the actions that we want 
to do’ (EU4). In 2018, the Colombian and Ecuadorian em-
ployers group decided not to sign the joint statement: »we 
have not achieved a joint statement, because we cannot 
reconcile many things with the business sector« (NEU5). 
The EU DAG sent a separate statement to the European 
Commission, instead. Another difficulty has been that the 
shadow DAG has also participated in the negotiation of 
the official joint statements as their right to contribute to 
the document was questioned. In the end, they were ac-
cepted as interlocutors because they have been monitoring 
the FTA for years (and they were strongly supported by 
several EU DAG members), even though they do not have 
an official mandate. 
Vertical relations at EU level are evaluated positively: »they 
[the European Commission] attend the meetings, provide 
info, create workshops, facilitate meeting with counter-
parts, the EU Delegation is also working very well, but then 
when we present the final declaration, the results of our 
work of the year or several years, they don’t have the ca-
pacity to provide an answer or a follow-up. That’s a pity« 
(EU8). The relations between the Peruvian government and 
the shadow DAG are unusual, in the sense that even 
though the former has not officially recognised the latter, it 
has not blocked its participation in the civil society meet-
ings. Since the complaint, the Peruvian government has 
been more reactive to the shadow DAG; they have an-
swered their letters and even met with them. Nevertheless, 
this has not led to a real dialogue: »for them, we are a 
group of experts, not a consultative body… What we want 
is a real dialogue. When we meet, they [Peruvian govern-
ment] always place themselves above us, like a teacher 
who is going to explain something to a student« (NEU5).
Content-wise, the agenda of the EU DAG has become di-
verse over the years: »in the first years we spent a lot of 
time establishing the DAG, the way we work and so on; 
three years later we started to address substantive, political 
problems… in this DAG we can discuss a lot of topics« 
(EU8). In the official Peruvian DAG bodies, the FTA has not 
been discussed, expect for one informative session in the 
Commission for Climate Change. In the shadow DAG, top-
ics concerning organisation, as well as monitoring of sus-
tainable development issues and human rights have been 
discussed. The agenda and joint declarations of the trans-
national meetings comprise labour standards, human 
rights, environmental standards, access to markets and the 
situation of small producers, as well as civil society partici-
pation as such. Even though the DAGs have existed for 
over six years, practical and logistical issues are still import-
ant during the transnational meetings: »some people don’t 
know what a DAG is, or the obligations or benefits of the 
DAGs; there’s a long learning path to be traversed for the 
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counterparts« (EU8). Labour rights violations persist in the 
three Andean countries, which has been given consider-
able attention in the EU DAG and transnational meetings. 
In Peru the main labour issues are related to labour inspec-
tion, freedom of association and collective bargaining.
7.3.3 Monitoring: Can they oversee?
In the context of the EU trade agreement with Peru, mon-
itoring the implementation of the commitments made in 
the TSD chapter was often referred to as a crucial function 
of the DAGs. Civil society organisations, also outside the 
DAGs, have been using the FTA actively as a way to de-
nounce Peru’s non-compliance with these commitments. 
In general, the European Commission has been responsive 
to the calls of civil society, whereas the Peruvian govern-
ment has followed only in a formalistic way. The potential 
to induce change is nevertheless considered low.
Monitoring activities have been undertaken by the EU DAG 
and the Peruvian shadow DAG. In the EU DAG, labour and 
human rights have been followed up closely. In addition, 
the development of the Andean DAGs and civil participa-
tion in the region have been monitored closely. The shad-
ow DAG has been looking into the consequences of trade 
liberalisation on human rights in general. In addition, they 
have also issued statements and reports concerning labour 
rights violations and environmental standards in Peru. An 
important monitoring exercise, executed by a coalition of 
EU and Peruvian civil society, including an EU DAG member, 
resulted in the submission of a formal complaint against 
the Peruvian government to the European Commission in 
2017 for failing to comply with the labour and environmen-
tal commitments made in the trade agreement (which was 
updated in 2018). Such monitoring is »the result of re-
search, which is expensive and difficult« (NEU5).
Turning to the procedures for providing input, the EU DAG 
has made use of the possibility to request meetings with 
the Commission, the latter’s attendance at some DAG 
meetings, as well as formal correspondence, namely writ-
ing letters to the European Commission. The shadow DAG 
has been very active (even before the shadow DAG was 
created as a distinct entity in 2017) as they wrote several 
letters to the Peruvian Ministry of Trade and Tourism and 
the Ministry of Environment, the EU Delegation in Peru, 
and the European Commission, and also reached out the 
Walloon parliament in Belgium.17 The complaint or queja 
presented to the European Commission is peculiar, as it is 
not a document issued by the official civil society mecha-
nisms and does not rely on an existing procedure in the 
TSD chapter for filing a complaint. Finally, the creation of 
the joint conclusions by the DAG-to-DAGs in the transna-
tional meeting is an additional way of providing the gov-
ernment with input. On one occasion the DAGs held a 
separate meeting with the governmental board. This was 
very much welcomed by the DAGs, even though »a one-
17 An overview of the Peruvian shadow DAG’s activities can be found 
here: http://www.redge.org.pe/sites/default/files/linea-de-tiempo_
final_web.pdf.
hour meeting is not enough time to discuss the implemen-
tation of the trade agreement during one year« (EU8). The 
transnational open forum is not considered to be a useful 
platform for the DAG or civil society in general as »during 
the Forum they only read the minutes of the junta [inter-
governmental board]« (EU8) and »the DAGs don’t have 
privileged space or recognition in the Forum; it does not 
allow for dialogue, it’s just a series of questions and very 
formal answers« (EU4).
Government accountability concerning the input given by 
civil society has evolved over the years. In the EU, it took 
time before the European Commission responded formally 
to the EU DAG’s concerns. The formal complaint was a 
game-changer and accelerated communications between 
the European Commission and both the EU and shadow 
DAGs. It replied in writing to both mechanisms, and sent a 
formal letter to the Peruvian government. A fact-finding 
mission took place in Peru in 2018 and the issues raised in 
the complaint were discussed during the intergovernmen-
tal board meeting that year. In 2019, the European Com-
mission informed the chair of the EU DAG that its 
exchanges with the Peruvian government had led to a 
common understanding between the authorities on the 
path to follow in order to improve the implementation of 
the TSD chapter. This gave rise to disappointment among 
the civil society actors involved (in Peru and the EU), be-
cause they consider the issues concerning human and la-
bour rights violations, environmental standards and 
inadequate mechanisms for civil society involvement to be 
still valid and ongoing. The European Parliament has also 
been active in this case: it mentioned the complaint and 
sustainable development issues in a resolution18 and a writ-
ten question.19 In Peru, no follow-up has been given to the 
joint statements. 
This brings us to the potential of these efforts to induce 
policy change. In the EU, civil society is aware that even 
though the European Commission has followed up on the 
concerns raised, this does not guarantee any concrete im-
provements: »year by year we repeat the same things, the 
same problems, nothing really changes« (EU4). Whereas 
the complaint influenced the responsiveness of the Peruvi-
an government, it has not led to more openness or poten-
tial for policy change: »More attention is now given to the 
participation of civil society. It has opened this possibility to 
improve communications with the government, but it is 
still insufficient. It is a checklist which serves to enable Peru 
to go to the subcommittee meeting and say, there it is, the 
DAG is participating in the meeting ... but it is by no means 
a real dialogue« (NEU5).
18 European Parliament, Resolution of 16 January 2019 on the imple-
mentation of the Trade Agreement between the European Union 
and Colombia and Peru. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.
eu/doceo/document/TA-8-2019-0031_EN.html.
19 European Parliament, Parliamentary question on the formal com-
plaint against the Peruvian Government for failing to comply with 
the labour and environmental commitments provided for in the 
Trade Agreement. Available at : https://www.europarl.europa.eu/
doceo/document/E-8-2018-006261_EN.html.
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7.3.4 Policy impact: can they influence?
Even though for some EU DAG members, policy impact 
was their main motivation for participating – »it was obvi-
ous for us to get involved in this group, as we saw it as a 
possibility to exert influence at the political level« (EU4) – 
concrete policy changes have not been observed as a result 
of the DAGs’ work. The DAGs are not involved in deci-
sion-making and whereas the European Commission has 
followed up on the complaint, the DAGs have had no di-
rect influence on government policy decisions. Because of 
Peru’s collaborative attitude to the EU’s follow-up on the 
complaint, it is improbable that the EU will want to activate 
the dispute settlement mechanism at some point.
7.4 CONCLUSION
In the case of Peru, a number of civil society organisations 
have been very proactive, striving for better representation 
and participation of Peruvian civil society in the Peruvian 
DAG. Their efforts have shown some results, even though, 
to date, they have not achieved their objectives. This case 
confirmed that good horizontal relations between EU and 
Non-EU civil society are beneficial in achieving the DAGs’ 
monitoring purpose. Nevertheless, government account-
ability remains at their own discretion and is unpredictable. 
Even though the European Commission has been fairly re-
sponsive and has taken actions to follow up on the con-
cerns shared by civil society (even organisations operating 
outside the formal DAGs), there is currently a standstill (or 




A separate questionnaire was sent to EU and Non-EU DAG members. The questions were identical, except for those ask-
ing which DAG and group they belong to, as well as references to the European Commission / Parliament which were 
adapted to refer to national government / parliament.
The Non-EU DAG survey was available in English, Spanish, Georgian, Korean, Romanian and Ukrainian. 
1. INTRODUCTION
Thank you for filling in this survey, your input is invaluable for a better understanding of the DAGs and the formulation of 
policy recommendations.
The survey consists of eight brief sections on your participation background, opinion on trade and sustainable develop-
ment, the DAG’s purpose, its functioning, content, monitoring and impact and, finally, recommendations and conclusions.
Your participation is anonymous.
Please note that you are not required to fill in the open-ended questions.
2. PARTICIPATION BACKGROUND
A) EU DAG SURVEY
To which group do you / does your organisation belong in the DAG? 
 – Business associations
 – Labour / trade unions
 – NGOs (for example, developmental, environmental and so on)
 – Other: please specify
In which DAG meetings have you participated?
EU DAG of EU trade agreement with Member Yes How many times? ≤ 2  |  3–6  |  7–10  |  ≥ 11
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If you are a member of more than one DAG, we invite you to answer the following questions for the DAG 
in which you have been most actively involved. Please indicate for which DAG you will be answering the 
survey:
 – Andean Community (excluding Bolivia)
 – Canada




 – South Korea
 – Ukraine
(tick the box, a maximum of one answer)
B) NON-EU DAG SURVEY
To which group do you / does your organisation belong in the DAG? 
 – Business associations
 – Labour / trade unions
 – NGOs (for example, developmental, environmental, and so on)
 – Government
 – Other: please specify
In which DAG meetings have you participated?
EU DAG of EU trade agreement with You’re a member of the national DAG of
Number of DAG meetings you’ve 














Peru (civil society DAG)
South Korea
Ukraine
If relevant, please indicate any peculiarity concerning your membership or participation  




3. TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
 
What is your / your organisation’s opinion on the impact of free trade on sustainable development?
 – Extremely positive 
 – Somewhat positive 
 – Neither positive nor negative 
 – Somewhat negative 
 – Extremely negative
What is your / your organisation’s opinion on the impact on sustainable development of the EU trade 
agreement in which you are involved as a DAG member?
 – Extremely positive 
 – Somewhat positive 
 – Neither positive nor negative 
 – Somewhat negative 
 – Extremely negative
4. PURPOSE OF DAGS 
By ›purpose‹, we mean the reason why the DAGs exist. The first question refers to your personal opinion on what the 
main purpose of the DAGs should be; the second examines the reason why DAGs are established by the EU.
What should be, according to your experience, the main purpose of DAGs? Please rank according to 
importance (1: most important, 8: least important)
 – Voice opinions
 – Policy impact
 – Create goodwill for the trade agreement
 – Network with officials
 – Network with civil society organisations
 – Monitor the agreement
 – Access to information
 – Control critical voices
What is, according to your experience, the main purpose of the civil society meeting(s)?  
Please order according to importance (1: most important, 8: least important)
 – Voice opinions
 – Policy impact
 – Create goodwill for the trade agreement
 – Network with officials
 – Network with civil society organisations
 – Monitor the agreement
 – Access to information
 – Control critical voices
Here you can add other purposes that should be (according to you) or are (according to the European 
Commission) the DAG’s main purpose. You can also share any comment you might have regarding the 
purpose of the DAGs:
(open answer)
5. FUNCTIONING
By ›functioning‹, we mean the organisational, operational and logistical aspects of the DAG. (The questions are not about 
impact, this will be surveyed next.)
Are you satisfied with the functioning of the DAG?
 – Extremely satisfied
 – Somewhat satisfied
 – Somewhat dissatisfied
 – Extremely dissatisfied
 – I don’t know
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To what extent do you agree with the following statements? The DAG…
 – …has sufficient logistical support
 – …has legitimate rules of procedure
 – …has a clear work programme
 – …takes decisions in a legitimate way
 – …functions independently from the government
 – …members represent relevant stakeholders
 – …members generally attend the meetings
 – …composition is balanced between the different groups
 – …meetings are well-prepared by the secretariat
 – …meetings are well-prepared by the members
 – …meetings involve genuine dialogue between the members
Answer options: 
 – Strongly agree
 – Somewhat agree
 – Somewhat disagree
 – Strongly disagree
 – I don’t know
Do the following factors affect the functioning of the DAG in a positive or negative way?
 – Travelling costs for DAG members
 – Functioning of the chair 
 – Relations between DAG members
 – Frequency of the meetings
 – Availability of information
 – Presence of European Commission / own government
 – Other: please specify
 – Answer options: 
 – Extremely positive
 – Somewhat positive
 – Neither positive nor negative
 – Somewhat negative
 – Extremely negative
 – I don’t know
How could the DAG’s functioning be improved?  
Please select up to three of your preferred changes:
 – Higher attendance of DAG members
 – DAG members that better represent relevant stakeholders
 – More independent DAG members
 – More genuine dialogue between DAG members
 – More funding for travelling costs DAG members
 – More frequent meetings
 – More support from the secretariat 
 – (Better) rules of procedure
 – (Better defined) work programme
 – Better preparation of the meetings 
 – Other: please specify
 – Nothing should change




By ›content‹, we mean the substance of the topics discussed in the DAG. 
 
Which topics were discussed during the DAG meetings you attended?  
Please order the issues according to most / least often discussed  
(1: most often discussed, 7: least often discussed)
 – Logistics (funding, meeting places and dates, etc.)
 – Participation (membership, representativeness, attendance)
 – Rules of procedure
 – Impact of the trade agreement on sustainable development issues
 – Impact of the trade agreement on other issues
 – General sustainable development issues
 – Issues related to DAG(s) in the partner country /region / EU DAG
 – Other
If ›sustainable development‹ was discussed, this was related to:






By ›monitoring‹, we mean the DAG’s activities and abilities to oversee, examine and evaluate the sustainability dimension 
of the EU trade agreement.
Are you satisfied with the monitoring activities of the DAG?
 – Extremely satisfied
 – Somewhat satisfied
 – Somewhat dissatisfied
 – Extremely dissatisfied
 – I don’t know
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
 – Own DAG members share sufficient information about FTA implementation 
 – The European Commission / own government shares sufficient information about FTA implementation 
 – The European Commission / own government is interested in the DAG’s work
 – There are procedures to provide input to the European Commission / own government
 – There are procedures for the European Commission /own government to follow up on the DAG’s input
 – The European Commission / own government follows up on the input given by the DAG
 – There is sufficient interaction between the European Commission / own government and the DAG
 – The European Parliament / own parliament is interested in the DAG’s work
 – There is sufficient interaction between the European Parliament / own parliament and the DAG
Answer options: 
 – Strongly agree
 – Somewhat agree
 – Somewhat disagree
 – Strongly disagree
 – I don’t know
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Do the following factors affect the monitoring of the DAG in a positive or negative way?
 – Expertise of DAG members
 – Complexity of the trade agreement
 – Complexity of the concept of sustainable development
 – Financial resources to conduct research
 – Functioning of own DAG
 – Degree of consensus among DAG members
 – Functioning of DAG(s) in partner country / region
 – Interaction with DAG(s) in partner country / region
 – Follow-up by European Commission / own government on DAG’s work
 – Other: please specify
Answer options: 
 – Extremely positive
 – Somewhat positive
 – Neither positive nor negative
 – Somewhat negative
 – Extremely negative
 – I don’t know
How could the DAG’s monitoring improve? Please select up to three of your preferred changes:
 – Increased expertise of DAG members
 – More financial resources to conduct research
 – More information sharing by own DAG members
 – More information sharing by the European Commission / own government
 – Better functioning of own DAG
 – Better functioning of DAG(s) in partner country / region / EU DAG
 – Better interaction with DAG(s) in partner country /region / EU DAG
 – Clear procedures to provide input to the European Commission / own government
 – Clear procedures for follow-up by the European Commission / own government on DAG’s work
 – More interest by the European Commission / own government in the DAG’s work
 – More interaction between the European Commission /own government and the DAG
 – More interaction between the European Parliament /own parliament and the DAG
 – Other: please specify
 – Nothing should change
(tick the box, a maximum of three answers)
8. IMPACT OF DAGS
By ›impact‹, we mean the consequences of the DAG’s work.
Are you satisfied with the impact of the DAG?
 – Extremely satisfied
 – Somewhat satisfied
 – somewhat dissatisfied
 – Extremely dissatisfied
 – I don’t know
According to you, what has the DAG achieved so far? Multiple answers can be selected 
The DAG has…
 – …promoted sustainable development 
 – …guaranteed ratification of the agreement 
 – …built alliances with other civil society organisations 
 – …reduced opposition to the agreement
 – …had an impact on decision-making
 – …facilitated discussions with officials 
 – …criticised the sustainable development dimension of the agreement
 – …legitimised the agreement with the larger public
 – …facilitated the presentation of new ideas
 – …other: please specify
 – …achieved nothing
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Here you can clarify more specifically what the achievements or failures of the DAG have been:
(open answer)
Do the following factors affect the impact of the DAG in a positive or negative way?
 – Functioning of the DAG
 – Monitoring capacity of the DAG 
 – Interaction with DAG partner country / region /  EU DAG
 – Involvement of the DAG in annual transnational civil society meeting
 – Involvement of the DAG in annual transnational meeting with government
 – Instruments at DAG’s disposal to provide input to European Commission / own government
 – Follow-up by European Commission / own government on DAG’s input
 – Accountability of European Commission / own government
 – Accountability of government partner country / region / European Commission
 – DAG involvement in dispute settlement mechanism
 – Non-enforceable nature of the dispute settlement mechanism 
 – Other: please specify
Answer options: 
 – Extremely positive
 – Somewhat positive
 – Neither positive nor negative
 – Somewhat negative
 – Extremely negative
 – I don’t know
How could the DAG’s impact be improved? Please select up to three of your preferred changes:
 – Better functioning of the DAG
 – Better monitoring activities of the DAG 
 – More involvement of the DAG in annual transnational civil society meeting
 – More involvement of the DAG in annual transnational meeting with government 
 – Having a separate meeting between all the trade agreement’s DAGs and governments 
 – Better instruments at DAG’s disposal to give input to the European Commission / own government
 – Better follow-up by the European Commission / own government on DAG’s input
 – More accountability of the European Commission / own government
 – More accountability of the partner country / region /  European Commission
 – Increased involvement of the DAG in the dispute settlement mechanism
 – Ability of DAG to trigger dispute settlement mechanism
 – More assertive enforcement of current dispute settlement mechanism
 – Possibility to enforce sustainable development commitments through sanctions
 – Other: please specify
 – Nothing should change
(tick the box, a maximum of three answers)
9. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
Do you have any other recommendation(s) for the improvement of the DAG’s work other than the changes 
selected in the previous questions? (open answer)
In your opinion, would it be worth continuing your / your organisation’s participation in the DAG as it is 
currently functioning?
 – Yes, please specify
 – No, please specify
 – I don’t know
Do you have any additional comments or remarks related to the DAG that you would like to share?  
(open answer)
10. OUTRO
Thank you very much for completing the questionnaire!
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Since the EU–Korea trade agreement 
was signed in 2011, all chapters on 
trade and sustainable development 
(TSD) have established civil society 
mechanisms to monitor the commit-
ments made in this chapter: a do-
mestic advisory group (DAG) for each 
party and an annual transnational 
civil society meeting. 
This study focusses on DAGs, the most 
institutionalised and permanent civil 
society bodies under the TSD chapters 
of EU trade agreements. The objective 
is to conduct a comprehensive evalua-
tion of DAGs, identify their main chal-
lenges, distinguish teething problems 
arising from structural issues and put 
forward solutions to address them. 
Original data collection was carried out 
through a worldwide survey among 
DAG members, as well as interviews 
with EU and Non-EU DAG members.
Further information on the topic can be found here: 
www.fes.de/themenportal-die-welt-gerecht-gestalten/
weltwirtschaft-und-unternehmensverantwortung
Even though most DAGs have been es-
tablished according to the regulations 
in the TSD chapters, to date they have 
attained little political relevance. There 
are numerous reasons for this, starting 
with organisational issues, such as the 
frequency and timely notification of 
meetings, the support of a secretariat 
and funding. At a more substantive 
level, DAG members criticise a lack of 
genuine dialogue between DAGs and 
both governments and the European 
Commission, which constitutes an ac-
countability deficit. And besides the 
perceived neglect of DAGs and their 
work, DAG members view their limited 
political impact also as a result of miss-
ing instruments: there are still no tools 
for DAGs to start a dispute settlement 
mechanism.
To make better use of DAGs’ expertise 
and enable them to fulfil their assigned 
monitoring role, improvements should 
be made at various levels: ensure that 
regular meetings take place; provide 
sufficient resources for participation 
and the support of a secretariat; en-
sure independent and representative 
DAG membership; establish clear work 
programmes; invest in DAG-to-DAG 
relations; improve the process of devel-
oping joint statements; establish more 
interaction between DAGs and gov-
ernments: institutionalise relations be-
tween DAGs and parliaments; provide 
structural resources for conducting re-
search; establish feedback loops with 
governments and the European Com-
mission; and maximise enforceability of 
the TSD chapters. 
DOMESTIC ADVISORY GROUPS IN EU TRADE AGREEMENTS
Stuck at the Bottom or Moving up the Ladder?
